Le Velle v. Penske Logistics , 197 F. App'x 729 ( 2006 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
August 11, 2006
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
RAY LEVELLE,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 05-1216
v. (D.C. No. 02-F-2220 (PAC))
PENSK E LOGISTICS, a subsidiary of (D . Colo.)
Penske Truck Leasing Corporation,
Defendant - Appellant.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before M U RPH Y, B AL DOC K, and M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judges.
I. Introduction
Ray LeVelle sued his former employer, Penske Logistics (“Penske”), in the
United States District Court for the D istrict of C olorado. Among other claims,
LeVelle alleged Penske violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)
when it terminated his employment after learning he was w orking subject to
doctor-recommended lifting restrictions. The A DA claim proceeded to a jury
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
trial. LeVelle prevailed, and the jury awarded him compensatory damages, back-
pay, and punitive damages. The district court awarded LeVelle attorneys’ fees
and costs. Penske appeals from both the judgment and the court’s award of
attorneys’ fees. This court exercises jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
W e affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
II. Background
“W hen reviewing a jury verdict, we review the record in favor of the
prevailing party, and give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be
drawn from the evidence.” M iller v. Eby Realty Group LLC, 396 F.3d 1105, 1108
(10th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). Viewed in this light, the record reveals the
following. From 1996 to M arch 1999, and again from November 1999 to
February 2001, LeVelle w orked for Penske delivering and installing household
appliances such as refrigerators, washers, dryers, dishwashers, ranges, and cook
tops. LeV elle started out at Penske as a driver’s helper. Helpers were
responsible for the “grunt work” of preparing appliances for installation and
moving appliances from a delivery truck into customers’ homes using a dolly.
Later, LeVelle became a driver. Drivers assessed delivery logistics, assisted the
helper in moving appliances, disconnected old appliances, connected new
appliances, dealt w ith paperw ork, and interacted with customers.
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In M arch 2000, LeVelle slipped while delivering an appliance and injured
his back. After the injury, he filed a report at work and sought medical treatment
at the health-care provider Penske used in cases of employee injuries. LeV elle’s
physicians told him he could not return to work. As a consequence, LeVelle did
not work from M arch 16, 2000 until October 9, 2000. During this time, LeVelle
underw ent physical therapy and received workers’ compensation benefits.
In September 2000, Dr. Robert Kawasaki gave LeVelle an impairment
assessment and functional capacity evaluation. Dr. Kawasaki determined LeVelle
had reached maximum medical improvement, but noted LeVelle had “some
significant limitations regarding his work capabilities.” Dr. Kawasaki
recommended the follow ing work restrictions:
1. For all lifting below the shoulder level, I recommend a light
duty category with 40 pounds maximum occasionally, 20
pounds frequently, and 10 pounds constantly.
2. For lifting overhead I recommend 20 pounds maximum
occasionally, 10 pounds frequently, and 5 pounds constantly.
3. For push and pull, I recommend 80 pounds maximum
occasionally, 40 pounds frequently, and 20 pounds constantly.
4. The patient will need to alternate activities between sitting,
standing, and walking as needed for comfort.
App. at 693. Dr. Kawasaki also determined LeVelle had an impairment of eleven
percent of the whole person. 1
1
In December 2000, LeVelle underwent a separate medical examination,
performed by Dr. David Reinhard. Dr. Reinhard agreed with Dr. Kawasaki that
LeVelle had reached maximum medical improvement by September 2000 and
(continued...)
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In October 2000, LeVelle gave his medical reports, including the
recommended work restrictions, to Brett Carl, Penske’s logistics center manager
at the time. LeVelle testified he and Carl discussed the doctor-recommended
work restrictions, and LeVelle assured Carl he would be able to perform his job
as a driver. At the conclusion of the conversation, Carl told LeVelle he could
return to work at Penske. At first, Penske teamed LeVelle with an experienced
driver who evaluated LeVelle’s ability to perform the job. After a week or so,
Penske gave LeVelle his own truck and a helper, and he returned to his former
position as a driver. LeVelle worked as a driver for Penske for the next several
months without any problems, working approximately the same hours and making
approximately the same number of deliveries as other Penske drivers.
