Sensabaugh v. United States District Court for the District of Colorado , 389 F. App'x 784 ( 2010 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
July 27, 2010
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
GERALD SENSABAUGH,
Plaintiff-Appellant, No. 09-1562
v. (D. of Colo.)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT (D.C. No. 1:09-CV-01688-ZLW)
FOR THE DISTRICT OF
COLORADO, and SUSAN JONES,
WARDEN, COLORADO STATE
PENITENTIARY,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HARTZ, ANDERSON, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges. **
Gerald Sensabaugh, a prisoner in the custody of the Colorado Department
of Corrections proceeding pro se, 1 appeals the district court’s dismissal of his
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
1
Because Sensabaugh is proceeding pro se, we construe his filings
(continued...)
complaint. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction since the allegations in the complaint challenge the implementation of
settlement orders arising from a class action, Montez v. Owens, No. 92-cv-0870
(D. Colo.).
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We AFFIRM the district
court’s dismissal of Sensabaugh’s complaint in part and REMAND with
instructions to treat the remainder of the complaint as an attempt to initiate
enforcement proceedings under the Montez settlement agreement and to transfer it
to the Montez special masters.
I. Background
Sensabaugh is a member of the class in Montez, an action brought in the
District of Colorado against the Colorado Department of Corrections under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101S12213, the Rehabilitation
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on behalf of Colorado inmates
suffering from particular disabilities. A settlement agreement in the Montez class
action was approved in August 2003.
The settlement agreement created a procedure by which special masters
evaluate individual class members’ claims for damages. The district court is
overseeing the settlement agreement’s implementation.
1
(...continued)
liberally. See Van Deelan v. Johnson, 497 F.3d 1151, 1153 n.1 (10th Cir. 2007).
-2-
In May 2006, the special masters ordered the Department of Corrections to
provide Sensabaugh a new four-inch mattress or an egg-crate mattress; a new,
proper-fitting pair of shoes; and $250.00. Between July and September 2006, and
between February and April 2008, Sensabaugh submitted several documents—
styled as motions—to the district court, seeking enforcement and modification of
the special masters’ order. With respect to Sensabaugh’s 2006 submissions, the
district court issued an order in September 2006 stating the Department of
Corrections had achieved full compliance with the special masters’ order.
Regarding Sensabaugh’s 2008 submissions, the district court issued an order in
September 2008 finding Sensabaugh’s claim had been fully adjudicated, holding
Sensabaugh’s submissions had been inappropriately filed as motions, and stating
additional filings by Sensabaugh would not be considered.
In December 2008, in an indirectly related matter, the special masters in
Montez filed a report, requesting guidance from the district court. The report
noted class counsel had asserted they do not represent class members on their
claims for individual damages sustained as a result of the Department of
Corrections’s continued non-compliance with the settlement agreement. The
report also indicated the Department of Corrections had stated no individual class
member should be able to seek personal relief. Finally, the report asked the
district court to determine whether the special masters should direct class
-3-
members’ individual requests for damages relating to non-compliance to class
counsel.
In July 2009, Sensabaugh filed another complaint, essentially seeking to
enforce the special masters’ May 2006 order. Sensabaugh’s complaint named the
district court and Colorado State Penitentiary Warden Susan Jones as defendants.
In November 2009, the district court dismissed Sensabaugh’s suit. The
district court held it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and stated Sensabaugh
needed to direct any issues relating to the Department of Corrections’ compliance
with the special masters’ order to the class counsel in Montez. The district court
also noted § 1915 requires courts to dismiss actions at any time if they are
frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seek
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief; informed Sensabaugh
future attempts to raise the same issues in a suit brought pursuant to § 1915 would
result in dismissal; and cautioned Sensabaugh his ability to file actions and
appeals under § 1915 could be barred if three or more of his actions or appeals
were dismissed for one of the aforementioned reasons. Sensabaugh appealed this
order in December 2009.
