Custinger v. City of Derby , 591 F. App'x 689 ( 2015 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
TENTH CIRCUIT February 4, 2015
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
BENJAMIN CUSTINGER
Plaintiff – Appellant,
No. 14-3196
v. (D.C. No. 6:14-CV-01123-EFM-KMH)
CITY OF DERBY, KANSAS (D. Kan.)
Defendant – Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before LUCERO, TYMKOVICH, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
The district court granted the City of Derby’s (“the City”) motion to dismiss
Benjamin Custinger’s pro se complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Custinger appeals this
decision, arguing that the district court used false reasoning and failed to adequately
consider the denial of his constitutional rights. Although Custinger did not provide a
specific legal basis in support of his claim, he generally alleges that the City violated his
constitutional rights. We therefore consider his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Hall v.
*
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This case is therefore ordered
submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent
except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may
be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 32.1 and Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1.
Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991) (“[I]f a court can reasonably read the [pro
se] pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so
despite the plaintiff’s failure to cite proper legal authority . . . .”).
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Custinger alleges that, after being booked and released from a jail in the City of
Derby, he took a taxi back to his apartment. As the jail had kept his belongings, Custinger
arranged to pay the taxi fare the next morning.
The following morning, an unidentified Derby police officer’s loud knock awakened
him. Before Custinger could get up to answer the door, the police officer entered the
apartment, drew his gun, and repeatedly yelled Custinger’s name. Custinger got out of
bed and went to speak with the officer. Upon seeing Custinger, the officer lowered his
weapon and told Custinger the taxi driver was outside waiting for the fare money. Once
Custinger paid the fare, the officer and taxi driver left.
On April 28, 2014, Custinger filed this action against the City. He asserted that the
officer’s actions violated his constitutional rights. Custinger later attached as exhibits to
his Complaint filings from two earlier unrelated cases (from Derby Municipal Court and
Sedgwick County District Court), claiming that these cases were further instances in
which his rights were violated.
The City moved to dismiss Custinger’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. The district court granted this motion. Custinger now
appeals.
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II. The Motion to Dismiss
“We review de novo the district court's granting of a motion to dismiss under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Slater v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 719 F.3d 1190,
1196 (10th Cir. 2013). Because Custinger is pro se, we afford his pleadings a liberal
construction. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972); Hall v. Bellmon, 935
F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
Having reviewed Custinger’s brief, we conclude that the district court correctly
granted the City’s motion to dismiss. Although a municipality can be sued under § 1983,
it cannot be held liable “solely because it employs a tortfeasor.” Monnell v. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Rather, a municipality can only be liable under § 1983
if its unconstitutional policy or custom caused the plaintiff’s constitutional deprivation.
See id. at 690, 694. A plaintiff such as Custinger can prove that such a policy of custom
exists through evidence of (1) formal regulations; (2) widespread practice so permanent it
constitutes a custom; (3) decisions made by employees with final policymaking authority
that are relied upon by subordinates; or (4) a failure to train or supervise employees that
results from a deliberate indifference to the injuries caused. See Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin
Peaks Charter Academy, 602 F.3d 1175, 1188–89 (10th Cir. 2010).
Custinger has failed to allege facts sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. As noted
above, to do so his Complaint would need to allege facts sufficient for us to reasonably
infer “1) the existence of a municipal policy or custom and 2) a direct causal link between
the policy or custom and the injury alleged.” Graves v. Thomas, 450 F.3d 1215, 1218
(10th Cir. 2006). Even giving his pleadings the liberal reading they are due, we cannot
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reasonably make these inferences. Although Custinger’s allegations may state a plausible
§ 1983 claim against the officer in his individual capacity, Custinger has never asserted
that the officer’s actions resulted from any policy or custom of the City. Absent such an
allegation, he cannot obtain relief against the City under § 1983. We therefore affirm the
district court’s grant of the City’s motion to dismiss.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Gregory A. Phillips
Circuit Judge
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