In December 2000, Penske asked LeVelle to install a set of appliances that
had already been delivered to a customer’s house. After arriving at the job site,
LeV elle and his helper discovered one of these appliances was a KSS refrigerator,
a large and heavy style of refrigerator. Installation of a KSS refrigerator required
a special type of dolly and at least one extra person. Because LeVelle did not
have the special dolly or the extra help, he did not install the refrigerator.
1
(...continued)
agreed with Dr. Kawasaki’s recommended work restrictions. Dr. Reinhard,
however, concluded LeVelle’s impairment rating was seventeen percent of the
whole person.
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LeVelle’s failure to install the KSS refrigerator was, in part, the subject of
a meeting between LeVelle and his supervisors in late January 2001. At the
meeting, LeVelle explained to his supervisors he could not install the appliance
because he did not have the correct dolly or the required number of people.
LeV elle also told his supervisors he w as still working subject to doctor-
recommended weight restrictions, and expressed to them his concern that
installing a KSS refrigerator without the special dolly and extra help might
adversely affect his back. LeVelle’s supervisors ended the meeting, and LeVelle
resumed his normal duties as a driver.
By the time of the meeting, Carolyn Jo W ard had replaced Brett Carl as
Penske’s logistics center manager. W ard testified that, until the meeting, she was
not aware LeV elle w as w orking subject to medical restrictions. She told the jury
that after the meeting with LeVelle, she looked through her files and asked other
Penske departments for information on LeVelle’s restrictions. Approximately one
week after the meeting, W ard obtained workers’ compensation and medical
records concerning LeVelle’s back injury and restrictions. W ard reviewed
LeVelle’s records and discussed his situation with Penske’s risk management
department. W ard told the jury she was concerned that if a driver who had
already suffered an on-the-job injury returned to work, he could re-injure himself.
On February 14, 2001, W ard called LeVelle into her office and told him he
could not work as a driver in light of the medical restrictions placed on him by his
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doctors. W ard assured LeVelle she w ould put him back on workers’
compensation, even though LeVelle told W ard he was no longer eligible to
receive workers’ compensation benefits. LeVelle testified he asked W ard whether
he could work at Penske in some other capacity. According to LeV elle, W ard
said she would talk to someone and let him know.
At trial, W ard testified she did not consider employing LeVelle in any
capacity other than as a driver and did not consider any alternative to terminating
LeVelle’s employment with Penske. Ward also told the jury she did not ask
anyone in her office or in the adjoining Penske division whether there was any
light-duty work available for LeVelle. She explained she knew the operation, and
there was no need to ask anyone else about available jobs. During her testimony,
W ard conceded there was a vacant transportation clerk position at the time
LeVelle was terminated, but noted she did not have approval to fill the position at
that time.
After W ard told LeVelle he could not work as a driver, LeVelle discovered
an adjoining Penske division was in need of a “retail” driver. LeVelle testified
retail drivers delivered cabinets from one loading dock to another and were not
subject to the same physical demands as drivers who installed appliances. The
manager of the adjoining Penske division offered LeVelle the retail driver job,
subject to approval from Penske’s human resources department. According to
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LeVelle, the manager later told him Penske’s human resources department would
not allow him to have the retail driver job.
On February 28, W ard gave LeVelle a letter informing him he was being
placed back on workers’ compensation. LeVelle insisted he was not eligible for
workers’ compensation and convinced W ard to look into the matter further. Ward
called LeVelle later that day and told him he was correct, she could not place him
back on workers’ compensation. W ard told LeVelle she had another letter for
him, and asked him to return the first letter she had given him.
LeVelle complied with W ard’s request, and W ard gave him the second
letter. The new letter terminated LeVelle’s employment at Penske, effective
M arch 1, 2001. W ard testified she terminated LeVelle because she believed his
doctor-recommended restrictions precluded him from doing the type of heavy-
duty work required of Penske drivers. She also stated she believed her decision
not to allow LeVelle to work as a driver was in the interest of LeVelle’s safety, as
well as the safety of other Penske employees.
