Henderson Ex Rel. Estate of Stoller v. National Railroad Passenger Corp. , 412 F. App'x 74 ( 2011 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS January 5, 2011
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
MAIDA HENDERSON and KEN
STOLLER, M.D., as Co-Personal
Representatives of the Estate of Galen
Stoller, a minor child; MAIDA
HENDERSON, as mother of Galen
Stoller, deceased,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v. No. 09-2173
NATIONAL RAILROAD (D.C. No. 2:08-CV-00298-RLP-RHS)
PASSENGER CORPORATION, d/b/a (D.N.M.)
AMTRAK; BURLINGTON
NORTHERN SANTA FE
CORPORATION, a/k/a BNSF;
BOARD OF COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS FOR SAN
MIGUEL COUNTY; SAN MIGUEL
COUNTY; DOES I-X,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE, BALDOCK, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
Sixteen-year-old Gallen Stoller was killed at a private railroad crossing when
an Amtrak passenger train hit the vehicle he was driving on a county road in Rowe,
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines
of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however,
for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
New Mexico. His parents, Plaintiffs Maida Henderson and Ken Stoller, filed a
wrongful death suit in New Mexico state court against Defendants Amtrak,
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railroad Corporation (“BNSF”), and San Miguel
County. In their complaint, Plaintiffs alleged negligence and gross negligence in the
operation of the train as well as in the design, construction, and maintenance of the
crossing, the railroad right-of-way, and/or the county road leading to the crossing.
Defendants successfully removed the matter to federal court based on
Amtrak’s status as a federal entity. Following some discovery, Plaintiffs filed a
motion to dismiss Amtrak voluntarily from the case and to remand the matter to state
court. Defendants BNSF and San Miguel County opposed remanding the case. The
district court denied Plaintiffs’ motion to remand but granted their motion to dismiss
Amtrak without prejudice. BNSF and San Miguel County later filed separate
motions for summary judgment on the merits. BNSF also moved to strike Plaintiffs’
Rule 26 “preliminary” and “supplemental” expert reports and to preclude that expert
from testifying at trial. The court held a hearing on the matter and ultimately granted
BNSF’s motion to strike and motion for summary judgment, refusing to consider
either the expert’s preliminary or supplemental report in granting BNSF’s motion for
summary judgment. The court subsequently granted San Miguel County’s motion
for summary judgment in a separate order. Plaintiffs seek to overturn all of these
adverse rulings, including the denial of their motion to remand, on appeal.
Exercising appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm in part and
2
reverse in part.
I.
We first address the propriety of the district court’s refusal to remand the case.
Plaintiffs argue 28 U.S.C. §§ 1447(c) and 1367(c)(3) required the district court to
remand the case to state court once it dismissed the only claim that provided federal
subject matter jurisdiction—Plaintiffs’ claim against Amtrak. We have “jurisdiction
over a denial of a motion to remand to state court when coupled with the appeal of
a final judgment” such as the district court’s grant of Defendants’ motions for
summary judgment. Huffman v. Saul Holdings Ltd. P’ship, 194 F.3d 1072, 1076
(10th Cir. 1999) (internal quotations omitted).
Upon removal, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’
claims against Amtrak under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1349 because
Congress created Amtrak and the United States owns over fifty percent of its stock.
See 49 U.S.C. §§ 24101–24711 (creating Amtrak). “Federal question jurisdiction
exists for congressionally incorporated corporations under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The
limitation to this basis of jurisdiction found in 28 U.S.C. § 1349 . . . does not apply
to congressionally incorporated entities, such as Amtrak, more than half of whose
capital stock is owned by the federal government. . . . [F]ederal courts have
jurisdiction over all cases involving Amtrak, regardless of the cause of action.”
Aliotta v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 315 F.3d 756, 758 n. 1(7th Cir. 2003) (internal
citations omitted). Accord Vasquez v. N. Cnty. Transit Dist., 292 F.3d 1049, 1060
3
(9th Cir. 2002); Chiwewe v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 2002 WL 31924776,
*2 (D.N.M. Aug. 21, 2002). Plaintiffs’ negligence claims against Amtrak, BNSF,
and San Miguel County all stemmed from their son’s fatal collision with an Amtrak
train on a BNSF crossing accessed by a San Miguel County road. The district court,
as a result, had supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(a) over Plaintiffs’ state-law
claims against BNSF and San Miguel County because they were “so related to claims
in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form[ed] part of the same
case or controversy under Article III.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
After removal, but well before final judgment, Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed
their claims against Amtrak. Section 1447(c) provides, in relevant part: “If at any
time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction, [a removed] case shall be remanded.” 2 Plaintiffs contend this language
required the district court to remand the case to state court once its claims against
Amtrak, the sole basis for federal jurisdiction, had been dismissed. This is not
necessarily an unreasonable argument given the statutory language, but it is one that
2
Prior to 1988, Section 1447(c) provided: “If at any time before final
judgment it appears that the case was removed improvidently and without
jurisdiction, the district court shall remand the case, and may order the payment of
just costs.” Based in part on that statutory language, the Supreme Court in Carnegie-
Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 351–52 (1988), held that a district court
possesses the discretion to remand to state court or retain jurisdiction of a removed
civil action once the single claim providing federal jurisdiction has been eliminated
and only state-law claims remain to be decided. But then Congress changed the text
of § 1447(c) to its present form.
