United States v. Magallanes-Torres , 386 F. App'x 766 ( 2010 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
July 13, 2010
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 09-2272
v. (D.C. No. 2:06–CR–01501-RB-1)
(D.N.M.)
JUAN JOSE MAGALLANES-
TORRES,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, BALDOCK, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.
Defendant-Appellant Juan Jose Magallanes-Torres pled guilty to simple
assault (count 1), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 111(a)(1), and re-entry of a removed alien
(count 2), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a) & (b). 1 R. 5-6; 3 R. 47. He had an offense level
of 24 and a criminal history category of I resulting in an advisory guideline
imprisonment range of 51-63 months. 2 R. 1. After reducing the advisory range
to the statutory maximums, the advisory sentence was twelve months’
imprisonment on count 1 followed by twenty-four months’ imprisonment on count
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
2. 1 3 R. 33; 2 R. 1, 23-24 ¶ 89; U.S.S.G. §§ 5G1.1(a) & 5G1.2(d). The district
court sentenced Mr. Magallanes-Torres to this advisory sentence: twelve months’
imprisonment on count 1 and twenty-four months’ imprisonment on count 2, to
run consecutively, followed by one year of unsupervised release. 1 R. 25-26. On
appeal, Mr. Magallanes-Torres argues that the district court (1) sentenced him for
simple assault under the wrong guideline, and (2) could not enhance his sentence
absent proof of his involvement in bodily injury beyond a reasonable doubt. Aplt.
Br. at 11-13. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C.
§ 3742(a) and affirm.
Background
On September 12, 2002, several persons attempted to rob a train near the
Mexican border. 2 R. 10. As FBI agents attempted to stop the suspects from
escaping, two of the agents were seriously injured with rocks, sticks and blunt
objects. 2 R. (P.S.R.) 9, ¶ 23; 12, ¶ 32; 13, ¶ 36. Mr. Magallanes-Torres was
charged with conspiracy in connection with the attempted train robbery, 18
1
The base offense level for the first count was 14 under U.S.S.G.
§ 2A2.2(a) (2008) which applies to aggravated assault. To that was added a
seven-level enhancement for permanent or life-threatening injury, id. §
2A2.2(b)(3)(C), and a six-level enhancement for a knowing that the victim was a
law enforcement officer, id. § 3A1.2(c)(1). 2 R. at 18, ¶¶ 46-48. No additional
offense level applied for the second count given the grouping rules in U.S.S.G. §
3D1.4(c). Mr. Magallanes-Torres received a three-level reduction for acceptance
of responsibility. Id. § 3E1.1. Thus, the total offense level was 24.
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U.S.C. § 371, but in 2002 the government dismissed the indictment against him
due to lack of evidence. 2 R. 6, ¶ 1-2; 12, ¶ 33. He was deported to Mexico on
December 31, 2002. 2 R. 12, ¶ 33.
The FBI then determined that blood found on Mr. Magallanes-Torres’s shoe
matched an injured FBI officer’s DNA. 2 R. 12, ¶ 33. In 2006, the government
indicted Mr. Magallanes-Torres for simple assault on a federal officer and issued
a warrant for his arrest. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 111(a)(1); 1 R. 4. On December 23,
2008, Mr. Magallanes-Torres was arrested upon re-entering the United States. 2
R. 12, ¶ 33-34. Thereafter, he pled guilty to an information containing the assault
count and an additional count for unlawful re-entry. 1 R. 5-6; 3 R. 47.