The letter terminating LeVelle stated, “Due to no work being available at
this time, you are terminated effective immediately.” A pp. at 687. LeVelle told
the jury he inquired about the wording of the letter with Terry Cooley, who
worked in Penske’s human resources department. LeVelle explained to Cooley he
felt the letter was misleading when Penske had terminated LeVelle due to his
medical restrictions, not because there was no work available. Cooley told
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LeVelle the letter would work better for him as it was written. If the letter stated
LeV elle w as terminated because of his restrictions, Cooley said, it would interfere
with LeVelle’s ability to get another job by letting other employees know of his
restrictions.
After his termination, LeVelle filed suit against Penske. LeVelle alleged
Penske violated the ADA by terminating him because it regarded him as disabled.
LeVelle also brought claims for racial discrimination and wrongful termination.
The district court granted summary judgment to Penske on the racial
discrimination and wrongful termination claims. LeV elle’s A DA claim, however,
proceeded to a jury trial.
A t trial, LeV elle argued he was qualified for protection under the ADA
because the evidence showed Penske regarded him as having a disability. See 42
U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C). The jury agreed; it found LeV elle was a qualified
individual and Penske regarded LeVelle as disabled. LeVelle also contended
Penske violated the ADA because the evidence showed its termination of him was
motivated by its perception that he was disabled. Again, the jury agreed, finding
Penske intentionally discriminated against LeVelle because its perception of him
as disabled was a motivating factor in its decision to discharge him.
The jury awarded LeVelle compensatory damages in the amount of
$10,000.00, back-pay in the amount of $28,500.00, and punitive damages in the
amount of $50,000.00. LeVelle filed a M otion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs,
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seeking fees in the amount of $111,949.50, an enhancement totaling $32,628.84,
and $2533.74 in costs. Pursuant to Rules 50 and 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Penske moved the court to grant judgment as a matter of law or, in the
alternative, grant a new trial or amend the verdict. It also opposed in part
LeVelle’s motion for fees and costs. The district court denied Penske’s R ule
50/Rule59 motion, and awarded LeVelle $111,949.50 in fees and $2533.74 in
costs. Penske appeals from the district court’s denial of its post-trial motion. It
also appeals the district court’s award of attorneys’ fees and costs.
III. Analysis
A. LeVelle’s “Regarded As” Disabled Claim
Penske contends the district court erred in denying its motion for judgment
as a matter or law or for a new trial on the merits of LeVelle’s ADA claim. This
court reviews de novo a district court’s denial of a m otion for judgment as a
matter of law. Kelly v. M etallics W., Inc., 410 F.3d 670, 674 (10th Cir. 2005).
Judgment as a matter of law is “only proper w hen the evidence and all reasonable
inferences to be drawn therefrom are so clear that reasonable minds could not
differ on the conclusion.” Id. (quotation omitted). In other words, a court may
grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law “only if the evidence points but
one way and is susceptible to no reasonable inferences which may support the
opposing party’s position.” M iller v. Auto. Club of N.M ., Inc., 420 F.3d 1098,
1131 (10th Cir. 2005) (quotations omitted). In reviewing a district court’s denial
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of a motion for a judgment as a matter of law , “[w]e review all the evidence in
the record, construing it and any inferences therefrom in favor of the non-moving
party, and refraining from making credibility determinations and weighing
evidence.” Id. W e review a district court’s denial of a motion for a new trial for
abuse of discretion, viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party. Escue v. N. Okla. Coll., 450 F.3d 1146, 1156 (10th Cir. 2006).
“[E]ven if we do not necessarily agree with the jury’s verdict, it must be upheld
unless it is clearly, decidedly or overwhelmingly against the weight of the
evidence.” Id. at 1157 (quotation omitted).