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most courts to our knowledge have found unpersuasive. 3 And, in any event, it is one
that the Supreme Court certainly foreclosed in Carlsbad Technology, Inc. v. HIF Bio,
Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1862 (2009).
The Supreme Court decided in Carlsbad that a “District Court’s remand order,
3
We have not expressly answered this question, though some of our opinions
allude to an answer. See New Mexico v. Gen. Elec. Co., 467 F.3d 1223, 1242 n.29
(10th Cir. 2006) (concluding that once the district court dismissed the State’s federal
claims in a removed case, the district court did not abuse its discretion under § 1367
in choosing to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law
claims, without discussing § 1447(c)); Hyde Park Co. v. Santa Fe City Council, 226
F.3d 1207, 1209 n.1 (10th Cir. 2000) (“Federal appeals courts have consistently held
. . . that they have jurisdiction to review a district court order dismissing federal
claims on the merits where the district court subsequently exercised its discretion
under § 1367 to remand supplemental state law claims to state court.”); United Int’l
Holdings v. Wharf, 210 F.3d 1207, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000) (explaining in the context
of a non-removed case that “[o]nce federal question jurisdiction exists, it is within
the trial court’s discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those state law
claims that derive from a common nucleus of facts. Thus, a district court has the
constitutional power to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state claims even
after a federal claim has been dismissed, provided the federal claim was not
insubstantial from the outset”); see also New Mexico v. Gen. Elec. Co., 335 F. Supp.
2d 1157, 1175–76 (D.N.M. 2003) (explaining that in removed cases once subject
matter jurisdiction exists, § 1447(c) does not deprive a district court of the authority
to hear related state law claims even if the federal claim is later dismissed and that
remand of those claims within the court’s supplemental jurisdiction is left to the
court discretion under § 1367(c)), affirmed in part and dismissed in part on other
grounds, 467 F.3d 1223 (10th Cir. 2006). Other courts have decided that revised
§ 1447(c)’s “lacks subject matter jurisdiction” does not take into account events that
occur after removal, see Bogle v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.3d 758, 762 (5th Cir.
1994); Matter of Shell Oil Co., 966 F.2d 1130, 1133 (7th Cir. 1992). Contra Villano
ex rel. Villano v. Kohl’s Dep’t Stores, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 2d 418, 420 (S.D.N.Y.
2005) (deciding that § 1447(c)’s revised language means that a district court must
“remand [an] action if at any time before final judgment the basis for federal
jurisdiction ceases to exist, irrespective of whether removal was proper at the time
it was made.”)
5
which rested on its decision declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
respondents’ state-law claims,” was not a “remand based on ‘lack of subject matter
jurisdiction for purposes of § 1447(c).’” 129 S. Ct. at 1866. The Court explained
that when the district court dismissed the single federal claim from the case, the
district court nonetheless retained its statutory supplemental jurisdiction over the
remaining state-law claims because “§§ 1367(a) and (c) provide a basis for subject-
matter jurisdiction over any properly removed state claim.” Id. at 1867. The district
court’s subsequent “decision declining to exercise that statutory authority was not
based on a jurisdictional defect but on its discretionary choice not to hear the claims
despite its subject-matter jurisdiction over them.” Id. Thus, an appellate court
reviews the district court’s remand order in that situation for abuse of discretion. Id.
Based on Carlsbad, we must conclude that after granting Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss
their only federal claim, the district court in this case retained subject matter
jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims against BNSF and San Miguel
County and, therefore, § 1447(c) did not require it to remand the state-law claims.
Instead, the district court possessed the discretion to either retain or remand those
claims pursuant to § 1367(c).
In exercising that discretion, the Supreme Court has instructed courts should
consider “the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity in order
to decide whether to exercise jurisdiction over a case brought in that court involving
pendent state-law claims.” Carnegie-Mellon, 484 U.S. at 350. In this case, the
6
district court concluded that judicial economy and fairness supported retaining
jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims against BNSF and San Miguel County.
At the time Plaintiffs requested remand, the parties had “filed a Joint Status Report
and Provisional Discovery Plan, prepared and served disclosure statements as
required by [Fed.]R.Civ.P. 26(a), attended a scheduling conference, exchanged
written discovery, taken multiple depositions, participated in a telephonic status
conference, and designated expert witnesses. A trial date of August 10, 2009 ha[d]
been set.” Appx. at 103. We reverse for an abuse of discretion only “when the
district court bases its ruling on an erroneous conclusion of law or relies on clearly
erroneous fact findings. . . . ‘[W]e may not . . . substitute our own judgment for that
of the trial court.’” Kiowa Indian Tribe of Okla. v. Hoover, 150 F.3d 1163, 1165
(10th Cir. 1998) (quoting Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass’n, Inc. v.
Shoshone River Power, Inc., 805 F.2d 351, 354–55 (10th Cir. 1986)). Because the
district court did not make any erroneous conclusions of law or fact, we uphold its
discretionary choice to refuse to remand this case to state court.
II.
Next, we address Plaintiffs’ challenge to the district court’s exclusion of their
August 2008 expert report pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 702. “Like other evidentiary
rulings, we review a district court’s decision to exclude evidence at the summary
judgment stage for abuse of discretion.” Sports Racing Serv., Inc. v. Sports Car Club
of Am., Inc., 131 F.3d 874, 894 (10th Cir. 1997). Consequently, “we will not disturb
7
the determination absent a distinct showing that it was based on a clearly erroneous
finding of fact or an erroneous conclusion of law or manifests a clear error of
judgment.” Cartier v. Jackson, 59 F.3d 1046, 1048 (10th Cir. 1995). Fed. R. Evid.
