Mid-Continent Casualty Co. v. Blutone Enterprises, LLC , 422 F. App'x 671 ( 2011 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
April 19, 2011
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
MID-CONTINENT CASUALTY
COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 10-6165
(D.C. No. 5:09-CV-00354-W)
v. (W.D. Okla.)
BLUTONE ENTERPRISES, LLC;
RAY LAWRENCE; EUGENE
RADFORD,
Defendants-Appellants,
and
SCOTT TURNER, JOYCE TURNER,
MARY SUE HEITZ,
Defendants.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before LUCERO, ANDERSON, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
On October 10, 2008, a 2005 Dodge pickup truck owned and operated by
Blutone Enterprises, LLC, was involved in an accident resulting in personal injury
to three individuals. Thereafter, Mid-Continent Casualty Company brought this
diversity action against Blutone Enterprises, LLC, Ray Lawrence, and Eugene
Radford (collectively, “Blutone”), seeking a declaratory judgment that at the time
of the accident the truck was not covered by the commercial auto policy issued by
Mid-Continent to Blutone. 1 A jury returned a verdict for Mid-Continent, finding
defendants had “not established by the greater weight of the evidence that the
2005 Dodge pickup involved in the collision . . . was covered under the . . .
policy.” Aplt. App. at 325. Blutone appeals, contending the district court
erroneously excluded (1) an Insurance Identification Card, and (2) Proposed Jury
Instruction No. 16. 2 Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we
affirm.
1
Mid-Continent also named as defendants the three people injured in the
accident (Scott Turner, Joyce Turner, and Mary Sue Heitz), but they are not
parties to this appeal.
2
To the extent Blutone asserts on appeal that the jury was confused by the
district court’s preliminary statement and by Jury Instructions Nos. 3 and 8,
Blutone waived appellate review—other than for plain error, which we do not
here discern—by failing to object to the instructions in the district court. See
Williams v. W.D. Sports, N.M., Inc., 497 F.3d 1079, 1094 (10th Cir. 2007)
(“[W]hen a party does not object to an instruction before the district court . . . we
can review the district court’s decision . . . only for plain error. Under that
standard, we will affirm unless the instructions were patently, plainly erroneous
and prejudicial.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
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The parties are familiar with the facts so we provide only a brief summary.
It is undisputed in this case that “[o]nly vehicles on the policy at the time of an
accident are covered vehicles.” Aplt. App. at 59. It is also undisputed that the
2005 Dodge pickup truck was not listed as a covered vehicle at the time of the
accident, and that Blutone never received a bill or paid a premium for this
vehicle. Notwithstanding, Blutone maintains that its employee, Donna Lawrence,
asked Mid-Continent’s agent, Kristina Donaldson, to add the truck to the policy
during a forty-seven second telephone conversation on February 20, 2008. 3 Trial
testimony established that Blutone’s commercial auto policy allowed for Blutone
to add or delete a vehicle by notifying Mid-Continent’s agent, and that this was
routinely done without incident—until this case.
I.
Prior to trial, Mid-Continent filed a motion in limine explaining that
Blutone claimed it had an Insurance Identification Card in its file for the 2005
Dodge pickup, and that Blutone intends to argue that the Card shows it “requested
the 2005 Dodge to be added” to the policy “and that Mid-Continent did add [it].”
Id. at 20. Mid-Continent asserted that “[s]uch a claim is false, irrelevant to the
single issue [in the case], confusing, and prejudicial.” Id. In support,
Mid-Continent explained that the reason Blutone had a Card in its file was
3
Whether the information necessary to add a vehicle to a policy can be
exchanged in forty-seven seconds was a major issue of discussion at trial.
