Mitchell v. City of Colorado Springs , 194 F. App'x 497 ( 2006 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
September 5, 2006
FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
SUSAN LOU ISE M ITCH ELL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 05-1480
(D.C. No. 05-cv-252-W DM -OES)
TH E CITY O F C OLO RA D O (D . Colo.)
SPR INGS, COLORADO, a municipal
corporation; the CO UN TY O F EL
PA SO , COLORADO, a municipal
corporation; the C OLO RA D O
SPRINGS DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S
OFFICE; BRUCE RAND in his
individual and official capacities;
DAVID A. GILBERT in his individual
and official capacities; G ILB ERT A.
M ARTINEZ in his individual and
official capacities; and D . PEA COCK,
in her individual and official
capacities,
Defendants-Appellees.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Before O’BRIEN, PO RFILIO, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Susan Louise M itchell appeals from a district court order
dismissing her complaint with prejudice because it fell short of the pleading
requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and because the court
concluded that her claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. W e
exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and affirm.
Background
From what we can divine from M itchell’s pleadings it appears that
som etim e betw een 2001 and 2003, she lost temporary custody of her two
grandchildren following a domestic dispute w ith Charles Rombough. Although it
appears that M itchell was criminally charged by the district attorney’s office in
Colorado Springs, it is unclear from her pleadings what she was charged with and
whether she was ever convicted of any crime. W hat is clear is that she believes
the state court proceedings were unfair and biased against her and in favor of
Rombough because he is a man and she is a woman.
On February 9, 2005, M itchell filed a pro se complaint in federal court
against the Office of the District Attorney for the Fourth Judicial District, the
City of Colorado Springs, the County of El Paso, and various other public offices
and officials that M itchell believes w ere involved in investigating the dispute
with Rombough or in the decision to remove her grandchildren from her home.
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The complaint was 43 pages long and contained 127 numbered paragraphs in
addition to numerous non-sequentially numbered footnotes. On February 24,
2005, she filed an amended complaint adding a dozen or so more defendants. The
amended complaint was 47 pages long and contained 134 numbered paragraphs in
addition to numerous footnotes. On M arch 1, 2005, a magistrate judge found
M itchell’s complaints to be “verbose, prolix and virtually impossible to
understand. . . . [A] rambling, massive collection of facts with no apparent
organizational scheme, and . . . completely lacking in clarity and intelligibility.”
R. at tab 10, at 3. Accordingly, he issued an order sua sponte striking M itchell’s
complaints for failing to comply with Rules 8(a) and 8(e)(1) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and directing M itchell to file an amended complaint that
complied with Rule 8. He warned M itchell that her case would be dismissed if
she filed another unintelligible pleading.
On April 22, 2005, after being granted an extension, M itchell filed her
second amended complaint. This complaint repeated the same jumble of
allegations contained in the first two complaints, but by single-spacing them,
M itchell managed to reduce the length of the complaint to 23 pages. Once again,
however, the magistrate judge found M itchell’s pleading to be in violation of
Rule 8. He summarized the problems with her second amended complaint as
follow s:
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[P]laintiff’s factual assertions remain rambling and incoherent. The
claims section, which [is] clearly delineated as containing eight
claims for relief, fail[s] to tie in the eleven and a half pages of
random factual allegations that [precede] it and separately either
contain[s] no apparent references to any factual bases relative to each
title or [consists of] conclusory allegations that may or may not be
relevant to the claim designated. Defendants are left with no notice –
and certainly no fair notice – of the claims against which they must
defend.
Id., tab 29 at 5. Even a liberal reading of M itchell’s second amended complaint,
the magistrate judge concluded, revealed no intelligible claims against any
particular defendant. He determined that the second amended complaint, like
M itchell’s prior two attempts, fell w oefully short of Rule 8’s requirements.
Furthermore, he found that even if properly asserted, M itchell’s claims, which
appeared to challenge the constitutionality of the state court proceedings, would
be barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 1 The magistrate judge therefore
issued a report pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) recommending dismissal of
M itchell’s second amended complaint w ith prejudice.
Over M itchell’s objection, the district court accepted the magistrate judge’s
recommendation by order dated October 19, 2005. The district court recognized
1
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which takes its names from two United
States Supreme Court cases (Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16
(1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482
(1983)) “prevents the lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases
brought by state-court losers challenging state-court judgments rendered before
the district court proceedings commenced.” Lance v. Dennis, 126 S. Ct. 1198,
1199 (2006) (quotations omitted).
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that dismissal was an extreme sanction, but found, based on the factors set forth
in Ehrenhaus v. Reynolds, 965 F.2d 916, 921 (10th Cir. 1992), that dismissal was
warranted in this case. 2 It also agreed with the magistrate judge that to the extent
any sense could be made of M itchell’s pleadings, her claims were barred under
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Therefore, the district court dismissed M itchell’s
claims with prejudice for her failure to comply with the court’s M arch 1, 2005,
order, her repeated violations of F.R.C.P. 8, and for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. This appeal followed.
Analysis
W e review for an abuse of discretion the district court’s
decision to impose the sanction of dismissal for failure to follow
court orders and rules. It is within a court’s discretion to dismiss a
case if, after considering all the relevant factors, it concludes that
dismissal alone would satisfy the interests of justice.
Gripe v. City of Enid, 312 F.3d 1184, 1188 (10th Cir. 2002) (citations and
quotation omitted).
Based on our careful review of the record, we conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing M itchell’s second amended
complaint with prejudice. The record reveals that the sanction of dismissal was
not imposed lightly and that the district court unquestionably considered the
2
The district court even considered two more complaints that M itchell
submitted after the magistrate judge’s recommendation, but found them to be no
more intelligible than her prior three attempts and still short of Rule 8’s
requirements.
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relevant factors before determining that no other sanction would serve the
interests of justice. M oreover, as this court has no more jurisdiction than the
district court to review the challenged state court proceedings, we have no choice
but to uphold the dismissal. Therefore, for the same reasons stated in the
magistrate judge’s April 29, 2005, report, which was fully adopted by the district
court in its October 19, 2005, order of dismissal, the judgment of the district court
is A FFIRME D.
Entered for the Court
John C. Porfilio
Circuit Judge
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