702 provides for the admission of expert testimony, “if (1) the testimony is based
upon sufficient facts or data.” “[N]othing in either Daubert[v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993),] or the Federal Rules of Evidence
requires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data
only by the ipse dixit of the expert. A court may conclude that there is simply too
great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.” Gen. Elec. Co.
v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997). Thus, “the testimony of an expert can be
rejected on summary judgment if it is conclusory and thus fails to raise a genuine
issue of material fact.” Matthiesen v. Bank One Mortg. Corp., 173 F.3d 1242, 1247
(10th Cir. 1999).
Plaintiffs timely submitted a sixteen-page expert report prepared by Dr.
Kenneth Heathington. In conjunction with granting BNSF’s motion for summary
judgment, the district court granted BNSF’s motion to strike this report on the basis
that it contained conclusions unaccompanied by factual predicates. In his
“preliminary” August 2008 report, Dr. Heathington asserted he made a personal site
inspection of the railroad crossing and from that inspection he was able to obtain “a
lot of data.” Appx. at 200. Based upon that inspection, he notably stated:
There are severely reduced sight distances for the crossing, and there
8
appears to be sight distance restrictions even when stopped at the STOP
sign. Specific sight distance deficiencies will be calculated once a plan
view has been prepared by a surveyor and certain photogrammetric
analyses are completed. Once the plan view is completed, calculations
can be made as to what percentage of reduction, if any, of sight
distance do various areas of vegetation pose. . . . It can be concluded
at this point in time that there are very serious safety deficiencies at the
crossing . . . . Sufficient data has not been resolved at this point to
state the deficiencies in hardly more than qualitative terms.
(emphasis added). Id. at 203. Given these admitted factual deficiencies, the report
otherwise contains only two sets of objective measurements—the width of the
roadway and crossing—but does not indicate what those widths ideally should be or
how the actual widths are dangerous. Otherwise, the report describes the crossing
in qualitative or subjective terms: “very complex,” “very sharp horizontal curves,”
“steep vertical curves,” “significantly skewed,” and “big hump.” Without stating the
facts upon which his subjective conclusions are based, Dr. Heathington’s report
contains nothing more than ipse dixit, making it nearly impossible for the trial court
to evaluate his opinion pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 702. The district court therefore
did not abuse its discretion in deciding that the report lacked adequate factual
support for its conclusions.
III.
We now turn to whether the district court abused its discretion in striking
Plaintiffs’ February 2009 “supplemental” expert report as untimely. We conclude
Plaintiffs’ arguments that the district court abused its discretion by striking the report
with regard to BNSF are unpersuasive for reasons explained herein. But because we
9
ultimately reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of San
Miguel County, we vacate the district court’s decision to strike the February report
with regard to San Miguel County and remand for further consideration.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(i) requires the disclosure of an expert’s report,
which “must contain . . . a complete statement of all opinions the witness will
express and the basis and reasons for them.” Courts may set a time by which the
parties must submit their experts’ reports. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(D). Parties bear
a continuing obligation to supplement these reports if the parties later learn the
information initially provided is incomplete or incorrect. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(E)
and 26(e). “Rule 26(a) expert reports . . . are intended not only to identify the expert
witness, but also ‘to set forth the substance of the direct examination’ . . . [and are]
necessary to allow the opposing party ‘a reasonable opportunity to prepare for
effective cross examination and perhaps arrange for expert testimony from other
witnesses.’” Jacobsen v. Deseret Book Co., 287 F.3d 936, 953 (10th Cir. 2002)
(quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(2) advisory committee note (1993)). “[A] district court
can allow evidence violating Rule 26(a) only if the violation was justified or
harmless.” Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)). But, “[a] district court need not make
explicit findings concerning the existence of a substantial justification or the
harmlessness of a failure.” Woodworker’s Supply, Inc. v. Principal Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 170 F.3d 985, 993 (10th Cir. 1999). In making this determination, the following
factors guide the broad discretion of district courts: “(1) the prejudice or surprise to
10
the party against whom the testimony is offered; (2) the ability of the party to cure
the prejudice; (3) the extent to which introducing such testimony would disrupt the
trial; and (4) the moving party’s bad faith or willfulness.” Id.The district court ordered Plaintiffs to submit their expert reports pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B) by August 29, 2008. Appx. at 870. The court also set
discovery and dispositive motion deadlines which were “extended by the agreement
of the parties to February 28, 2009 and March 27, 2009, respectively.” Id. at 871.
The case was set for trial in August 2009. Id. at 103. Accordingly, Plaintiffs
submitted the sixteen-page report prepared by Dr. Heathington, discussed in Part II,
on August 29, 2008 in which he lists numerous materials he will need to consult to
complete his analysis, i.e., the calculation of “what percentage of reduction, if any,
of sight distance do various areas of vegetation pose,” and indicating that “this
preliminary report will be significantly expanded as information that has been
requested is received. I do not expect these preliminary findings to change but only
to be significantly expanded upon.” Id. at 203, 205. BNSF tried to depose Dr.
Heathington during the discovery period, but Plaintiffs stated that they and Dr.