“The ADA prohibits discrimination by covered entities, including private
employers, against qualified individuals with a disability.” Sutton v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 477 (1999). Under the ADA, a person with a disability
is defined, among other things, as an individual who is “regarded as having . . . an
impairment” which “substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of
such individual.” 2 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). “[T]o establish a disability under the
‘regarded as’ prong of the ADA with respect to the major life activity of working,
an individual must show [his] employer regarded him . . . as being substantially
2
The Supreme Court has observed an employee may fall within the
“regarded as” prong of the ADA’s definition in two ways: his employer can
believe he has a substantially limiting impairment that he does not actually have,
or his employer can believe his actual impairment is substantially limiting when
his impairment is not, in fact, substantially limiting. Sutton v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999).
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limited in performing either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various
classes.” Steele v. Thiokol Corp., 241 F.3d 1248, 1256 (10th Cir. 2001)
(quotation omitted). The employee also must show his employer’s misperceptions
were based on myths, fears, or stereotypes associated with disabilities. Doebele
v. Sprint/United M gmt. Co., 342 F.3d 1117, 1133 (10th Cir. 2003).
Penske contends the jury’s verdict on LeVelle’s ADA claim cannot stand
because LeVelle presented no evidence it regarded him as unable to perform a
class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes. Penske also asserts
LeVelle failed to present evidence to show its actions were based on speculation,
myth, or stereotype. Upon review of the record as a whole, w e cannot agree with
Penske’s argument.
(1) Regarded As Unable to Perform a Broad Range of Jobs
LeVelle presented evidence susceptible to reasonable inferences supporting
his position that Penske viewed him as unable to perform a broad variety of jobs.
According to W ard’s testimony, after she determined LeVelle could not work as a
driver, she did not consider him for any other positions with Penske because of
his restrictions. W ard told the jury there was a vacant transportation clerk
position at Penske at the time LeVelle was terminated, and she defined the vacant
job as a clerical position that did not involve heavy physical work. Although
W ard noted she lacked approval to have the transportation clerk position filled at
that time, she conceded she did not consider LeVelle for the job and admitted she
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received approval to fill the position shortly after LeVelle was terminated. The
foregoing evidence is susceptible to the reasonable inference Penske did not
consider LeVelle for the transportation clerk position because of his medical
restrictions.
After learning Penske would not allow him to continue working as a driver
delivering and installing appliances, LeVelle inquired of the manager of another
Penske division about getting a job delivering cabinets on a route that was largely
“retail.” LeVelle testified the retail route would have involved delivering
cabinets from one loading dock to another, and would not have required him to
install the cabinets. Although the cabinet delivery position would have required
LeVelle to move boxes w eighing up to 300 pounds w ithout a helper, LeVelle told
the jury he was physically capable of the job. LeVelle explained that by sliding a
dolly under an appliance, tilting it to a balanced position, and rolling the
appliance on the dolly, he could singlehandedly move heavy appliances without
lifting them. LeV elle told the jury he believed he did not exceed his doctor-
recommended restrictions when he used the dolly in this fashion. Penske’s human
resources department, however, did not allow LeVelle to be hired for the cabinet
delivery position. A jury could reasonably infer from LeVelle’s testimony that
the cabinet delivery position was not as physically demanding as the driver
position, that LeVelle could have performed the job without violating his medical
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restrictions, and that Penske nonetheless refused to consider LeVelle for the
position.
Upon terminating LeVelle, Penske gave him a letter stating he was laid off
because no work was available, not because he was subject to medical
restrictions. Cooley, the Penske human resources department employee, told
LeVelle he would be better off with the “no work available” letter and explained a
letter revealing the existence of LeV elle’s restrictions to potential future
employers w ould interfere with LeVelle’s ability to get another job. A jury could
reasonably infer from this testimony that Cooley believed disclosure of LeV elle’s
restrictions would interfere with LeVelle’s ability to get any other job, not just
another job involving heavy physical labor.
In short, evidence presented at trial permits the reasonable inference Penske
regarded LeVelle as being unable to perform a wide range of jobs. Therefore, a
jury could reasonably conclude Penske viewed LeVelle unable to perform a class
of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes.
