Ridley v. Vmt Long Term Management, Inc. , 68 F. Supp. 3d 88 ( 2014 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
DONNA A. RIDLEY, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 14-0496 (EGS)
)
VMT LONG TERM CARE )
MANAGEMENT, INC., )
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court on Defendant VMT Long Term Care Management, Inc.’s
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint [ECF No. 6]. 1 For the reasons discussed below, the
motion will be granted.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, an African American woman, Compl. ¶ 3, was employed by defendant VMT
Long Term Care Management, Inc. (“VMT”), id. ¶ 4, as a home health aide from August 2004
until her termination on December 19, 2012, id. ¶ 5. Preceding plaintiff’s termination was an
incident at the Washington Hospital Center, described by a VMT representative as follows:
[The] Clinical Administrator for VMT[] received an email on
December 14, 2012 from . . . the [Emergency Department] Charge
Nurse at Washington Hospital Center. The email stated that
[plaintiff] brought the patient for whom she was caring to the
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The Court will deny Plaintiff’s Motion [ECF No. 10], and instead construe it as plaintiff’s
opposition (“Pl.’s Opp’n”) to VMT’s motion to dismiss. In addition, the Court will deny
plaintiff’s motion for a hearing [ECF No. 12] as moot.
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Emergency Department and immediately left the premises without
giving a report on the patient. The patient was not conscious and
therefore [was] unable to speak for herself. [Plaintiff] was asked to
stay with her patient by the Triage Nurse to which [plaintiff],
according to the Nurse’s account and by her own admission replied
“you all can take care of her”. [Plaintiff] then proceeded to leave
the premises to deliver an inservice that she completed for the
Home Health Aide of another agency. By [plaintiff’s] own
admission, she was gone at least 30 minutes . . . .
Upon [plaintiff’s] return to the [Emergency Department], she was
informed that she acted inappropriately by leaving her patient
unattended when she had been specifically asked not to do so.
[Plaintiff] proceeded to verbally accost the Triage Nurse by telling
her “to shut her f---ing mouth” and that she would “wait outside”
for her.
Compl., Ex. (Employee Counseling Record dated December 19, 2012). Plaintiff was charged
with client abandonment, conducting personal business during work hours, and engaging in
heated arguments or outburst in front of clients. Id., Ex. (Employee Counseling Record). On
December 19, 2012, “VMT terminated [plaintiff’s] employment.” Id. ¶ 5.
Plaintiff asserts that “[t]he reasons for the termination were not true.” Compl. ¶ 6. She
alleges that “[a] white employee at Washington Hospital Center had called [her] racially
derogatory names,” id., and that this same employee “made false allegations against [her]
including falsely accusing her of abandoning a patient,” id. ¶ 7. Plaintiff alleges that, “[b]y firing
her for false reasons that VMT knew were related to her race, VMT violated [her] rights under
42 U.S.C. [§] 1981.” Id. ¶ 9. She demands judgment in her favor, compensatory damages,
reinstatement to her position as a home health aide, and attorney fees and costs of litigation, id.
(Claims for Relief).
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II. DISCUSSION
A. Dismissal Under Rule 12(b)(6)
VMT moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on
the ground that plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See
generally Def. VMT Long Term Care Management, Inc.’s Mem. of P. & A. in Support of its
Mot. to Dismiss Pl.’s Compl. (“Def.’s Mem.”) at 3-7. According to VMT, “[r]ead as a whole,
[the] Complaint does not adequately state a claim for racial discrimination because [it] fails to
plead facts that rise above the speculative level showing that VMT was motivated to terminate
[plaintiff’s] employment based on her race.” Id. at 2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In considering such a motion, the “complaint is construed
liberally in the plaintiff[’s] favor, and [the Court] grant[s] plaintiff[] the benefit of all inferences
that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276
(D.C. Cir. 1994)). “However, the [C]ourt need not accept inferences drawn by [the] plaintiff[] if
such inferences are unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint.” Id. Nor must the Court
accept “a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” nor “naked assertions devoid of
further factual enhancement.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Aktieselskabet AF 21. November 2001 v. Fame Jeans Inc., 525 F.3d 8,
17 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (noting that the D.C. Circuit has “never accepted legal conclusions cast
in the form of factual allegations” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Ordinarily on a Rule
12(b)(6) motion, the Court considers only “the facts alleged in the complaint, documents
attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference in the complaint, and matters about which the
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Court may take judicial notice.” Gustave-Schmidt v. Chao, 226 F. Supp. 2d 191, 196 (D.D.C.