Heathington were unavailable and, in any case, BNSF would want to wait to depose
him until it received his “supplemental” report which they anticipated he would
complete in mid-February. Id. at 803. BNSF thereafter selected its experts and
timely submitted their reports to Plaintiffs. On February 20, 2009 Plaintiffs provided
Dr. Heathington’s 197-page “supplemental” report. That same day, BNSF filed its
11
motion for summary judgment. Thus, the supplemental report “was received eight
days before the discovery deadline, six months after the Rule 26 deadline, and on the
same date that BNSF moved for summary judgment” and just more than one month
before all dispositive motions were due. Id. at 871–72. Less than a week later,
BNSF filed a motion to strike the February 2009 supplemental report (as well as Dr.
Heathington’s August 2008 preliminary report).
Plaintiffs listed thirteen items that Dr. Heathington claimed were necessary to
his analysis which were unavailable prior to the August 2008 Rule 26 deadline. Id.
at 872. But, the district court noted that between the time Plaintiffs retained Dr.
Heathington in May 2008 and the expert report deadline in August 2008, Plaintiffs
evidently made very little effort to obtain the necessary information:
For example, it was up to the Plaintiffs to perform the survey, do a site
inspection, take photographs of Galen’s car (which was in Plaintiffs’
possession), conduct interviews with the local residents, and perform
the photogrammetric analysis. Plaintiffs made no request to go on the
subject property until June 25 and then never followed up. The train
volumes and traffic volumes were never requested. The depositions
were not noticed until September, 2008, which was after the report
deadline.
Id. at 873. And, the rest of the “unavailable” information BNSF in fact provided to
Plaintiffs in its initial disclosures. Id. Plaintiffs did not provide an explanation as
to why they did not seek or provide any of this information to Dr. Heathington in a
timely manner. Id. at 874.
Taking into consideration the factors we laid out in Jacobsen, the district court
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granted BNSF’s motion to strike, explaining:
Because the Supplement[al Report] was submitted on the same day as
BNSF filed its Motion for Summary Judgment, the prejudice and
surprise are apparent. There is no ability to cure this prejudice at the
summary judgment stage. . . . Plaintiffs provide the Court with no
explanation as to why the allegedly necessary information was not
sought in a timely manner. Nor do they explain why the information
they did have was not provided to Dr. Heathington.
Id. According to the court, admitting the report at this stage in the litigation:
Would necessitate an entire re-working of the case. Dr. Heathington’s
reliance on several different analytic approaches . . . as well as his
reliance on many and varied studies on train safety would either
dramatically expand the already retained experts’ opinions or would
require new experts to be employed. New reports would be generated.
Discovery would be reopened and new trial deadlines would be set due
to scheduling conflicts. Although enough time and money can cure
almost any deficiency, the Court does not believe that perpetual
litigation is what the Tenth Circuit . . . meant by “cure.”
Id. at n.3. Plaintiffs also never requested an extension of the Rule 26 deadline. For
these reasons, the court concluded Plaintiffs had displayed a “complete lack of
diligence” and “utter lack of regard to the deadlines.” Id. The court, as result,
determined the Rule 26 violation “was neither justified nor harmless.” Id. 4
4
We acknowledge the district court did not explicitly declare Plaintiffs’
conduct to have been in bad faith or wilful (though it comes close by describing their
unexplained “utter lack of regard to the deadlines” when “they knew they did not
have the information necessary for Dr. Heathington to complete his report and yet
they did not seek an extension of time.”). Id. Regardless, as we have previously
explained, Plaintiffs’ “good faith alone would not be enough to overcome the other
factors” and “‘a district court need not make explicit findings concerning the
existence of a substantial justification or harmlessness.’” Jacobsen, 287 F.3d at 953,
954 (quoting Woodworker’s Supply, 170 F.3d at 993)).
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On appeal, Plaintiffs contend BNSF waived its objections to Dr. Heathington’s
supplemental report because BNSF was aware of the disclosed deficiencies in his
August 2008 preliminary report and the level of detail that Dr. Heathington would
later provide as a result of his having testified in dozens of cases against BNSF.
Plaintiffs also argue they sent a letter to BNSF’s counsel asking if BNSF had any
objection to Dr. Heathington taking additional time to supplement his preliminary
report. According to Plaintiffs, BNSF made no objection. Plaintiffs additionally
contend submitting this 197-page report six months after the court’s expert
disclosure deadline does not in any way prejudice BNSF because time remains to
depose Dr. Heathington and to provide rebuttal testimony prior to trial.
First, Plaintiffs provide no authority for the assertion that a party can waive
objections to another’s compliance with court-ordered deadlines by virtue of its
conduct in another case. Second, it appears BNSF did alert Plaintiffs to its belief
that Dr. Heathington’s “preliminary” August report was incomplete because it
“lack[ed] opinions whatsoever, much less the information mandated by Fed. R. Civ.
P. 26(a)(2).” Appx. at 80. Moreover, whether BNSF objected to Plaintiffs’ August
2008 expert report for any reason strikes us as entirely irrelevant to the merits of
BNSF’s objection that Plaintiffs submitted the February 2009 report six months after
the court-imposed expert disclosure deadline. Third, as the district court noted, if
Plaintiffs needed additional time, they should have requested an extension from the
court, not solely from BNSF. See Sims v. Great Am. Life Ins. Co., 469 F.3d 870,
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895 (10th Cir. 2006) (“Despite ample opportunity to request an amendment to the
scheduling order, Great American never did so, instead opting to file an Amended
Witness List . . . five months past the original deadline. Because Great American did
not comply with the court’s scheduling order, the district court properly excluded
Great American’s accident reconstruction expert as untimely disclosed.”). Finally,
the district court rationally concluded that a “supplemental” report that adds
approximately 180 pages of additional information to a sixteen page report “eight
days before the discovery deadline, six months after the Rule 26 deadline, and on the
same date that BNSF moved for summary judgment” and just more than one month
before all dispositive motions were due would prejudice BNSF and disrupt the
litigation. Appx. at 871–72, 874 n.3. For these reasons, we uphold the district
court’s decision to strike the report as to BNSF.
