Indera Mortley v. US Attorney General , 238 F. App'x 465 ( 2007 )


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  •                                                         [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT                    FILED
    ________________________         U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    June 19, 2007
    No. 06-16453                     THOMAS K. KAHN
    Non-Argument Calendar                    CLERK
    ________________________
    BIA Nos. A97-851-788 & A97-851-789
    INDERA MORTLEY,
    CHRISTAL NERESSA WILLIAMS,
    CHRISTOPHER CYRIL WILLIAMS,
    CHARLES WESLEY WILLIAMS,
    Petitioners,
    versus
    U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent.
    ________________________
    Petition for Review of a Decision of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    _________________________
    (June 19, 2007)
    Before ANDERSON, BARKETT and HULL, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Indera Mortley, Charles Wesley Williams, and their two children
    (collectively “petitioners”) petition for review of the final order of the Board of
    Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), which adopted and affirmed the Immigration
    Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of their application for asylum and withholding of removal
    under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) and relief under the United
    Nations Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). After review, we deny the petition
    for review.
    I. BACKGROUND
    Petitioners, natives and citizens of Guyana, were admitted to the United
    States in the summer of 2003 on nonimmigrant visas. The petitioners remained in
    the United States longer than permitted. Upon arriving in the United States, the
    petitioners filed timely applications for asylum, withholding of removal and CAT
    relief. Petitioners claimed that they were persecuted in Guyana based on their
    ethnicity and political opinion. In February 2004, the Department of Homeland
    Security issued notices to appear, charging the petitioners with removability under
    INA §§ 237(a)(1)(B) and 101(a)(15), which they conceded.1
    Mortley is of Indian ancestry, and Williams is black. According to
    petitioners, they experienced problems in Guyana living together as a mixed-race
    1
    Mortley and Williams filed separate asylum applications. Mortley’s asylum application
    listed her two children as derivative applicants. The IJ consolidated Mortley’s and Williams’s
    proceedings.
    2
    couple and having children because of longstanding tension between Guyana’s two
    primary ethnic groups. The ethnic divide in Guyana is also political; the two major
    political parties in Guyana are the PPP (formed largely by Indo-Guyanese) and the
    PNC (formed by Afro-Guyanese).
    According to petitioners’ asylum applications and hearing testimony,
    Williams was a successful businessman in Guyana who was a regular contributor
    to and supporter of the PNC. However, after Williams met Mortley, he began to
    give money to the PPP as well. Mortley and Williams received approximately
    fifteen threatening telephone calls over a seventeen-month period between
    February 2002 and June 2003, when they left Guyana. The anonymous callers
    demanded money and threatened to kill Mortley and kidnap their daughter because
    Williams was living with an Indian woman. The callers never identified
    themselves and never said they were members of the PNC. However, Mortley and
    Williams believed the callers were members of the PNC because they accused
    Williams of “turn[ing] your back on us” and “not supporting us anymore.”
    On one occasion, Mortley was on her way to pick up her daughter at school
    when her driver noticed a car following them. The car continued to follow them
    after they picked up the daughter, but turned on to another street when they
    stopped to tell the police what was happening. On another occasion, Mortley heard
    someone calling at their front gate one evening while her husband was out of town.
    3
    Mortley did not go outside because the person did not call her by name. Mortley
    heard gunshots and, when she eventually went outside, she discovered the dead
    body of a stranger in the road in front of her house. Two days later, a caller told
    Williams that “they” had left the dead man in front of his house and that “they”
    were going to get Williams’s daughter.
    Williams and Mortley repeatedly went to the police, but got no help.
    Although Williams and Mortley took the threats seriously, they never paid the
    money the callers demanded. Neither Williams nor Mortley ever had a face-to-
    face confrontation with the callers, and the callers never carried out any of their
    threats.
    The IJ denied petitioners all relief and ordered them removed to Guyana. In
    his oral decision, the IJ noted inconsistencies between the hearing testimony and
    earlier asylum interviews of Mortley and Williams, suggesting that these
