United States v. Reed, Kevin , 238 F. App'x 177 ( 2007 )


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  •                       NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
    To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    Chicago, Illinois 60604
    Argued May 29, 2007
    Decided August 17, 2007
    Before
    Hon. William J. Bauer, Circuit Judge
    Hon. Diane P. Wood, Circuit Judge
    Hon. Ann Claire Williams, Circuit Judge
    Nos. 06-1884 and 06-2870
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                     Appeals from the United States District
    Plaintiff-Appellee,             Court for the Northern District
    of Illinois, Eastern Division.
    v.
    No. 02 CR 236
    KEVIN REED and ANTOINE HILL,
    Defendants-Appellants.              Elaine E. Bucklo,
    Judge.
    ORDER
    This is the second effort by Kevin Reed and Antoine Hill to obtain relief from their
    sentences for drug dealing. In their first appeal, we affirmed their convictions and
    remanded for re-sentencing in accordance with United States v. Paladino, 
    401 F.3d 471
    , 481 (7th Cir. 2005). At their re-sentencing, the defendants raised certain
    objections to the Guideline calculations for the first time. The district court
    determined that the “law of the case” prevented it from revisiting the Guideline
    determination and, after analyzing the § 3553(a) factors, sentenced Hill to 226 months’
    imprisonment and Reed to 300 months’ imprisonment. Defendants appeal their
    sentences, and we affirm.
    In December 2000, the FBI and the Joliet Police Department, together with
    several other agencies, conducted a narcotics investigation into a drug ring operating
    Nos. 06-1884 and 06-2870                                                          Page 2
    in Joliet, Illinois. As a result of the investigation, Reed and Hill were charged with,
    among other things, conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute
    in excess of five kilograms of cocaine and in excess of 50 grams of cocaine base. Reed,
    who was the central figure in the conspiracy, pleaded guilty to the conspiracy charge.
    Hill was convicted of conspiracy and two counts of using a telephone to facilitate the
    conspiracy but was acquitted of a substantive count of possession with the intent to
    distribute in excess of 500 grams of cocaine.
    In their first appeal, Hill and Reed raised several issues regarding their sentences.
    Hill claimed that his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was violated because his
    sentence was based, in part, upon facts found by the judge rather than the jury. Reed
    claimed that the district court improperly determined that the government’s proffer
    letter encompassed his entire cooperation agreement and the district court failed to
    remedy the prosecutor’s breached promise to seek a downward departure in his
    sentence in exchange for his cooperation. Their final challenge, that their sentences
    violated Booker, was successful. We remanded the case for re-sentencing in accordance
    with Paladino.
    At their re-sentencing, Hill and Reed asserted new challenges to their sentences by
    claiming that the district court improperly calculated their criminal history categories.
    Hill also claimed that the district court improperly calculated his offense level. The
    district court rejected defendants’ arguments, determining that the “law of the case”
    prevented it from recalculating the Guideline range. Defendants timely filed this
    appeal. Reed’s attorney has moved to withdraw under Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    , 
    87 S. Ct. 1396
    , 
    18 L. Ed. 2d 493
     (1967), because he cannot discern any
    nonfrivolous ground for appeal. We invited Reed to respond to counsel’s motion, see
    Cir. R. 51(b), and he has done so. Thus, in regard to Reed, we confine our review of the
    record to the potential issues raised in Reed’s attorney’s facially-adequate brief and
    Reed’s Rule 51(b) response.
    We review de novo whether an issue is the law of the case. See Moore v. Anderson,
    
    222 F.3d 280
    , 283 (7th Cir. 2000). The law-of-the-case doctrine requires a district court
    to confine its discussion to the issues remanded, and bars the district court from
    addressing issues that could have been raised on appeal. See United States v. Morris,
    
    259 F.3d 894
    , 898 (7th Cir. 2001). “[A]ny issue conclusively decided by this court on
    the first appeal is not remanded.” United States v. Husband, 
    312 F.3d 247
    , 251 (7th
    Cir. 2002). Additionally, the court’s silence on an issue implies that it is not available
    for consideration on remand. 
    Id.
    In their original appeal, Hill and Reed failed to challenge the individual sentencing
    calculations made by the district court. The law of the case prevented them from
    raising these new issues at their re-sentencing because they were outside the scope of
    the remand. See United States v. Buckley, 
    251 F.3d 668
     (7th Cir. 2001) (rejecting
    Nos. 06-1884 and 06-2870                                                         Page 3
    defendant’s argument that the district court erred by refusing to consider at sentencing
    argument on remand which was not raised in the initial appeal), United States v.
    Sumner, 
    325 F.3d 884
     (7th Cir. 2003) (same). The district court properly found that
    it could not reevaluate the new issues.
    For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.