Brooks v. Hanson ( 2019 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT February 19, 2019
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
JASON BROOKS,
Petitioner - Appellant,
No. 18-1489
v. (D.C. No. 1:18-CV-02666-LTB)
(D. Colo.)
MATTHEW HANSON, Warden of the
Sterling Correctional Facility; PHIL
WEISER, Colorado Attorney General,
Respondents - Appellees.
_________________________________
ORDER DENYING A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY**
_________________________________
Before CARSON, BALDOCK, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Petitioner Jason Brooks, a Colorado state prisoner appearing pro se, seeks a
certificate of appealability (“COA”) to appeal the district court’s dismissal of his 28

Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2), Phil Weiser is substituted for Cynthia
Coffman as the respondent in this case.
**
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order is not binding precedent, except
under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be
cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and
10th Cir. R. 32.1.
U.S.C. § 2241 habeas application. He also seeks to proceed in forma pauperis. We
deny a COA, deny his motion to proceed in forma pauperis, and dismiss this matter.
I.
In 2010, Brooks pleaded guilty to four counts of securities fraud. In addition
to 32 years’ imprisonment, the Colorado state court ordered Brooks to pay
$ 5,132,352.46 in restitution. In 2015, a state court clerk informed Brooks that his
restitution order was subject to a monthly interest charge under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-
1.3-603(4). Since receiving that notice, Brooks has filed multiple habeas petitions,
including a § 2254 petition challenging the restitution portion of his Colorado state
court sentence.
Brooks’ current § 2241 petition is no different. He maintains that the state
court’s application of § 18-1.3-603(4) denied him due process because it is not clear
when or how interest attaches to the restitution amount. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-
1.3-603(4)(b)(l).
The district court dismissed Brooks’ § 2241 habeas application for lack of
jurisdiction, concluding that Brooks did not satisfy the statutory requirements to
challenge the restitution order. The district court further determined that even
liberally construing Brooks’ claim as a challenge to his sentence pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2254, the district court lacked jurisdiction over a second or successive
claim absent this court’s approval. Brooks filed a timely motion to reconsider. The
district court construed that motion as a motion to alter or amend the judgement
2
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). The district court denied the Rule 59(e)
motion for lack of jurisdiction for the same reason it dismissed Brooks’ § 2241
habeas application.
II.
Habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is only warranted if the petitioner
“is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). The “in custody” language of § 2241 is
jurisdictional. See Hensley v. Mun. Court, 411 U.S. 345, 353 n.10 (1973)
(explaining that a finding of no custody “would not merely have postponed the
exercise of habeas corpus jurisdiction, but have barred it altogether”). Custody
“encompasses not only individuals subject to immediate physical imprisonment, but
also those subject to restraints not shared by the public generally that significantly
confine and restrain freedom.” Mays v. Dinwiddie, 580 F.3d 1136, 1139 (10th Cir.
2009).1 An order to pay “restitution or a fine, absent more, is not the sort of
significant restraint on liberty contemplated in the custody requirement of the federal
habeas statutes.” Id. (citing Erlandson v. Northglenn Mun. Court, 528 F.3d 785, 788
(10th Cir. 2008)).
1
Mays discussed the “in custody” requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The
Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, however, may be applied to habeas-corpus
actions filed under § 2241. See Rule 1(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.
3
The district court correctly concluded that Brooks is not in custody with
respect to his claim challenging the restitution order. Brooks’ challenge to the
restitution order only affects the amount of restitution owed. His claim has no impact
on his obligation to serve the remainder of his sentence. Because Brooks’ habeas
application challenges the restitution order only, it does not seek to remedy any
“severe restraints [to his] individual liberty.” Hensley, 411 U.S. at 351; see also
Mays, 580 F.3d at 1139 (holding that monetary obligations, without more, are not
enough to satisfy the custody requirement of federal habeas statutes). Thus, the
district court correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over this action. See also
Bailey v. Hill, 599 F.3d 976, 981 (9th Cir. 2010) (concluding that being “in physical
custody while attacking [a] restitution order is insufficient to confer jurisdiction”
over a habeas petition because “the elimination or alteration of a money judgment,
does not directly impact—and is not directed at the source of the restraint on—his
liberty”); Washington v. Smith, 564 F.3d 1350, 1351 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that an
incarcerated prisoner’s claim challenging only the calculation of restitution is not a
cognizable claim for federal habeas relief).
In his application to this court for a COA, Brooks advances a theory that he
did not raise in his initial § 2241 habeas application to the district court.2 He argues
that the Colorado statute is analogous to the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”)
2
Brooks’ § 2241 application is not an unauthorized second or successive claim with
respect to his previous § 2254 application. See Zayas v. I.N.S., 311 F.3d 247, 256
(3d Cir. 2002) (“[T]he gatekeeping regime of § 2244(b) is inapplicable to a
‘second or successive’ § 2241 habeas petition.”); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b).
4
Inmate Financial Responsibility Program (“IFRP”). 28 C.F.R. § 545.11. A number
of circuits, including ours, have observed that challenges to the IFRP attack the
execution of the petitioner’s sentence and are properly raised in a § 2241 petition.
E.g., Davis v. Wiley, 260 F. App’x 66, 68 (10th Cir. 2008); Ihmoud v. Jett, 272 F.
App’x 525, 526 (7th Cir. 2008); Ridley v. Smith, 179 F. App’x 109, 110–11 (3d Cir.
2006). We consider arguments not raised in an initial habeas application and
presented initially to the district court forfeited. See United States v. Moya, 676 F.3d
1211, 1213 (10th Cir. 2012). Further, Brooks does not request that we review this
argument for plain error. Thus, we deny his request for a COA on this forfeited
argument. Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc., 634 F.3d 1123, 1131 (10th Cir. 2011)
(“[T]he failure to argue for plain error and its application on appeal . . . surely marks
the end of the road for an argument for reversal not first presented to the district
court.”).
III.
No reasonable jurist could debate the district court’s dismissal. See Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Therefore, we deny Brooks’ application for a
COA and dismiss his appeal.
5
We deny Brooks’ request to proceed in forma pauperis.3
Entered for the Court
Joel M Carson III
Circuit Judge
3
Given the multiple habeas petitions Brooks filed challenging the restitution
order, we conclude that Brooks’ appeal lacked good faith. See Coppedge v. United
States, 369 U.S. 438, 444 (1962). Accordingly, we deny his request for in forma
pauperis status.
6