However, the analysis as to San Miguel County substantially differs. The
County did not move to strike the February report because “it believed (1) . . . San
Miguel had been placed on sufficient notice of Dr. Heathington’s opinions regarding
San Miguel in his initial report; and (2) Dr. Heathington’s supplemental report
actually lent support to San Miguel’s defense.” San Miguel Resp. Br. at 3.
Regardless, the district court refused to consider the February report in granting the
County’s motion for summary judgment. Appx. at 1162–63 n.2. (“As detailed in this
Court’s earlier Memorandum Opinion and Order [Doc. 124], Dr. Heathington’s
Supplemental Report was stricken from the record. Despite that, the County attaches
15
a page from the [report] . . . . The Court will not consider that Report.”). The new
trial schedule necessitated by this appeal’s outcome combined with the County’s
repeated belief that the February report’s untimely submission was harmless
significantly alter the Jacobsen calculus. Trial is no longer imminent because we are
remanding this case for further proceedings. Upon remand, the district court could
allow more time for discovery without disrupting the trial schedule. Jacobsen, 287
F.3d at 954. Or, it could find that the Rule 26(a) violation remains neither justified
nor harmless. But given the change in circumstances this opinion works, we leave
that determination for the district court.
IV.
To the merits, we go. In their wrongful death suit, Plaintiffs allege BNSF
negligently designed and maintained the crossing, by failing to clear excessive
vegetation from the sight triangle, install active warning devices (e.g., flashing
lights, wig-wags, bells, and/or gates to warn of approaching trains), and take other
reasonable steps to make its crossing reasonably safe for the traveling public. See
Aplt. Open. Br. at 4. It is undisputed that BNSF marked the crossing with a stop
sign and a railroad crossing symbol (though not an official, reflectorized crossbuck
sign) approximately twelve to fourteen feet from the tracks. It is also undisputed
that Galen’s car was on the tracks when the train collided with the vehicle. The
parties dispute, however, whether Galen stopped at the stop sign. After striking both
of Plaintiffs’ expert reports, the district court granted BNSF’s motion for summary
16
judgment. In its view, Plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of fact as
to whether “BNSF breached any duty of care it may have had to Galen or that any
breach on its part led to the collision.” Id. at 877.
A.
“We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying
the same legal standard used by the district court.” Garrison v. Gambro, Inc., 428
F.3d 933, 935 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations omitted). Summary judgment is
appropriate only when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). When
reviewing the evidence, we draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light
most favorable to Plaintiffs. Garrison, 428 F.3d at 935.
B.
Under New Mexico law, Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving their negligence
allegations by demonstrating “the existence of a duty” owed by Defendants to them,
“breach of that duty, which is typically based upon a standard of reasonable care, and
the breach being a proximate cause and cause in fact of” their damages. Chavez v.
Desert Eagle Distrib. Co. of N.M., 151 P.3d 77, 80 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006) (internal
quotations omitted). “‘Negligence is generally a question of fact for the jury. A
finding of negligence, however, is dependent upon the existence of a duty on the part
of the defendant. Whether a duty exists is a question of law for the courts to
decide.’” Herrera v. Quality Pontiac, 73 P.3d 181, 186 (N.M. 2003) (quoting Schear
17
v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 687 P.2d 728, 729 (N.M. 1984)). Whether a defendant
breached that duty and whether that breach constitutes a proximate cause of the
plaintiff’s injury are questions of fact. Id. But, we may “decide questions of
negligence and proximate cause, if no facts are presented that could allow a
reasonable jury to find proximate cause.” Calkins v. Cox Estates, 792 P.2d 36, 42
n.6 (N.M. 1990).
New Mexico law requires “a railroad . . . to exercise the standard of care of
a reasonably prudent person.” Lopez v. S. Pac. Co., 499 F.2d 767, 774 (10th Cir.
1974); see also Largo v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 41 P.3d 347, 352
(N.M. App. 2001) (explaining that railroads have a duty “‘to take all reasonable
precautions to maintain grade crossing safety’” (quoting CSX Transp., Inc. v.
Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 665 n.5 (1993))); Lerma v. State Highway Dep’t of N.M.,
877 P.2d 1085, 1087 (N.M. 1994) (concluding that every person has a duty to
exercise ordinary care for others’ safety). Therefore, “railroads have a common-law
duty to provide and adequately maintain warnings at railroad crossings.” Largo, 41
P.3d at 351. New Mexico courts have also held railroads responsible for vegetation
that obstructs the view of the track along the line of approach. See De Padilla v.
