Christopher Compton v. State of Indiana , 58 N.E.3d 1006 ( 2016 )


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  •                                                                        FILED
    Aug 24 2016, 8:17 am
    CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT                                  ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Scott L. Barnhart                                        Gregory F. Zoeller
    Brooke Smith                                             Attorney General of Indiana
    Keffer Barnhart LLP                                      Larry D. Allen
    Indianapolis, Indiana                                    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Christopher Compton,                                     August 24, 2016
    Appellant-Defendant,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    82A01-1511-CR-1997
    v.                                               Appeal from the Vanderburgh
    Superior Court
    State of Indiana,                                        The Honorable Robert J. Pigman,
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                                      Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    82D02-1403-MR-355
    Robb, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 82A01-1511-CR-1997 | August 24, 2016                 Page 1 of 13
    Case Summary and Issues
    [1]   Following a trifurcated jury trial, Christopher Compton was convicted of three
    counts of felony murder and found to be an habitual offender. Compton
    appeals, raising two restated issues: (1) whether Compton was deprived of due
    process when the trial court allowed the media to Tweet live updates of his trial
    from the courtroom, and (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion in
    admitting evidence of Compton’s incriminatory statements. Concluding the
    trial court did not deprive Compton of due process nor did it err in admitting
    evidence of Compton’s statements, we affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   In March 2014, Keri Jones, along with her two twin three-year-old daughters,
    lived in a second-floor apartment in Evansville with several family members
    and friends. Compton and Jones had been dating on and off for a few years,
    but Compton did not live in the apartment. On the afternoon of March 17,
    2014, Compton visited the apartment. Compton and Jones were both
    intoxicated and the pair began arguing. After the argument, Compton stated,
    “Something is going to happen real soon.” Transcript at 817. Not long
    thereafter, Compton and Jones began arguing again, with Compton
    threatening, “[I]f you don’t leave with me, if you and the babies don’t leave
    with me now, I’m going to burn this mother f***er to the ground . . . .” 
    Id. at 964.
    Jones’s uncle, the owner of the apartment, then ordered Compton to
    leave. A few minutes later, the occupants of the apartment smelled smoke,
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 82A01-1511-CR-1997 | August 24, 2016   Page 2 of 13
    observed flames coming from the stairwell, and attempted to escape through the
    apartment’s second-floor windows. Jones, one of Jones’s daughters, and
    another occupant were unable to escape and died from smoke inhalation
    and/or carbon monoxide poisoning.
    [3]   Meanwhile, a neighbor, Earl Iverson, observed Compton walking away from
    the apartment and explained to Compton smoke was coming from the
    apartment. Compton replied, “I know, I started it.” 
    Id. at 570,
    618. Iverson
    immediately walked towards the apartment and told responding police officers
    Compton admitted to starting the fire. Police officer William Arbaugh
    identified Compton outside a nearby liquor store. After Compton made
    incriminating statements,1 police officers advised Compton of his Miranda
    rights. Thereafter, Compton explained, “I flicked the Mild, I mean that Black
    and Mild, (inaudible) went in there, I have no clue. . . . I know I flicked the, I
    flicked the fire (inaudible) lighting my Black and Mild (inaudible).” 
    Id. at 593.
    Compton was arrested. During an interview with Detective Keith Whitler,
    Compton stated the fire started when he flicked a cigar onto some clothing
    resting on a baby stroller near the stairwell.
    1
    We note the conversation between Compton and police officers was captured on Officer Arbaugh’s body
    camera, which the State admitted into evidence and played for the jury. After Officer Arbaugh asked
    Compton his name, Compton stated, “I just flicked the fire, I just flicked the fire onto the umm, onto the
    umm. . . . I flicked it umm—I ain’t going to lie. I flicked on a (inaudible) umm baby stroller, that was it.”
    Tr. at 590. A police officer responded, “You flicked a spark on a baby stroller?” 