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because Mid-Continent’s agent had sent Blutone extra cards “[b]ecause when you
have a fleet card you can use it in any of your vehicles.” Id. at 21. In other
words, unlike a personal auto policy, a commercial auto policy’s identification
cards do not list an individual vehicle; rather, under “MAKE/MODEL” the cards
say “Fleet,” Aplee. Supp. App. at 3. Since the Insurance Identification Card does
not list an individual vehicle, reasoned Mid-Continent, it—and/or testimony about
it—is not relevant to proving or disproving whether Ms. Lawrence asked
Ms. Donaldson to add the 2005 Dodge pickup truck to the policy on February 20,
and is therefore inadmissable. In the alternative, Mid-Continent argued that any
evidence regarding the Card should be ruled inadmissible because it would be
confusing and prejudicial since the jury might believe that the Card lists the
individual vehicle the way an individual vehicle is listed on a personal auto
policy.
Blutone filed a response to Mid-Continent’s motion in limine, contending
that the Insurance Identification Card was generated to allow it to obtain title to
the 2005 Dodge pickup truck and thereby comply with Oklahoma law. Blutone
urged that the Card was relevant because “[i]t is evidence of whether . . .
[Blutone] thought it had insurance on the 2005 Dodge Pickup.” Aplt. App. at 33.
Blutone further argued that the Card evidenced “Mid-Continent’s manner of doing
business,” stating that Mid-Continent “can and should have to explain to the
Court and jury why the [Card] was produced and given to Blutone.” Id.
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After considering the parties’ filings and hearing argument on
Mid-Continent’s motion, the court stated:
Here is what I’m going to do. I will sustain the same ruling that I
previously made [4] with regard to the insurance verification form,
except that you [(counsel for Blutone)] will be given permission to
approach the bench if you think [the Insurance Identification Card]
becomes relevant, or if you think you can persuade the Court that it
becomes relevant by anything said or done by [counsel for
Mid-Continent], then you may approach the bench and we’ll have a
discussion with regard to what I will call a reserve ruling on the
motion in limine.
Id. at 83-4.
On appeal, Blutone takes issue with the district court’s exclusion of the
Insurance Identification Card and asserts that we should review the district
court’s exclusion of the Card for an abuse of discretion. Mid-Continent counters
that because the district court reserved ruling on the motion in limine, the proper
standard of review is the rigorous plain error standard. See Perkins v. Silver
Mountain Sports Club & Spa, LLC, 557 F.3d 1141, 1146-47 & n.4 (10th Cir.
2009). We need not engage in a standard of review inquiry, however, because
even applying the more lenient abuse-of-discretion standard we find no error.
Blutone submits that the district court abused its discretion because the
Insurance Identification Card is relevant and admissible under Federal Rules of
4
Earlier in the proceeding, the district court judge stated, “Let’s rule on the
motion[] in limine . . . . next is these insurance verification forms [(also known as
Insurance Identification Cards)]. I don’t see what part they play in this particular
lawsuit.” Aplt. App. at 75, 77.
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Evidence 401 and 402—it is “how Mid Continent chooses to allow its insureds to
prove they are in compliance with Oklahoma’s mandatory liability insurance
law,” and it “show[s] ownership and Blutone’s state of mind as to whether it
believed it was insured.” Aplt. Br. at 11. Blutone also directs our attention to the
jury’s two questions to the court during deliberations: “(1) Was the Truck
tag[g]ed; and (2) was it registered to Blutone.” Id. at 12 (citing Aplt. App. at 65).
Blutone argues that the jury “knew that a person cannot tag or register a vehicle
without showing proof of insurance,” which “is generally accomplished by
submitting an insurance verification form to the state.” Id. at 12. Therefore,
argues Blutone, “[t]he jurors were without the very piece of evidence that was at
the heart of their questioning,” and this relevant evidence’s probative value
outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice or confusion. Id. (citing Fed. R. Evid.
403). We disagree.