Atchison, T & S.F. Ry. Co., 120 P. 724, 729–30 (N.M. 1911) (upholding a verdict
against the railroad despite allegations of the deceased’s negligence in crossing the
tracks in part because “there is also evidence in the record . . . tending to establish
the fact that at other points along the line of [the deceased’s] approach to the track
18
his view was obstructed by trees, weeds, and an irrigation ditch”). “[W]hether
reasonable care and prudence require under all the circumstances of [a] case that
special warning facilities be maintained at a crossing is a question of fact for the
jury.” Lopez, 499 F.2d at 774; see also Herrera, 73 P.3d at 195 (“The finder of fact
must determine whether Defendant breached the duty of ordinary care by considering
what a reasonably prudent individual would foresee, what an unreasonable risk of
injury would be, and what would constitute an exercise of ordinary care in light of
all surrounding circumstances of the present case.”).
New Mexico law also requires “a traveler approaching an open, unguarded
railroad crossing . . . to stop, look and listen for trains using the tracks, and the act
of looking and listening must be performed in such [a] manner as to make it
reasonably effective.” Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co. v. McFarlin, 336 F.2d
1, 2 (10th Cir. 1964). However, New Mexico law provides:
“A proximate cause of an injury is that which in a natural and
continuous sequence [unbroken by an independent intervening cause]
produces the injury, and without which the injury would not have
occurred. It need not be the only cause, nor the last nor nearest cause.
It is sufficient if it occurs with some other cause acting at the same
time, which in combination with it, causes the injury.”
Herrera, 73 P.3d at 195 (quoting U.J.I. 13-305 NMRA 2003) (alteration in Herrera).
As a result, a driver’s failure to “stop, look and listen” will not necessarily be
deemed as a matter of law the sole proximate cause of the collision if sufficient
evidence exists from a which a jury could conclude the railroad was also negligent.
19
Lopez, 499 F.2d at 771. Nor will a motorist’s failure to “stop, look and listen”
preclude recovery under a theory of contributory negligence because New Mexico
has adopted comparative fault. See Tafoya v. Rael, 193 P.3d 551, 556 (N.M. 2008)
(explaining that under New Mexico’s comparative fault regime “although [a
defendant] may have owed a duty to Decedent, [the defendant] can only be liable for
that portion of damages attributable to his own negligence, and his liability will be
reduced in proportion to Decedent’s own . . . negligence in the event that caused his
death.”). 5 Like proximate cause, comparative fault is a question of fact. Lerma, 877
5
In Lopez, the district court directed a verdict in favor of the railroad with
respect to the decedent driver because he “failed to stop at a stop sign, which
constituted contributory negligence as a matter of [New Mexico] law.” 499 F.2d at
771. That ruling was not appealed. With regard to the decedent passengers,
however, we could not “say as a matter of law that [the driver]’s running of the stop
sign was the sole proximate cause of the accident” because “[i]n New Mexico there
may be more than one proximate cause and based upon the evidence [of the
railroad’s negligence] the jury could reasonably determine that [the railroad]’s
negligence was one of the proximate causes.” Id. In McFarlin, we decided that the
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence under New Mexico law for failing to
stop, look, and listen for a train at a point along the road from which she could see
the tracks. 336 F.2d at 3. But we decided Lopez and McFarlin when New Mexico
still employed contributory negligence. In 1981, the New Mexico Supreme Court
discarded contributory negligence and adopted comparative fault so that a plaintiff’s
own negligence no longer precludes her recovery entirely against a tortfeasor.
Tafoya, 193 P.3d at 556 (citing Scott v. Rizzo, 634 P.2d 1234, 1241–42 (1981)
(“hold[ing] that a pure comparative negligence standard shall supersede prior law in
New Mexico, and that a plaintiff suing in negligence shall no longer be totally barred
from recovery because of his contributory negligence.”), overruled on other grounds
by Herrera, 73 P.3d 181). To be sure, New Mexico law continues to impose a duty
upon drivers to stop, look, and listen before crossing railroad tracks. Scott and its
progeny mean, however, that a driver’s negligent breach of that duty no longer
entirely bars his own recovery from the railroad.
20
F.2d at 1088. Therefore, at this stage in the litigation we must decide whether any
genuine issues of fact exist as to whether BNSF breached its duty of reasonable care
in designing, constructing, or maintaining the crossing at issue and whether that
breach was a proximate cause of Galen’s collision.
C.
Plaintiffs fail to clear the first hurdle of providing evidence that raises genuine
issues of material fact as to BNSF’s breach. Aside from Dr. Heathington’s excluded
reports, Plaintiffs attached to their response to BNSF’s motion for summary
judgment the testimony of Harold Garcia, a San Miguel County representative, who
stated “the fence line . . . is what signifies the railroad right-of-way” and the end of
the county’s ownership of the road that crosses the track. Appx. at 365–66. They
attached portions of the deposition of David Rivera, a BNSF representative, who
testified that BNSF policy dictated “vegetation shall be controlled for the full width
of the railroad’s right-of-way at the crossing,” he could not recall any vegetation
within BNSF’s right-of-way that obstructs the view of an oncoming train, and that
approximately two trains a day pass through the crossing in addition to the
occasional empty freight train. Id. at 429, 438, and 443. Plaintiffs submitted the
testimony of the train’s engineer which described the accident in rather unfavorable
terms from Plaintiffs’ perspective. They also provided the deposition of the train’s
co-engineer in which he stated that he thought there were bushes and trees along the
fence line and that he could not see an approaching car because of that vegetation
21
until the car made the turn toward the tracks and passed the fence line. Id. at 393.