    Id. Compton provided
    an
    inaudible answer.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 82A01-1511-CR-1997 | August 24, 2016                         Page 3 of 13
    [4]   The State charged Compton with three counts of felony murder, fourteen
    counts of Class A felony arson, and alleged Compton was an habitual offender.
    Prior to trial, Compton filed a motion to exclude evidence of the inculpatory
    statements he made to Iverson, police officers, and Detective Whitler, alleging
    the State failed to establish the corpus delicti of arson. Specifically, Compton
    argued there was no evidence an arson occurred apart from his inculpatory
    statements. At a hearing on the motion, fire investigator Jennifer Hunt testified
    the fire originated at the bottom of the stairwell. She did not find any evidence
    of accelerants nor was she able to determine the source of the fire. Hunt ruled
    out all potential natural and accidental causes of the fire, but could not rule out
    the possibility the fire was intentionally set. Ultimately, Hunt concluded the
    cause of the fire was undetermined.2 The State also introduced evidence to
    establish a timeline of Compton’s whereabouts before and during the fire. After
    taking the matter under advisement, the trial court denied Compton’s motion.
    [5]   Prior to trial, the trial court instructed the jury not to use the internet to gather
    information about the case and not to read, watch, or listen to any source
    discussing the trial, including newspapers, radio, television, and the internet.
    During trial, but outside the presence of the jury, a reporter approached the trial
    court and asked whether the media could give live updates of the trial via the
    2
    Hunt reiterated her conclusions at trial.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 82A01-1511-CR-1997 | August 24, 2016   Page 4 of 13
    social media application, Twitter. Compton objected and the trial court
    overruled his objection, noting,
    I’m going to—I am going to instruct the parties to tell their
    witnesses to turn off their Twitter accounts until after they’ve
    testified. . . . But I am going to allow those of you in the media
    that are here that are Tweeting, I think that’s what it’s called,
    you’re going to be permitted to do that so long as it’s done in a
    way that doesn’t interfere with the proceedings.
    
    Id. at 553.
    Also during trial, the State sought to admit evidence of Compton’s
    inculpatory statements. Compton renewed his objection on the basis the State
    failed to establish the corpus delicti of arson, which the trial court overruled. The
    jury found Compton guilty but mentally ill on all three counts of felony murder
    and further found Compton to be an habitual offender. 3 This appeal ensued.
    Discussion and Decision
    I. Use of Twitter
    [6]   Compton contends the trial court violated Rule 2.17 of the Code of Judicial
    Conduct in allowing the media to Tweet live updates of his trial from the
    courtroom, arguing Tweeting live updates of his criminal trial amounts to
    3
    The State dismissed the arson charges against Compton.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 82A01-1511-CR-1997 | August 24, 2016      Page 5 of 13
    inherently prejudicial “broadcasting” that violates his right to due process.4 The
    State counters Tweeting does not amount to broadcasting, and even if so,
    Compton has not demonstrated he suffered any prejudice.5 Because
    broadcasting a defendant’s trial is not inherently prejudicial and Compton has
    not demonstrated he suffered prejudice as a result of the alleged broadcasting,
    we need not address whether Tweeting live updates of a criminal trial is deemed
    “broadcasting.”
    [7]   At the outset, we note the First Amendment to the United States Constitution
    guarantees freedom of the press and the Sixth Amendment guarantees a public
    trial by an impartial jury. U.S. CONST. amends. I and VI. A public criminal
    trial ensures the proceedings are fair because it allows members of the public to
    observe proceedings. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 
    448 U.S. 555
    ,
    580-81 (1980). “The requirements of a public trial are satisfied by the
    opportunity for both the public and the press not only to attend the trial but to
    report what they observe.” Van Orden v. State, 
    469 N.E.2d 1153
    , 1157 (Ind.