(2) Action Based on M yths, Fears, or Stereotypes
The evidence presented at trial also permits the conclusion that Penske’s
actions were based upon myths, fears, or stereotypes about LeVelle’s perceived
disability, not upon his actual ability to work. Penske argues it acted reasonably,
basing its actions solely on the lifting, pulling, and pushing restrictions
recommended by LeVelle’s physicians. As discussed above, however, LeVelle
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presented evidence sufficient to permit the inference Penske refused to consider
LeVelle for jobs even when LeVelle’s doctor-recommended restrictions would not
have precluded him from performing those jobs. Based on this evidence, a jury
could reasonably infer Penske’s actions were based upon myths, fears, or
stereotypes about LeVelle’s perceived disability rather than an objective
evaluation of LeVelle’s actual abilities.
(3) Summary
After considering the record as a whole and drawing all reasonable
inferences in favor of LeVelle, we conclude a jury could reasonably infer Penske
considered LeVelle unable to perform a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in
various classes, and Penske based its actions on myths, fears, or stereotypes
instead of on LeVelle’s actual abilities. The evidence presented at trial was
therefore sufficient to permit the conclusion that Penske regarded LeVelle as
disabled for purposes of the ADA. Accordingly, Penske is not entitled to
judgment as a matter of law . For the same reasons, we conclude the district court
did not abuse its discretion when it denied Penske’s motion for a new trial.
B. Award of Punitive Damages
Penske contends the district court erred in denying its motion for judgment
as a matter of law or for a new trial on the issue of punitive damages. It claims
there is no evidence to support the jury’s award of punitive damages. This court
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reviews de novo whether there exists sufficient evidence to support an award of
punitive damages. Dilley v. SuperValu, Inc., 296 F.3d 958, 966 (10th Cir. 2002).
A court may award punitive damages to an ADA plaintiff when the plaintiff
demonstrates the defendant “engaged in a discriminatory practice or
discriminatory practices w ith malice or with reckless indifference to the federally
protected rights of an aggrieved individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1); see also
EEOC v. Wal-M art Stores, Inc., 187 F.3d 1241, 1244 (10th Cir. 1999). A
plaintiff seeking to meet this standard need not show “egregious or outrageous
discrimination independent of the employer’s state of mind.” Kolstad v. Am.
Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 535 (1999). He must, however, demonstrate the
employer “at least discriminate[d] in the face of a perceived risk that its actions
w[ould] violate federal law.” Id. at 536. To demonstrate he is entitled to punitive
damages, a plaintiff must meet a higher standard than that required to show he is
entitled to compensatory damages. Id. at 534. For that reason, “[t]here will be
circumstances where intentional discrimination does not give rise to punitive
damages liability.” Id. at 536.
LeVelle argues a jury could conclude Penske knew it was violating his
rights under the ADA because Cooley, who worked in Penske’s human resources
department, participated in LeVelle’s termination. LeVelle argues a jury could
infer that as a human resources employee, Cooley knew federal disability law and
thus was aware Penske’s decision to terminate LeVelle might violate the ADA.
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As LeVelle points out, this court has determined a jury could conclude an
employer discriminated in the face of a perceived risk that its action would
violate federal law when the discriminating employer’s agent testified he was
familiar w ith the ADA’s requirements when he suspended a disabled employee.
Wal-M art Stores, 187 F.3d at 1246. In the instant case, however, LeVelle did not
call Cooley as a witness, and the record is devoid of evidence indicating whether
Cooley was familiar with the requirements of the ADA. Cooley’s position in
Penske’s human resources department, standing alone, is not enough to support a
reasonable inference Penske terminated LeVelle in the face of a perceived risk its
actions would violate federal law.