“[A] trial court has broad discretion to determine whether evidence is
relevant, and its decision will not be reversed on appeal absent a showing of clear
abuse of that discretion.” Hill v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields Inc., 790 F.2d 817,
825 (10th Cir. 1986). In this case, the Insurance Identification Card was
irrelevant to the single issue before the jury—whether Blutone’s Ms. Lawrence
asked Mid-Continent’s agent, Ms. Donaldson, to add the truck to the policy
during a forty-seven second telephone conversation on February 20, 2008. The
Card did not tend to prove or disprove this question because, among other things,
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it does not include a vehicle identification number, make, model, or year of a
vehicle; instead, it only says “Fleet,” Aplee. Supp. App. at 3. Accordingly, we
are not “firmly convinced that a mistake [was] made” by the district court. Hill,
790 F.2d at 826. Indeed, the court invited Blutone’s counsel “to approach the
bench if you think [the Insurance Identification Card] becomes relevant, or if you
think you can persuade the Court that it becomes relevant by anything said or
done by” counsel for Mid-Continent. Aplt. App. at 83-4. But Blutone did not
make any proffer on this issue at trial. We conclude that the district court’s
decision to exclude this evidence was not an abuse of discretion.
II.
Blutone next contends the district court abused its discretion in refusing to
give Blutone’s Proposed Jury Instruction No. 16, and that doing so caused
confusion amongst the jury members. In a diversity case such as this, “the
substance of a jury instruction is a matter of state law, but the grant or denial of a
tendered instruction is governed by federal law.” Blanke v. Alexander, 152 F.3d
1224, 1232 (10th Cir. 1998). Although we review the district court’s refusal to
give a particular instruction for an abuse of discretion, “[w]e review de novo
whether, as a whole, the district court’s jury instructions correctly stated the
governing law and provided the jury with an ample understanding of the issues
and applicable standards.” Martinez v. Caterpillar, Inc., 572 F.3d 1129, 1132
(10th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “We reverse only in those
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cases where we have a substantial doubt whether the jury was fairly guided in its
deliberations . . . .” Id. (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).
Proposed Jury Instruction No 16 stated, in pertinent part:
ACTIONS OF INSURANCE AGENT ARE ACTIONS OF
INSURER
Act performed by the insurance agent can bind the insurance
company within the scope of his authority, which includes the taking
and preparation of applications for insurance for submission to the
insurance company.
You should consider the actions of Messer-Bowers [(the
5
agent )] as those actions of Mid-Continent because Messer-Bowers[’]
actions in taking information and preparing applications falls with
the scope and authority of the agency of Messer-Bowers.
Aplt. App. at 48.
But, as Mid-Continent points out, the district court read the parties’
stipulations to the jury, which stated, in part:
The parties have agreed to the following facts:
(2) Messer Bowers Company, Inc., is Mid-Continent Casualty
Company’s agent. Notice to Messer-Bowers would be notice to
Mid-Continent Casualty Company. Likewise, failure to notify
Messer-Bowers would be failure to notify Mid-Continent Casualty
Company.
Id. at 59. Thus, counters Mid-Continent it would be confusing “for the jury to be
told the parties stipulated to the agency relationship but then be instructed that
5
Messer-Bowers is an agent of Mid-Continent, the insurer, as is
Ms. Donaldson in her capacity as a Messer-Bowers employee.
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agency was an issue to be decided,” Aplee. Br. at 11-12, especially when
“[f]actual stipulations withdraw a fact from issue and dispense with the need for
proof of the fact,” id. at 12 (citing Christian Legal Soc. Chapter of the Univ. of
Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2983 (2010)). We
agree with Mid-Continent. In deciding to exclude Proposed Jury Instruction
No. 16, the district court concluded that the stipulation adequately covered the
agency issue and that the instruction that Blutone proffered would be duplicative
of the stipulation. This determination was not an abuse of discretion and we do
not have any doubt that the jury “was fairly guided in its deliberations.”
Martinez, 572 F.3d at 1132 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
III.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Bobby R. Baldock
Circuit Judge
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