In a sentencing memorandum, Mr. Magallanes-Torres argued that the PSR
incorrectly used the sentencing guideline, U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2 (2008), which applies
to aggravated assault. 1 R. 10-12. Mr. Magallanes-Torres argued that the
elements of the simple assault charged did not involve aggravated conduct, such
as “physical contact, a deadly or dangerous weapon, bodily injury, or the intent to
commit murder or any felony other than those referred to in § 113(a)(2).” United
States v. Hathaway, 318 F.3d 1001, 1008 (10th Cir. 2003); 1 R. 11. He pointed
out that under U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2, the base offense level was 14 and resulted in a
guideline sentence well above the one-year statutory maximum. 2 1 R. 11-
2
At the time of the offense (September 12, 2002), 18 U.S.C. § 111provided:
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12. According to Mr. Magallanes-Torres, a better fit was either U.S.S.G. § 2A2.3
(minor assault) or U.S.S.G. § 2A2.4 (obstructing or impeding officers). 1 R. 12.
Finally, relying upon United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005),
Mr. Magallanes-Torres argued that the introduction of argument or evidence
concerning serious bodily injury at sentencing was improper. 1 R. 13-14. He
argued that the government must prove aggravated assault beyond a reasonable
doubt for the court to sentence him on that basis. Id.The government responded that the PSR correctly calculated the offense
(a) In general.--Whoever--
(1) forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or
interferes with any person designated in section 1114 of this title
while engaged in or on account of the performance of official duties;
or
(2) forcibly assaults or intimidates any person who formerly served
as a person designated in section 1114 on account of the performance
of official duties during such person's term of service,
shall, where the acts in violation of this section constitute only
simple assault, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
one year, or both, and in all other cases, be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than three years, or both.
(b) Enhanced penalty.--Whoever, in the commission of any acts
described in subsection (a), uses a deadly or dangerous weapon
(including a weapon intended to cause death or danger but that fails
to do so by reason of a defective component) or inflicts bodily injury,
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years,
or both.
The statute now contains more severe penalties.
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guideline by selecting “the guideline most appropriate for the offense conduct
charged” given two choices contained in the statutory index: §§ 2A2.2
(aggravated assault) and 2A2.4 (obstructing or impeding officers). U.S.S.G. App.
A intro. comment.; 1 R. 17-23; see also U.S.S.G. §§ 1B1.1(a), 1B1.2(a). The
government argued that the DNA evidence linking Mr. Magallanes-Torres to the
incident, the admitted factual basis for his plea, and his statement that he “could
have encouraged others” to injure the victim all proved his relevant conduct to be
aggravated assault. 1 R. 17-18. The government conceded that it erred in not
charging Mr. Magallanes-Torres with felony assault. 1 R. 16.
Before announcing the sentence, the district court remarked that he was
“proud to report” that the sentence in the typical re-entry case was less than forty-
five to seventy-five days. 3 R. 20. In the end, however, the district court ruled
that it had discretion to impose each count’s statutory maximum consecutively. 1
R. 32-33. The court sentenced Mr. Magallanes-Torres to twelve months’
imprisonment on count 1 and twenty-four months’ imprisonment on count 2, to
run consecutively, followed by one year of unsupervised release. 1 R. 33-34.
Discussion
We review the sentence imposed by the district court for reasonableness
under an abuse of discretion standard after first considering the procedure used to
determine that sentence. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The
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district court’s legal conclusions concerning the guidelines are reviewed de novo;
its factual findings for clear error. United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1054
(10th Cir. 2006).
I. The Court Correctly Calculated the Guideline Sentence.
On appeal, Mr. Magallanes-Torres renews his argument that the district
court used the wrong guideline when it sentenced him for simple assault. Aplt.
Br. at 13-21. He argues that either § 2A2.3 (minor assault) or § 2A2.4
(obstructing or impeding officers) captures his conduct better than § 2A2.2
(aggravated assault). Id. at 19.
The starting point for determining a sentence is the correct guideline range.
Gall 552 U.S. at 49. Here, the starting point is the statutory index in Appendix A,
see U.S.S.G. §§ 1B1.1(a), 1B1.2(a), which contains two guideline provisions, §§
2A2.2 and 2A2.4. According to the commentary, where multiple guidelines are
listed, a court should “use the guideline most appropriate for the offense conduct
charged in the count of which the defendant was convicted.” U.S.S.G. App. A,
intro. comment. In this case, that choice is made easier because § 2A2.4 refers
the court to § 2A2.2 “if the conduct constituted aggravated assault.” U.S.S.G.