LeVelle claims a number of other facts suggest Penske terminated him in
the face of a perceived risk it was violating the ADA. For example, he contends
Penske must have been aw are its actions risked violating the A DA because W ard
terminated him soon after she found out about his restrictions, without making
any effort to seek updated medical information or perform an individualized
assessment of his abilities. This evidence does not suggest Penske knew
terminating LeV elle risked violating the A DA and therefore does not support
LeVelle’s claim to punitive damages. LeVelle also argues Penske must have
known terminating him risked violating the law because W ard and Cooley gave
him a letter containing a false explanation for his termination. As noted above,
LeVelle presented no evidence to suggest Cooley was familiar with the
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requirements of the ADA. Similarly, W ard gave unrebutted testimony that she
had never received training in A DA compliance. Without any evidence to suggest
Cooley or W ard was familiar with the requirements of the ADA, the termination
letter they gave to LeVelle, standing alone, does not permit the reasonable
inference that Penske knew its actions risked violating the law . Finally, LeVelle
asserts Penske’s conduct in terminating him evidenced malicious disregard of his
federal rights. The record does not substantiate LeVelle’s claim, and we find
LeVelle’s argument unpersuasive.
After reviewing the record on appeal, we conclude LeVelle failed to present
evidence that would allow a jury to find Penske discriminated in the face of a
perceived risk its conduct would violate the A DA. Accordingly, the district court
erred when it denied Penske’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on the issue
of punitive damages.
C. Award of Attorneys’ Fees
Penske contends the district court’s award of attorneys’ fees to LeVelle was
excessive and must be substantially reduced. This court reviews a district court’s
award of attorneys’ fees for abuse of discretion, although the “legal analysis
underpinning the fee award is reviewed de novo.” Praseuth v. Rubbermaid, Inc.,
406 F.3d 1245, 1257 (10th Cir. 2005). W e conduct our review with knowledge
that “[t]he district court has an inherent advantage in passing on a fee request
given its familiarity with the proceedings below.” Id. “U nless district courts are
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specific in their reasons for awarding attorneys’ fees,” however, “we have no
adequate basis upon which to review such awards.” Wolfe ex. rel Joseph A. v.
N.M . Dep’t of Hum an Servs., 28 F.3d 1056, 1061 (10th Cir. 1994).
“A party who prevails on an ADA claim is permitted recovery of attorneys’
fees, costs and expenses.” Praseuth, 406 F.3d at 1257. As the prevailing party,
LeVelle requested attorneys’ fees in the amount of $111,949.50 and an
enhancement in the amount of $32,628.84. Penske conceded LeVelle was entitled
to attorneys’ fees, but argued the court should award him less than the amount he
requested. It argued LeVelle was not entitled to the full amount he claimed
because, inter alia, LeVelle did not prevail on his race discrimination and
wrongful discharge claims, he did not need two attorneys at trial, certain of his
expenditures were excessive, and he w as not entitled to any enhancement of fees.
The district court awarded LeVelle attorneys’ fees in the amount of
$111,949.50, which w as the exact lodestar amount presented by LeV elle. In
making its award, however, the district court indicated it reduced the lodestar and
added an enhancement in arriving at $111,949.50. The court stated its award was
based in part on an offset between a reduction in fees for limited
inefficiencies, some vague billing entries and the lack of success on
two of the plaintiff’s claims balanced against a limited enhancement
of allowable fees that is justified here. Implicit in the award is the
reasonableness of the hourly rates sought by plaintiff’s counsel.
LeVelle v. Penske Logistics, N o. 02-F-2220 (D. Colo. April 18, 2005) (Orders O n
Post-Trial M otions).
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On appeal, Penske claims the district court abused its discretion by
awarding excessive attorneys’ fees. W ithout a more particularized explanation of
the reductions and enhancements found by the district court, however, we cannot
determine whether the district court abused its discretion. See, e.g., Bartlett v.
M artin M arietta Operations Support, Inc. Life Ins. Plan, 38 F.3d 514, 519 (10th
Cir. 1994) (concluding the district court did not sufficiently explain its award of
attorney’s fees). This court therefore remands the district court’s order on
attorneys’ fees for more detailed findings. LeVelle’s motion for leave to file a
sur-reply is granted.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, this court affirms the district court’s denial of
Penske’s post-trial motion in part, vacates the district court’s award of punitive
damages, and remands for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
M ichael R. M urphy
Circuit Judge
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