    inconsistencies “hurt their credibility.” However, the IJ concluded that, even
    assuming the credibility of Mortley and Williams, petitioners still failed to
    demonstrate past persecution.2 The IJ concluded that Mortley and Williams “were
    being subject[ed] to extortion” and that there was “no indication that the
    persecutors here [were] motivated by race, or by ethnicity.” The IJ further
    2
    Because the IJ did not make a clean credibility determination, we assume for purposes of
    this petition for review that the IJ’s credibility finding was not dispositive. See Yang v. U.S.
    Att’y Gen., 
    418 F.3d 1198
    , 1201 (11th Cir. 2005).
    4
    concluded that petitioners failed to show a well-founded fear of future persecution
    if they returned to Guyana or that they were eligible for CAT relief.
    Petitioners appealed to the BIA, which adopted and affirmed the IJ’s
    decision. The BIA concluded that the IJ’s adverse credibility finding was not
    clearly erroneous, that extortionate threats did not constitute persecution and that,
    at any rate, “any harm suffered does not rise to the level of persecution.” This
    petition for review followed.
    II. DISCUSSION
    Petitioners argue that the BIA and IJ erred in finding that they are statutorily
    ineligible for asylum.3 Specifically, Petitioners contend that they established past
    persecution based on their ethnicity and imputed political opinion.4
    An alien is entitled to asylum if he or she can establish, with specific and
    3
    When the BIA issues a decision, we review only that decision, except to the extent that
    the BIA expressly adopts the IJ’s decision. See Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 
    257 F.3d 1262
    , 1284 (11th
    Cir. 2001). Here, because the BIA expressly adopted the IJ’s decision in addition to making
    findings of its own, we review both the IJ’s decision and the BIA’s findings. See 
    id.
    “A factual determination by the BIA that an alien is statutorily ineligible for asylum or
    withholding is reviewed under the substantial evidence test.” 
    Id. at 1283
    . Under this test, we
    “must affirm the BIA’s decision if it is supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative
    evidence on the record considered as a whole.” 
    Id. at 1284
     (quotation marks omitted). The
    substantial evidence test is “highly deferential,” 
    id.,
     and to “reverse the IJ’s fact findings, we
    must find that the record not only supports reversal, but compels it.” Mendoza v. U.S. Att’y
    Gen., 
    327 F.3d 1283
    , 1287 (11th Cir. 2003).
    4
    Petitioners argue only that they are eligible for asylum based on past persecution. They
    do not challenge the findings that they are ineligible for asylum based on a well-founded fear of
    future persecution and that they are ineligible for withholding of removal and CAT relief.
    Therefore, we do not address these claims further. See Mendoza, 
    327 F.3d at
    1286 n.3.
    5
    credible evidence, that he or she suffered past persecution on account of his or her
    race, political opinion, or other statutorily listed factor. See 
    8 C.F.R. § 208.13
    (a)-
    (b); Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 
    257 F.3d 1262
    , 1287 (11th Cir. 2001). Although the
    INA does not expressly define the term “persecution,” we have stated that
    “persecution is an extreme concept, requiring more than a few isolated incidents of
    verbal harassment or intimidation.” Sepulveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    401 F.3d 1226
    ,
    1231 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation marks omitted). We have held that menacing
    telephone calls and threats do not rise to the level of persecution. See 
    id.
    Here, Williams and Mortley testified that they were persecuted because: (1)
    they received approximately fifteen telephone calls in which anonymous callers
    demanded money and threatened to kidnap their daughter and kill Mortley;
    (2) someone followed Mortley’s car while she was picking up her daughter from
    school; and (3) an unknown man was killed outside their house and afterward a
    caller who claimed responsibility threatened Williams and his daughter. The
    threatening phone calls and acts of intimidation to which petitioners were subjected
    do not rise to the level of persecution. See 
    id.
     Accordingly, the BIA’s denial of
    asylum is supported by substantial evidence.5
    PETITION DENIED.
    5
    Because substantial evidence supports this basis for denying petitioners asylum, we do
    not address the petitioners’ remaining argument that the IJ erred in finding that they failed to
    show a nexus between the alleged persecution and their ethnicity or political opinion.
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 06-16453

Citation Numbers: 238 F. App'x 465

Judges: Anderson, Barkett, Hull, Per Curiam

Filed Date: 6/19/2007

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/2/2023