Plaintiffs additionally provided the testimony of Galen’s mother which described
Galen’s good driving habits, her personal experience in crossing the tracks, and
acquaintances’ close calls in crossing the tracks about which she had heard. Lastly,
Plaintiffs attached a single photograph of the stop and railroad crossing sign posted
by BNSF at the crossing. Id. at 444. 6
6
In their opening brief before this Court, Plaintiffs cite photographs and a
video they argue shows the dirt and gravel road that crosses the track and is lined on
both sides with intermittent vegetation outside of BNSF’s right-of-way. Aplt. Open.
Br. at 11–12; Appx. at 985–1002. Plaintiffs also cite pictures which they argue
depict some vegetation along and extending within the fence line that parallels the
track as well as down the tracks. And, they point to the affidavits of local residents
who described their inability to see the tracks until just before crossing them. Id. at
1014–31. However, they first presented this evidence to the district court after it had
entered summary judgment for BNSF in their response to San Miguel County’s
motion for summary judgment and called them to the court’s attention in their
unsuccessful motion for reconsideration of the district court’s grant of BNSF’s
motion for summary judgment. Though we review the grant of summary judgment
de novo, generally “our inquiry is limited to the summary judgment record before the
district court when the motion was decided.” West Coast Life Ins. Co. v. Hoar, 558
F.3d 1151, 1157 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations omitted). We also “ordinarily
limit[] our review to the materials adequately brought to the attention of the district
court by the parties.” Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 671 (10th Cir.
1998). Thus, we are not at liberty to consider that evidence on appeal of the grant
of summary judgment to BNSF.
We acknowledge Plaintiffs subsequently submitted this evidence and called
it to the court’s attention in Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration. But such an
acknowledgment provides Plaintiffs little relief. First, Plaintiffs would bear the
considerable burden of demonstrating the court’s denial of reconsideration
constituted an abuse of discretion. Fye v. Okla. Corp., Comm’n, 516 F.3d 1217,
1223–24 (10th Cir. 2008); Artes-Roy v. City of Aspen, 31 F.3d 958, 961 n.4 (10th
Cir. 1994) (refusing to consider evidence first presented to the district court with the
plaintiff’s motion to reconsider “because plaintiff cannot get a second chance to
(continued...)
22
None of this evidence suggests that BNSF breached its duty in designing or
constructing the crossing because it does not describe in more than general terms the
crossing’s configuration, construction, design, or elevation. As to the adequacy of
the warnings, the sole picture Plaintiffs attached reveals the crossing was marked
with a stop sign and a railroad crossing sign and that the sign was unobstructed.
Besides Dr. Heathington’s reports, Plaintiffs have not provided any evidence as to
how that warning was insufficient. The evidence remaining in the record comes the
closest to suggesting the existence of some sort of vegetation obstruction within
BNSF’s right-of-way. But ultimately it fails to raise a genuine issue of fact as to
whether any vegetation grew within BNSF’s right-of-way that obstructed a motorist’s
view of an oncoming train.
V.
Finally, we turn to Plaintiffs’ appeal of the grant of summary judgment to San
Miguel County. “For purposes of its motion for summary judgment and this appeal
only, San Miguel admits it[] had a duty to maintain a safe roadway and that it
6
(...continued)
present the facts on a motion to reconsider”). Second, and most important, though
Plaintiffs’ notice of appeal indicates they challenge the district court’s denial of
reconsideration, they have failed to argue on appeal it abused its discretion in
denying their motion for reconsideration. Instead, they choose to focus solely on the
court’s order granting summary judgment in favor BNSF. Thus, whether the district
court should have reviewed the evidence Plaintiffs provided subsequent to its
summary judgment order is not properly before us. See Jordan v. Bowen, 808 F.2d
733, 736 (10th Cir. 1987) (“Appellants who fail to argue the issue in their brief are
deemed to have waived their contention on appeal.”).
23
breached that duty when it failed to (1) remove vegetation on the approach to the
crossing; (2) improve [the road] to provide a stable, level and sufficiently-wide
driving surface; (3) change the configuration of [the road] so the approach to the
crossing did not involve multiple turns and slopes requiring driver attention; and (4)
erect an advance warning sign on [the road].” San Miguel Resp. Br. at 9. Regardless
of these breaches, the County argues that because Galen had a duty to stop at the
stop sign and no sight obstructions appear at the stop sign, Galen by virtue of his
fault alone either (1) stopped at the sign but misjudged the train’s speed in
proceeding through the crossing or (2) failed to stop at the sign altogether. Id. at 10.
San Miguel argues that as a result “Plaintiffs presented no facts which would allow
a reasonable jury to find its negligence proximately caused Galen Stoller’s death.”
Id. at 9.
The district court entered summary judgment for San Miguel, explaining:
In this case, Galen had the duty of ordinary care, which was to stop,
look, and listen at the railway crossing and then to proceed through the
crossing only if it was safe to do so. The undisputed facts indicate that
the crossing in question was marked as a railroad crossing; Galen was
familiar with the crossing; there was a stop sign at the crossing; Galen
had been instructed by his Mother to stop at the stop sign; the train
sounded its whistle prior to arriving at the crossing; and Galen’s car
was on the railroad tracks when the train collided with the vehicle.
Appx. at 1164. We take no issue with those findings. The district court went on to
conclude:
There is simply no evidence in this case that the County breached any
duty to Galen which was the proximate cause of his death. . . . [E]ven
24
if there was sight impairment at 50 feet from the crossing, there is no
evidence that there was sight impairment at the stop sign, which was 12
feet from the crossing and where every motorist has the duty to stop,
look, and listen and proceed only when safe to do so. The lack of
evidence of any negligence on the part of the County
entitles it to summary judgment. Id. at 1165.