    1984) (referencing Nixon v. Warner Comm., Inc., 
    435 U.S. 589
    (1978)), cert.
    denied, 
    471 U.S. 1104
    (1985). In addition, “the right to attend criminal trials is
    4
    Rule 2.17 provides, in relevant part, “Except with prior approval of the Indiana Supreme Court, a judge
    shall prohibit broadcasting, televising, recording, or taking photographs in the courtroom and areas
    immediately adjacent thereto during sessions of court or recesses between sessions . . . .”
    5
    The State also argues Compton waived this argument by not moving for a mistrial or requesting an
    admonishment. We disagree. A request for an admonishment or mistrial was unnecessary because all
    discussions about Twitter, up until that point, had been outside the jury’s presence. Compton
    contemporaneously objected to allowing the media to use Twitter thereby preserving the issue for appeal.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 82A01-1511-CR-1997 | August 24, 2016                      Page 6 of 13
    implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment.” Richmond Newspapers, 
    Inc., 448 U.S. at 580
    (footnote omitted).
    [8]   In Estes v. Texas, 
    381 U.S. 532
    (1965), the trial court denied Estes’s motion to
    bar the broadcasting of his trial by television, radio, and photography. Estes
    argued broadcasting a criminal trial is inherently prejudicial and therefore
    broadcasting a trial deprives a defendant of due process. Writing for the Court,
    Justice Clark agreed with Estes, noting,
    [T]his Court itself has found instances in which a showing of
    actual prejudice is not a prerequisite to reversal. This is such a
    case. It is true that in most cases involving claims of due process
    deprivations we require a showing of identifiable prejudice to the
    accused. Nevertheless, at times a procedure employed by the
    State involves such a probability that prejudice will result that is
    deemed inherently lacking in due process.
    
    Id. at 542-43.
    Four justices concurred, including Justice Harlan who filed a
    limited concurring opinion. Justice Harlan agreed reversal was necessary but
    he could not agree broadcasting criminal trials inherently deprived defendants
    of a fair trial. See 
    id. at 590-91
    (Harlan, J., concurring). Dissenting, Justice
    Brennan wrote,
    I write merely to emphasize that only four of the five Justices
    voting to reverse rest on the proposition that televised criminal
    trials are constitutionally infirm, whatever the circumstances.
    Although the opinion announced by my Brother CLARK
    purports to be an “opinion of the Court,” my Brother HARLAN
    subscribes to a significantly less sweeping proposition. . . . Thus
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 82A01-1511-CR-1997 | August 24, 2016    Page 7 of 13
    today’s decision is not a blanket constitutional prohibition against
    the televising of state criminal trials.
    
    Id. at 617
    (Brennan, J., dissenting).
    [9]    In Willard v. State, 
    272 Ind. 589
    , 
    400 N.E.2d 151
    (1980), the State charged
    Willard with, inter alia, murder. Over Willard’s objection, the trial court
    permitted live video taping of the trial and further allowed the tapes to be
    disseminated to the media. As the trial progressed, the Indiana Commission on
    Judicial Qualifications discovered Willard’s trial was being videotaped and
    disseminated to the media. In response, the Commission notified the trial court
    it was violating the Code of Judicial Conduct by broadcasting and/or recording
    courtroom proceedings. After Willard became aware of the Commission’s
    concerns, he moved for a mistrial, which the trial court denied.
    [10]   Before our supreme court, Willard relied on Estes, arguing the broadcasting of
    his trial was inherently prejudicial. Upon examining Estes, the court concluded
    Estes did not stand for the proposition televised criminal trials are inherently
    prejudicial; rather, such determinations “must be made on a case by case
    basis.”6 
    Id. at 599.
    In addressing the merits of Willard’s claim, the court noted
    the trial court did violate the Code of Judicial Conduct in broadcasting the trial,
    but that fact alone did not require a reversal. 
