United States v. Christensen , 240 F. App'x 280 ( 2007 )


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  •                                                                        F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
    July 19, 2007
    FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT                Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    No. 06-4277
    v.                                           (D.C. No. 2:04-CR -40-DS)
    (D. Utah)
    D IA N E C . C HR ISTEN SEN ,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
    Before T YM KOV IC H, EBEL, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
    Defendant Diane C. Christensen pleaded guilty to conspiracy to impede,
    impair, obstruct, and defeat the lawful government functions of the Internal
    Revenue Service in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 371
    . Her plea agreement states that
    she “knowingly, voluntarily and expressly waive[s] [her] right to appeal any
    sentence imposed . . . and the manner in which the sentence is determined, on any
    *
    This panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not
    materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2);
    10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral
    argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
    however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and
    10th Cir. R. 32.1.
    of the grounds set forth in [
    18 U.S.C. § 3742
    ] or on any ground whatever, except
    . . . [for] (1) a sentence above the maximum penalty provided in the statutes of
    conviction as set forth in [the plea agreement]; and (2) a sentence above the high-
    end of the guideline range as determined by the district court at
    sentencing . . . .” M otion to Enforce, Attachment A (Plea Agreement) at 3. The
    district court determined a guideline range of 41 to 51 months and imposed a
    sentence of 41 months, well within the five-year statutory maximum recited in the
    plea agreement and at the low-end of the guideline range. Nonetheless, defendant
    appealed. The government has now moved to enforce defendant’s appeal waiver
    under United States v. Hahn, 
    359 F.3d 1315
     (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc). W e grant
    the motion and dismiss the appeal.
    Under Hahn, we consider “(1) whether the disputed appeal falls within the
    scope of the waiver of appellate rights; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and
    voluntarily waived his appellate rights; and (3) whether enforcing the waiver
    would result in a miscarriage of justice.” 
    Id. at 1325
    . Defendant contends that
    her appeal does not fall within the terms of the appeal waiver she accepted, and
    that her waiver of appeal rights was not knowingly and voluntarily entered
    because she did not waive the right to appeal an illegal sentence. She claims that
    her sentence is illegal under Blakely v. Washington, 
    542 U.S. 296
     (2004), and
    United States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
     (2005), because the district court may have
    enhanced her sentence based on facts not found by a jury.
    -2-
    Defendant’s argument is patently without merit. A sentence is illegal if it
    “is ambiguous w ith respect to the time and manner in which it is to be served, is
    internally contradictory, omits a term required to be imposed by statute, is
    uncertain as to the substance of the sentence, or is a sentence which the judgment
    of conviction did not authorize.” United States v. Dougherty, 
    106 F.3d 1514
    ,
    1515 (10th Cir. 1997) (quotation omitted); see also United States v.
    Gonzalez-H uerta, 
    403 F.3d 727
    , 739 n.10 (10th Cir.) (holding term “illegal
    sentence” is reserved for instances where sentence exceeds statutory maximum),
    cert. denied, 
    126 S.Ct. 495
     (2005). Defendant does not argue, nor do any of the
    materials submitted to us suggest, that her sentence is deficient in any such
    fundamental respect.
    M oreover, as noted, defendant expressly agreed to waive her right to appeal
    “the manner in w hich the sentence is determined, . . . , except . . . [for] (1) a
    sentence above the maximum penalty provided in the statute of conviction . . . ,
    and (2) a sentence above the high-end of the guideline range as determined by the
    district court at sentencing.” Plea Agreement at 3. Defendant’s sentence is
    within the statutory maximum and at the low-end of the guideline range. The plea
    colloquy demonstrates that defendant knowingly and voluntarily agreed to this
    appeal waiver. Thus, the sentence imposed complies with the terms of the plea
    agreement and the understanding expressed by the defendant at the plea hearing.
    -3-
    Defendant has not demonstrated that her appeal falls outside the scope of waiver
    or that she did not knowingly and voluntarily agree to the appeal waiver.
    Accordingly, the government’s motion to enforce the waiver is GR AN TED
    and the appeal is DISM ISSED. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
    ENTERED FOR THE COURT
    PER CURIAM
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 06-4277

Citation Numbers: 240 F. App'x 280

Judges: Ebel, Gorsuch, Per Curiam, Tymkovich

Filed Date: 7/19/2007

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/3/2023