§ 2A2.4(c)(1). This cross-reference provision must be applied with regard to
relevant conduct. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a); United States v. Rue, 988 F.2d 94, 96
(10th Cir. 1993).
The question thus is whether Mr. Magallanes-Torres’s relevant assault
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conduct was aggravated. “Aggravated assault” is “a felonious assault that
involved (A) a dangerous weapon with intent to cause bodily injury (i.e., not
merely to frighten) with that weapon; (B) serious bodily injury; or (C) an intent to
commit another felony.” U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2 comment. n.1.
The sentencing court identified Mr. Magallanes-Torres’s relevant conduct
from the presentence report and Mr. Magallanes-Torres’s other admissions. 3 R.
22, 30-32. In his statement accepting responsibility, Mr. Magallanes-Torres
admitted that he “was part of group of people who were involved in the attack of
the victim in this case.” 2 R. 17, ¶ 44. Though he stated that he “was not
personally involved in the injury to the victim,” he admitted that he “could have
encouraged others to do so.” Id. He admitted he intended to rob the train. 3 R.
25. At the plea hearing, the government highlighted that he admitted to
participating in a forcible assault and also maintained that it could produce an
eyewitness to this conduct. 3 R. 47-48. The government also relied upon the
DNA evidence linking Mr. Magallanes-Torres to the assault on the victim. 3 R.
48. The victim suffered permanent bodily injury in the form of skull fractures
that caused seizures, headaches, and sleep disorders, all of which required
continued medication. 2 R. 14-15.
The facts support use of the aggravated assault guideline (§ 2A2.2) based
upon relevant conduct. At sentencing, counsel for Mr. Magallanes-Torres seemed
to concede that the aggravated assault conduct could be used in determining the
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sentence for the assault count, although he argued that this conduct had nothing to
do with the unlawful re-entry count. 3 R. 23–24. As it is, we conclude that the
district court correctly calculated the advisory sentence by applying § 2A2.2.
Mr. Magallanes-Torres relatedly argues that the most appropriate guideline
was § 2A2.3 (minor assault) because the charge was for misdemeanor assault.
U.S.S.G. § 2A2.3 comment. n.1; Aplt. Br. at 19. There are at least two problems
with this argument. First, the statutory index does not list § 2A2.3 as applicable
to 18 U.S.C. § 111 and therefore its use would be improper. United States v.
Hicks, 313 F. App’x 674, 675 n.3 (4th Cir. 2009) (unpublished); United States v.
Williams, 260 F. App’x 444, 447 (3rd Cir. 2008) (unpublished). Second, the
minor assault guideline refers the court to the aggravated assault guideline if “the
conduct constituted aggravated assault.” U.S.S.G. § 2A2.3(c). As noted
previously, the cross-reference must be determined with regard to relevant
conduct, so § 2A2.3 leads to the aggravated assault guideline in this case. The
commentary to § 2A2.3 makes it clear that minor assault includes “a misdemeanor
assault, or a felonious assault not covered by § 2A2.2.” U.S.S.G. § 2A2.3
comment. n.1 (emphasis added).
II. The Court Correctly Did Not Commit Booker Error.
Mr. Magallanes-Torres also renews his argument that, under Booker, the
district court could not enhance his sentence without proving his aggravated
assault conduct beyond a reasonable doubt. Aplt. Br. at 21-29. He argues that
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the court cannot take his uncharged aggravated conduct into account at sentencing
because the misdemeanor assault statute did not contemplate this level of injury.
Id. at 28-29.