In March 2010, the district court issued an order regarding the Montez
special masters’ December 2008 report. The order held McNeil v. Guthrie, 945
F.2d 1163 (10th Cir. 1991), governs the special masters’ treatment of individual
class members’ pro se motions, stated submissions relating to the enforcement of
-4-
the special masters’ orders are properly filed pro se with the special masters, and
stipulated individual class members’ claims relating to the terms of or the
Department of Corrections’s compliance with the settlement agreement generally
are for class counsel to pursue. The order also stated the special masters could
accept no further pro se filings relating to the enforcement of their orders after
April 16, 2010.
II. Discussion
We review a district court’s decision to dismiss a complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction or under § 1915 de novo. See Rio Grande Silvery
Minnow (Hybognathus amarus) v. Bureau of Reclamation, 599 F.3d 1165, 1175
(10th Cir. 2010); Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1094 (10th Cir. 2009).
On appeal, Sensabaugh argues the district court erred by dismissing his
complaint. He also continues to seek enforcement of the special masters’ May
2006 order.
“[I]ndividual prisoners lack standing to individually litigate matters relating
to [a] class action.” McNeil, 945 F.2d at 1166. When confronted with the
complaint of a class member seeking equitable relief based on issues relating to
the class action, a district court may dismiss the complaint without prejudice and
instruct the plaintiff to cooperate with class counsel or intervene in the class
action. See id.; Goff v. Menke, 672 F.2d 702, 705 (8th Cir. 1982) (cited with
approval in McNeil, 945 F.2d at 1166). Additionally, a district court may treat
-5-
such a complaint as an attempt to initiate contempt proceedings and transfer it to
the class action docket. See Goff, 672 F.2d at 705.
Here, in accordance with McNeil, the district court dismissed Sensabaugh’s
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction—Sensabaugh did not have
standing to bring his complaint. Without finding fault in that determination, and
noting the apparent confusion in Montez regarding whether individual class
members were to submit their requests for the enforcement of the special masters’
orders to class counsel, the special masters, or the district court, we conclude the
appropriate course is to treat Sensabaugh’s action as an effort to enforce the
special masters’ May 2006 order.
To the extent Sensabaugh seeks to assert claims against the United States
District Court for the District of Colorado based on the district court’s rulings in
Montez, we dismiss Sensabaugh’s complaint. Sensabaugh’s vague and conclusory
allegations that the district court engaged in a conspiracy with the Department of
Corrections to deprive him of the relief ordered by the special masters fail to state
a claim on which relief may be granted. See Bixler v. Foster, 596 F.3d 751, 756
(10th Cir. 2010) (“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.”) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Moreover, insofar as Sensabaugh attempts to hold the district
court liable for its decisions, Sensabaugh again fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted. “A judge is immune from liability for his judicial acts
-6-
even if his exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural
errors.” Moss v. Kopp, 559 F.3d 1155, 1163–64 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Viewing the remainder of Sensabaugh’s complaint as an attempt to initiate
enforcement proceedings, we remand to the district court for transfer to the
Montez court for evaluation by the special masters, for several reasons. First, the
special masters in Montez are familiar with evaluating individual class members’
efforts to enforce the special masters’ orders. Second, reassigning the complaint
to the Montez court assures Sensabaugh’s requests will be directed to the
appropriate entity—i.e., class counsel, the special masters, or the district court.
Finally, transferring Sensabaugh’s complaint would provide an opportunity for
Sensabaugh’s concerns to be addressed. As a practical matter, given that the
Montez court’s March 2010 order stated pro se filings relating to the enforcement
of orders would not be accepted after April 16, 2010, the issues Sensabaugh raises
may not be heard if he is forced to file new pro se submissions with the special
masters in Montez.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of
Sensabaugh’s complaint in part and REMAND with instructions to treat the
remainder of the complaint as an attempt to initiate enforcement proceedings and
to transfer it to the Montez special masters. Further, we GRANT Sensabaugh’s
-7-
motion to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis. Sensabaugh has shown a
financial inability to pay the required fees and, in accordance with our above
disposition, we do not find his appeal violated § 1915. Nevertheless, Sensabaugh
must make partial payments until the filing fee is paid in full.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Timothy M. Tymkovich
Circuit Judge
-8-