Notably, however, San Miguel County has admitted its negligence. It only
disputes whether that negligence was a proximate cause of the collision. Therefore,
we need not decide whether Plaintiffs have presented a genuine issue of fact as to
whether San Miguel breached any duty it owed Galen. Instead, we must determine
if a genuine issue of fact exists as to whether San Miguel’s admitted negligence was
a proximate cause of the collision and whether Galen’s conduct constitutes an
intervening cause.
San Miguel acknowledges that under New Mexico law there may be more than
one proximate cause of an injury and that the issues of proximate and intervening
cause turn on foreseeability. Nonetheless, San Miguel contends that Galen’s failure
to stop at the stop sign or misjudgment of the train’s speed were unforeseeable. We
note, however, that whether Galen failed to stop and or negligently misjudged the
train’s speed is genuinely disputed. Regardless, San Miguel’s assumption that it
breached the duties it owed Galen means that we cannot hold as a matter of law that
Galen’s alleged failure to stop at the stop sign was the sole proximate cause of the
accident. See Lopez, 499 F.2d at 771.
Moreover, we cannot say at this stage in the litigation that as a matter of law
25
Galen’s alleged negligence was an intervening cause. Two cases convince us this
is so. In Lopez, the decedent motorist failed to stop at a nearby stop sign before
traversing the railroad crossing. Nonetheless, the jury entered a verdict in favor of
the passengers’ estates. 499 F.2d at 772. The railroad appealed the verdict, arguing
the trial court erred in refusing to give an intervening cause instruction. Id. “The
evidence showed that [the railroad] knew a high percentage of motorists failed to
stop at their railroad crossings.” Id. The evidence at trial also “suggested these
passive devices [stop signs and crossbucks] did not sufficiently warn motorists, who
were negotiating sharp curves and looking for traffic at intersections, that a train was
approaching.” Id. at 771. And, the railroad produced no evidence that the motorist’s
failure to stop produced a result that could not be reasonably foreseen to be a result
of the railroad’s failure to provide adequate warning devices. Id. at 772. We
therefore concluded the trial court did not err in refusing to give an intervening cause
instruction. Id. Notably, Lopez did not interpret New Mexico law to require the
plaintiffs to prove the railroad’s negligence caused the decedent to run the stop sign.
Lopez, instead, asked whether running a stop sign was a foreseeable result of the
railroad’s alleged negligence. Finding that it was, Lopez concluded the railroad was
not entitled to an intervening cause instruction and let the jury’s determination of
proximate cause stand.
In Lerma v. State Highway Department of New Mexico, 877 P.2d 1085 (N.M.
1994), a thirteen-year-old was hit by a car after climbing over a fence along a
26
freeway. The State Highway Department maintained in the subsequent personal
injury action that as a matter of law the child’s “intentional act of crossing the
interstate was the sole proximate cause of her injuries.” 877 P.2d at 1086. The trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of the Department, and the court of appeals
reversed. Id. at 1085. In concluding that genuine issues of material fact as to
proximate cause and comparative negligence existed, the New Mexico Supreme
Court explained “‘some degree of negligence on the part of all persons is
foreseeable’” and “[t]he fact that the danger may have been open and obvious would
not obviate a duty on the part of the Department to protect the public from the
public’s own foreseeable negligence.” Id. at 1088 (quoting Klopp v. Wackenhut
Corp., 824 P.2d 293, 297 (N.M. 1992)). Therefore, the Court refused to hold as a
matter of law that the child’s own conduct was the sole proximate cause of the
accident.
Although San Miguel County has not admitted it knew people regularly failed
to stop at railroad crossings or stop signs, running a stop sign or misjudging a train’s
speed seems at least as foreseeable as climbing over a four foot fence to cross a
freeway. And, the County has not provided any reason to conclude Galen’s alleged
failure to stop or inability to judge the speed of the train could not be reasonably
foreseen as a result of its admitted failure to “(1) remove vegetation on the approach
to the crossing; (2) improve [the road] to provide a stable, level and sufficiently-wide
driving surface; (3) change the configuration of [the road] so the approach to the
27
crossing did not involve multiple turns and slopes requiring driver attention; and (4)
erect an advance warning sign on [the road].” San Miguel Resp. Br. at 9. One of the
reasons someone may not stop before crossing railroad tracks or at a stop sign,
though he has the duty to do so, is that he does not perceive any danger because he
cannot see the approaching train before he gets to the stop sign or tracks as a result
of sight obstructions caused by vegetation or turns and slopes in the road. Therefore,
we cannot say as a matter of New Mexico law that Galen’s alleged negligence in
failing to stop at the stop sign or misjudging the speed of the train after stopping is
so far removed from San Miguel’s admitted negligence that his conduct constitutes
an intervening cause, breaking the proximate cause chain. We leave the ultimate
resolution of that question for the trier of fact.
For these reasons, we uphold the district court’s exclusion of Plaintiffs’
August expert report, uphold its exclusion of Plaintiffs’ February expert report as to
BNSF, vacate its exclusion of Plaintiffs’ February expert report as to San Miguel
County, AFFIRM its entry of summary judgment in favor of BNSF, REVERSE its
entry of summary judgment in favor of San Miguel County, and remand for further
proceedings.
Entered for the Court,
Bobby R. Baldock
United States Circuit Judge
28