    Id. Rather, because
    of the
    6
    For this reason, we reject Compton’s argument that the act of Tweeting live updates of his criminal trial, if
    considered broadcasting, is inherently prejudicial.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 82A01-1511-CR-1997 | August 24, 2016                         Page 8 of 13
    overwhelming evidence supporting Willard’s conviction, the lack of evidence
    indicating a “carnival atmosphere” surrounding the trial, and the fact the jury
    was sequestered and not made aware of the recordings, the court concluded the
    broadcasting of Willard’s criminal trial did violate due process. 
    Id. at 599-600.
    [11]   As noted above, it is unnecessary to decide whether Twitter is “broadcasting,”
    because even assuming it is, broadcasting is not inherently prejudicial and
    Compton has shown no specific prejudice to him in this case.7 Similar to
    Willard, the evidence against Compton, including his inculpatory statements, is
    overwhelming, see infra Part II.B; prior to trial, the trial court instructed the jury
    not to receive information about the case from any source, including internet
    7
    Despite our ultimate conclusion, we take this opportunity to express our concern as to the impact social
    media applications have on due process and trials. Social media applications, such as Twitter, allow users to
    disseminate information immediately from their portable devices, similar to live television and radio
    broadcasts. The use of Twitter has already created multiple issues surrounding whether such use may
    compromise a defendant’s due process rights. See generally Jamie K. Winnick, A Tweet is(n’t) Worth a
    Thousand Words: The Dangers of Journalist’s Use of Twitter to Send News Updates from the Courtroom, 64 Syracuse
    L. Rev. 335 (2014). For example, jurors and prosecutors have utilized Twitter during criminal trials. See
    Dimas-Martinez v. State, 
    385 S.W.3d 238
    , 242 (Ark. 2011) (“[A] second juror was posting on his Twitter
    account during the case, and continued to do so even after being questioned by the circuit court, [which was]
    evidence of juror misconduct that calls into question the fairness of his trial.”) (footnote omitted); State v.
    Polk, 
    415 S.W.3d 692
    , 696 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (noting how troubling it was that a state prosecutor, who was
    not involved in the defendant’s case, tweeted live updates of the defendant’s criminal trial and such conduct
    “greatly magnified the risk that a jury will be tainted by undue extrajudicial influences”). There are also
    concerns potential witnesses may see information tweeted about other witnesses’ testimonies despite a trial
    court’s separation of witnesses order, a concern shared by Compton. See 
    Winnick, supra, at 347-48
    . Despite
    these concerns, we decline to opine whether the use of Twitter should be permitted in the courtroom.
    We note, however, the pretrial instructions in this case did not instruct the jury not to refrain from seeking
    information through social media applications. Rather, the instructions merely instructed the jurors not to
    receive information from the internet. Given how easily one may access the internet in this technological
    age, we fear such an instruction may not be specific enough to deter jurors from using Twitter now and in the
    future. In addition, we note when the ethics rules regarding “broadcasting” were written, social media was a
    vastly different medium than today. We believe judges and attorneys are in need of guidance on how they
    approach the use of social media during criminal trials. Therefore, given the rapidly evolving relationship
    between Twitter and our judicial system, we believe it is time for all appropriate judicial, attorney, and ethics
    committees to come together to specifically address these concerns.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 82A01-1511-CR-1997 | August 24, 2016                          Page 9 of 13
    sources; the jury was sequestered during the Twitter discussion; the trial court
    instructed the media not to Tweet in a manner that would disrupt proceedings;
    the trial court instructed the attorneys to notify their respective witnesses not to
    use Twitter until after they testified; and there is no evidence any witnesses or
    jurors viewed any Tweets pertaining to the trial.8 We conclude Compton was
    not deprived of due process when the media was allowed to Tweet live updates
    of his criminal trial from the courtroom.
    II. Admission of Evidence
    A. Standard of Review
    [12]   The admissibility of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court.
    Cherry v. State, 
    971 N.E.2d 726
    , 730 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. A trial
    court may abuse its discretion if its decision is clearly against the logic and
    effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or if the court has
    misinterpreted the law. 
