United States v. Heags , 388 F. App'x 765 ( 2010 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
July 21, 2010
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 09-3383
v. (D.C. No. 2:07-CR-20168-JWL-8)
(D. Kan.)
JAMES HEAGS,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before MURPHY, TYMKOVICH, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
This matter is before the court on the government’s motion to enforce the
appeal waiver contained in defendant James Heags’s plea agreement. The
defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute or possess with intent to
distribute more than 50 grams of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.
The district court sentenced defendant to a total of 235 months’ imprisonment.
*
This panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not
materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2);
10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral
argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and
10th Cir. R. 32.1.
This sentence was below the statutory maximum of life imprisonment and at the
low end of the 235 to 293 month advisory guideline range determined by the
district court. In his plea agreement, the defendant “knowingly and voluntarily
waive[d] any right to appeal or collaterally attack any matter in connection with
[his] prosecution, conviction and sentence.” Mot. to Enforce, attached Plea
Agreement at 6. As to his sentence, the defendant expressly agreed to waive “any
right to appeal a sentence imposed which is within the guideline range determined
appropriate by the court.” Id. Nevertheless, the defendant filed a notice of
appeal, seeking to challenge his sentence. The government has moved to enforce
the appeal waiver under United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315 (10th Cir. 2004)
(en banc) (per curiam). We grant the government’s motion and dismiss the
appeal.
In Hahn, this court held that “in reviewing appeals brought after a
defendant has entered into an appeal waiver,” this court will determine “(1)
whether the disputed appeal falls within the scope of the waiver of appellate
rights; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his appellate
rights; and (3) whether enforcing the waiver would result in a miscarriage of
justice.” 359 F.3d at 1325. A miscarriage of justice will result if (1) “the district
court relied on an impermissible factor such as race”; (2) “ineffective assistance
of counsel in connection with the negotiation of the waiver renders the waiver
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invalid”; (3) “the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum”; or (4) “the waiver is
otherwise unlawful.” Id. at 1327 (quotations omitted).
The defendant intends to claim on appeal that the district court erred in
denying his motion for a variance and in overruling his objections to the
presentence report (PSR). The defendant admits that his appeal falls within the
scope of his appeal waiver. He asserts that his appeal waiver was not knowingly
and voluntarily entered and that it would be a miscarriage of justice to enforce it
because “one of his issues on appeal is whether the court erred in considering
relevant conduct that he did not know would be used to calculate the Guidelines
sentence imposed.” Response at 9. We have repeatedly held, however, that
appellate waivers are enforceable even though a defendant did not know exactly
how the waiver might apply. See Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1326 (rejecting the argument
that “a defendant can never knowingly and voluntarily waive his appellate rights
because he cannot possibly know in advance what errors a district court might
make in the process of arriving at an appropriate sentence”); United States v.
Montano, 472 F.3d 1202, 1205 (10th Cir. 2007) (rejecting argument that an
appeal waiver is unenforceable when a defendant does not know what the
sentencing range will be when entering the plea agreement). Looking at the
language of the plea agreement and the plea colloquy, it is clear that the
defendant was advised of the consequences of his appeal waiver, as he concedes.
Response at 10. He repeatedly told the court that he understood those
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consequences and was knowingly and voluntarily agreeing to the appeal waiver,
Mot. to Enforce, attached Tr. of Plea Hearing, at 21-23. Thus, the defendant has
failed to establish that he did not knowingly and voluntarily agree to his appeal
waiver. Further, we have held that alleged sentencing errors do not establish that
enforcement of the appeal waiver would be unlawful under the
miscarriage-of-justice inquiry. See United States v. Sandoval, 477 F.3d 1204,
1208 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Our inquiry is not whether the sentence is unlawful, but
whether the waiver itself is unlawful.”).
The defendant’s miscarriage-of-justice argument also rests on claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the negotiation of the appeal
waiver. An ineffective assistance of counsel claim must ordinarily be raised in a
collateral 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceeding. See United States v. Porter, 405 F.3d
1136, 1144 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that this rule applies even where a defendant
seeks to invalidate an appellate waiver based on ineffective assistance of
counsel). Thus, this claim is not properly brought on direct appeal. We have held
that a plea agreement waiver of postconviction rights does not waive the right to
bring a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion based on ineffective assistance of counsel claims
that challenge the validity of the plea or the appeal waiver. United States v.
Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 2001). Indeed, the defendant’s
appeal waiver expressly recognizes his right to bring such an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim in a § 2255 motion. Plea Agreement at 6. Thus,
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defendant is not prohibited by the appeal waiver from raising his ineffective
assistance of counsel claims in a § 2255 motion.
The government’s motion is GRANTED, and the appeal is DISMISSED,
without prejudice to the defendant’s right to raise an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim in a collateral proceeding.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
PER CURIAM
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