Both before and after Booker, district courts have had the authority to take
uncharged conduct into account at sentencing. United States v. Rodriguez-Felix,
450 F.3d 1117, 1131 (10th Cir. 2006); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (“No limitation
shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and
conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States
may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.”);
U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a). “[I]t is now universally accepted that judge-found facts by
themselves do not violate the Sixth Amendment.” United States v. Lauder, 409
F.3d 1254, 1269 (10th Cir. 2005). The relevant constitutional issue is instead how
courts may enhance sentences based on uncharged conduct. Booker held that the
Sixth Amendment prohibited the court from relying on judge-found facts to
enhance a defendant’s sentence mandatorily. Lauder, 409 F.3d at 1269. Here,
there is no evidence that the district court mandatorily enhanced Mr. Magallanes-
Torres’s sentence and committed Booker error.
And under the current advisory guideline system, the government need not
prove sentencing evidence to a judge or jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead,
a district court may find facts relevant to sentencing by a preponderance of the
evidence. Rodriguez-Felix, 450 F.3d at 1131. At the same time, of course, a
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judge may not use these facts to enhance a sentence beyond the offense’s
statutory maximum or to sentence an offender for a different, uncharged offense.
United States v. Magallanez, 408 F.3d 672, 685 (10th Cir. 2005); Hathaway, 318
F.3d at 1010. Mr. Magallanes-Torres therefore is incorrect when he asserts that
the government needed to prove his uncharged aggravated assault conduct beyond
a reasonable doubt. Rather, to consider the conduct at sentencing, the court need
only find by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Magallanes-Torres’s
relevant assault conduct was aggravated.
Mr. Magallanes-Torres does not dispute whether this evidentiary burden
was met or could have been satisfied. The court did not sentence him above his
offenses’s statutory maximums. 3 R. 33. Nor did the court sentence him for any
offense other than those offences to which he pled guilty. Accordingly, the court
permissibly used uncharged aggravated assault conduct when it sentenced Mr.
Magallanes-Torres.
In support of his claim that the government must prove his aggravated
assault beyond a reasonable doubt, Mr. Magallanes-Torres relies upon this court’s
opinion in United States v. Hathaway. Aplt. Br. at 22-29. But that case only
discussed the elements of assault that an indictment must charge to elevate an
assault offense from a misdemeanor to a felony. Hathaway, 318 F.3d at 1006-09.
It did not discuss a district court’s ability to consider the circumstances
surrounding an assault when it calculates the advisory guideline range. And,
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again, this is not a case where a defendant was sentenced for a crime different
from the one charged and proven at trial. Id. at 1010.
Mr. Magallanes-Torres further argues that the court could not rely on facts
he admitted in his plea colloquy when he did not know that his stipulations to
conduct involving aggravated assault would be used to calculate his sentence.
Aplt. Br. at 23-29. We review the district court’s “factual findings for clear error,
reversing only if a finding is wholly without factual support in the record, or after
reviewing the evidence, we are definitively and firmly convinced that a mistake
has been made.” Rodriguez-Felix, 450 F.3d at 1130.
We find no error. In the plea colloquy, Mr. Magallanes-Torres said that he
understood that the district court would calculate and impose a sentence that may
be at the statutory maximum or that may differ from what Mr. Magallanes-
Torres’s counsel anticipated. 3 R. 46-47. The court found that these statements,
as well as Mr. Magallanes-Torres’s plea and other factual stipulations, were
knowing and voluntary. 3 R. 48. As such, the court could rely on his admissions
at sentencing.
To the extent that Mr. Magallanes-Torres is arguing that the district court
imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence, he has not overcome the appellate
presumption of reasonableness that attaches to a properly-calculated guidelines
sentence. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 350-51 (2007). The presumption
may be overcome if the length of the sentence is unreasonable after considering
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the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors within the totality of the circumstances. See
United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1055 (10th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
Although he argues that the length of his sentence is unfair when compared to
other defendants charged with re-entry, we think it is apparent that the district
court differentiated based upon his prior conduct, specifically, his admitted role in
a robbery and an assault.
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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