Chaplin v. Park Hospital District, Inc. , 402 F. App'x 375 ( 2010 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
November 16, 2010
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALSElisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
ROBIN D. CHAPLIN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 09-1482
(D. Ct. No. 1:08-CV-00717-RPM)
PARK HOSPITAL DISTRICT, INC., a (D. Colo.)
Colorado non-profit corporation, d/b/a
Estes Park Medical Center,
Defendant - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before TACHA, SEYMOUR, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-appellant Robin Chaplin appeals from the district court’s order granting
defendant-appellee Park Hospital District, Inc. d/b/a Estes Park Medical Center
(“EPMC”) summary judgment on all Ms. Chaplin’s claims. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291 and AFFIRM for substantially the same reasons as set forth in the
district court’s September 30, 2009 order.
I. BACKGROUND
Ms. Chaplin began working as a bedside nurse at EPMC in 2002. In July of 2004,
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
she began experiencing significant neck and back pain that became progressively worse
over time. Indeed, by October 2004, her physical ailments had become so debilitating
that she sometimes struggled to perform the physical aspects of her job and was forced to
miss work at various times when her symptoms intensified. Nevertheless, she remained
employed at EPMC and continued to perform the functions of a bedside nurse when her
physical condition permitted.
In 2007, Ms. Chaplin began informing her supervisors of her condition and of her
doctors’ recommendations that she stop working as a bedside nurse. On April 3, 2007,
Ms. Chaplin requested that she be transferred to the position of Unit Coordinator, a
clerical position, in order to accommodate her physical ailments. The specific position
she sought, however, was occupied by another employee who was on maternity leave.
Nevertheless, Ms. Chaplin claims to have been told by her supervisors that if she resigned
from her nursing position and applied for the Unit Coordinator position, she would “likely
be provided the new position.” In reliance on this statement, Ms. Chaplin sent a letter to
her supervisor in which she formally expressed her interest in the Unit Coordinator
position and formally resigned from her position as a bedside nurse, effective May 15,
2007. EPMC immediately accepted her resignation but did not immediately respond to
her inquiry regarding the Unit Coordinator position.
Although she had resigned and had not yet received a response from EPMC
regarding her interest in the Unit Coordinator position, Ms. Chaplin submitted a request
for a medical leave of absence on April 30, 2007. She requested that her leave begin on
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May 15th, the effective date of her resignation. When, after nearly two weeks, EPMC
had not responded to her request for medical leave, Ms. Chaplin contacted the human
resources department and discovered that her leave was denied because she had resigned
and would therefore not be employed by EPMC during the period of requested leave.
Ms. Chaplin was never considered for the Unit Coordinator position, and her
employment at EPMC ended, in accordance with her letter of resignation, on May 15,
2007. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Chaplin obtained a position at a drug and alcohol
rehabilitation center. Although this new position does not impose the same physical
rigors as her position at EPMC, it is a full-time nursing position.
Almost a year after leaving EPMC, Ms. Chaplin filed the instant lawsuit in which
she alleges: (1) failure to accommodate her disability under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”); (2) interference with her rights under the Family Medical
Leave Act (“FMLA”); (3) breach of an implied employment contract; and (4) promissory
estoppel.1 During the first scheduling conference, the district court invited EPMC to seek
summary judgment within thirty days, which it did. Ms. Chaplin filed a response in
opposition, in which she primarily argued the existence of disputed facts and that she had
not been given an adequate opportunity to obtain discovery. Ms. Chaplin’s response also
suggested a narrow theory of disability—namely, that she is disabled for purposes of the
ADA because her physical condition prevents her from performing the functions of a
1
Ms. Chaplin’s complaint also contained several other claims which have since
been dismissed and are not the subject of this appeal.
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bedside nurse. See Pl.’s Resp. to Def’s Mot. for Sum. J. at 11 (“Plaintiff’s treating
physicians . . . unanimously conclude that she has [debilitating injuries], which in their
opinion would create an impaired ability to perform the necessary functions of bedside
nursing, that her condition would cause extreme and/or debilitating pain as she attempts
to perform the regular duties of bedside nursing, and that it would greatly interfere with
her ability to perform these duties to such an extent that she will be forced to give up
bedside nursing as a profession.”) (emphasis added). During argument on the summary
judgment motion, however, Ms. Chaplin’s counsel suggested that her physical condition
precluded her from performing “many, many different kinds of jobs.” Supp. App’x at 16.
In a brief order, the district court granted EPMC summary judgment on all of Ms.
Chaplin’s claims. Specifically, the court held that: (1) Ms. Chaplin failed to establish an
adequate basis for further discovery; (2) Ms. Chaplin failed to establish a disability under
the ADA because her inability to perform the particular job of a “bedside nurse” is
insufficient to establish that she is substantially limited in her ability to perform a class of
jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes; (3) Ms. Chaplin’s FMLA claim failed
because she was no longer employed by EPMC during the period of leave requested; and
(4) statements by EPMC employees that Ms. Chaplin would “likely” receive the Unit
Coordinator position were insufficient to establish an implied contract or an enforceable
promise. This appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Ms. Chaplin contends that the district court impermissibly invited
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EPMC to move for summary judgment and that the court erred in granting EPMC
summary judgment on each of Ms. Chaplin’s claims. We disagree. Contrary to Ms.
Chaplin’s assertions, the district court’s request that EPMC seek summary judgment was
not an abuse of discretion, nor is it, as Ms. Chaplin contends, “indicative of bias by the
bench.” Rather, “the court always can ‘invite’ the appropriate party to move under Rule
56 when it thinks the case is ripe for summary disposition.” 10A Charles A. Wright et al.,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 2720 (3d ed. 2010); see also Goldstein v. Fidelity &
Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc., 86 F.3d 749, 751 (7th Cir. 1996) (“It is . . . largely
unnecessary [to consider summary judgment sua sponte], as a district court can always
invite a non-moving party to file a motion for summary judgment in its favor.”).
With regard to Ms. Chaplin’s ADA claim, we need not address the district court’s
conclusion that she failed to establish a disability, because it is apparent from the record
that her claim fails on another ground. See Mosier v. Callister, Nebeker & McCullough,
546 F.3d 1271, 1275 (10th Cir. 2008) (“We may affirm the district court’s decision for
any reason supported by the record.”). “[A]t the summary judgment stage, the plaintiff-
employee bears the burden of specifically identifying a vacant position, reassignment to
which would serve as a reasonable accommodation.” Duvall v. Georgia-Pac. Consumer
Prods., 607 F.3d 1255, 1263 (10th Cir. 2010). Ms. Chaplin identifies only the Unit
Coordinator position as a reasonable accommodation to which she could have been
reassigned. The record establishes, however, that the Unit Coordinator position was, and
is to this day, held by another EPMC employee. Accordingly, Ms. Chaplin cannot satisfy
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her burden on this claim.
Finally, after carefully reviewing the parties’ briefs and the appellate record, we
agree with the district court that Ms. Chaplin has not established, an entitlement to FMLA
leave, the existence an implied contract, or the existence of an enforceable promise.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM for substantially the same reasons set forth
in the district court’s September 30, 2009 order.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT,
Deanell Reece Tacha
Circuit Judge
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