2002) (citing EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624-25 (D.C. Cir.
1997)).
“To survive a [Rule 12(b)(6) ] motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim is facially
plausible when the pleaded factual content “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. Although a pro se complaint
“must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), it
too, “must plead ‘factual matter’ that permits the court to infer ‘more than the mere possibility of
misconduct,’” Atherton v. District of Columbia Office of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681-82 (D.C.
Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
B. Plaintiff Fails to State a § 1981 Claim
“All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right . . . to
make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). It is
established that such contracts include employment contracts. Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency,
Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975) (holding that Ҥ 1981 affords a federal remedy against
discrimination in private employment on the basis of race”); see Patterson v. Cnty. of Oneida,
N.Y., 375 F.3d 206, 224 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting that § 1981 “outlaws discrimination with respect
to the enjoyment of benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of a contractual relationship, such
as employment”). To state a claim under § 1981, a plaintiff not only “must initially identify an
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impaired contractual relationship . . . under which [she] has rights,” Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v.
McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 476 (2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), but also
must allege “some facts that demonstrate that [her] race was the reason for the defendant’s
actions.” Bray v. RHT, Inc., 748 F. Supp. 3, 5 (D.D.C. 1990), aff’d sub nom. Bray v. Hebble, 976
F.2d 45 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (citation omitted).
Four paragraphs of plaintiff’s complaint pertain to race. Two of these paragraphs, see
Compl. ¶¶ 5, 9, are mere assertions that VMT terminated plaintiff because of her race. The other
two paragraphs allege that a Charge Nurse at the Washington Hospital Center called plaintiff
racially derogatory names. Id. ¶¶ 6, 8. There is no suggestion, however, that the Charge Nurse
is in any way associated with VMT, such that the nurse’s statements can be attributed to VMT.
“[P]laintiff cannot merely invoke [her] race in the course of a claim’s narrative and
automatically be entitled to pursue relief.” Bray, 748 F. Supp. at 5 (citing Jaffe v. Fed. Reserve
Bank of Chicago, 586 F. Supp. 106, 109 (N.D. Ill. 1984)). Rather, her complaint must allege a
racially discriminatory purpose for VMT’s action. See, e.g., Fagan v. U.S. Small Business
Admin., 783 F. Supp. 1455, 1464 (D.D.C. 1992), aff’d, 19 F.3d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Without a
factual basis to support an inference of discrimination by VMT based on plaintiff’s race, the
complaint asserts nothing more than a “mere possibility of misconduct.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
It therefore fails to state a claim under § 1981, and it must be dismissed. See Mekuria v. Bank of
America, 883 F. Supp. 2d 10, 15 (D.D.C. 2011) (dismissing § 1981 claim where complaint’s
only allegations regarding race “are nothing more than legal conclusions devoid of any factual
support” which do not “suggest that the Bank or any of its employees discriminated against
[plaintiff] based on his race”); Middlebrooks v. Godwin Corp., 722 F. Supp. 2d 82, 88 (D.D.C.
2010) (“Even reading plaintiff’s complaint in the light most favorable to her and construing all
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reasonable inferences in her favor, the Court can find no facts that support an inference of
discrimination.”), aff’d, 424 F. App’x 10 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 846(2011).
III. CONCLUSION
The Court concludes that plaintiff fails to state a claim of discrimination under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981. Accordingly, VMT’s motion to dismiss will be granted. An Order accompanies this
Memorandum Opinion.
Signed: EMMET G. SULLIVAN
United States District Judge
Dated: September 18, 2014
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