    Id. B. Corpus
    Delicti
    [13]   Compton contends the trial court abused its discretion in admitting his
    inculpatory statements, arguing the State failed to present evidence outside of
    8
    At trial, Compton argued allowing the media to Tweet live updates of the trial would infringe upon the trial
    court’s separation of witnesses order. To the extent Compton is raising a violation of the separation of
    witnesses order on appeal, his argument fails. See Morell v. State, 
    933 N.E.2d 484
    , 490-91 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)
    (stating with respect to separation of witnesses, “where there is no affirmative evidence introduced that the
    witnesses had in fact discussed their testimony there is no reviewable question”).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 82A01-1511-CR-1997 | August 24, 2016                       Page 10 of 13
    his confessions sufficient to establish the corpus delicti for arson. Specifically, he
    argues there is no evidence—apart from the inculpatory statements he made to
    Iverson, police officers, and Detective Whitler—establishing an arson occurred.
    A crime may not be proven solely on the basis of a confession.
    There must be some other proof of the crime, in order to prevent
    confessions to crimes which never occurred. In Indiana, to
    support the introduction of a defendant's confession into
    evidence, the corpus delicti of the crime must be established by
    independent evidence of (1) the occurrence of the specific kind of
    injury and (2) someone’s criminal act as the cause of the injury.
    [T]he independent evidence need not be shown beyond a
    reasonable doubt; rather, the evidence need only provide an
    inference that a crime was committed. Such inference may be
    established through circumstantial evidence.
    Sweeney v. State, 
    704 N.E.2d 86
    , 111-12 (Ind. 1998) (alteration in original)
    (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 
    527 U.S. 1035
    (1999); see also 
    Cherry, 971 N.E.2d at 730
    (“Proof of the corpus delicti means
    proof that the specific crime charged has actually been committed by
    someone.”) (citation omitted).
    [14]   At the outset, we acknowledge Hunt did not find any accelerants nor evidence
    the fire was set intentionally. However, she ruled out all possible natural and
    accidental causes to the fire, and as a result, she could not rule out the
    possibility the fire was set intentionally. See generally Fox v. State, 
    179 Ind. App. 267
    , 277, 
    384 N.E.2d 1159
    , 1167 (1979) (“[T]here is rarely direct evidence of
    the actual lighting of a fire by an arsonist; rather, the evidence of arson is
    usually circumstantial. Such evidence is often of a negative character; that is,
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 82A01-1511-CR-1997 | August 24, 2016   Page 11 of 13
    the criminal agency is shown by the absence of circumstances, conditions, and
    surroundings indicating that the fire resulted from an accidental cause.”)
    (citation omitted). The evidence establishes Compton was present at the
    apartment prior to the fire. While at the apartment, Compton stated,
    “Something is going to happen real soon[,]” tr. at 817, and threatened Jones by
    stating, “if you don’t leave with me, if you and the babies don’t leave with me
    now, I’m going to burn this mother f***er to the ground[,]” 
    id. at 964.
    Shortly
    thereafter, the apartment caught fire and Compton was observed walking away
    from the apartment. The victims died as a result of smoke inhalation and/or
    carbon monoxide poisoning. The evidence independent of Compton’s
    inculpatory statements provides an inference an arson was committed. See
    
    Sweeney, 704 N.E.2d at 111-12
    . We therefore conclude the corpus delicti for
    arson was sufficiently established and the trial court did not err in admitting
    evidence of Compton’s inculpatory statements.
    Conclusion
    [15]   Compton cannot demonstrate he suffered prejudice as a result of the alleged
    broadcasting of his criminal trial and we therefore conclude Compton was not
    deprived of due process. We further conclude the trial court did not err in
    admitting evidence of Compton’s inculpatory statements. Accordingly, we
    affirm.
    [16]   Affirmed.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 82A01-1511-CR-1997 | August 24, 2016   Page 12 of 13
    Najam, J., and Crone, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 82A01-1511-CR-1997 | August 24, 2016   Page 13 of 13