Archuleta (Martinez) v. Lacuesta , 131 F.3d 1359 ( 1997 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
DEC 3 1997
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
ROSE ARCHULETA, Personal
Representative of the Estate of Marvin
Archuleta,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 96-2221
WESLEY LACUESTA, RONALD
HENSINGER, JOHN DENKO, NEW
MEXICO STATE POLICE
DEPARTMENT, and NEW MEXICO
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY,
Defendants - Appellants.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
(D. Ct. No. CIV-95-1274-MV)
Robert R. Rothstein and John L. Sullivan, Rothstein, Donatelli, Hughes,
Dahlstrom, Cron & Schoenburg, Santa Fe, New Mexico, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Louis N. Colon, Legal Bureau/RMD, State of New Mexico, Santa Fe, New
Mexico, for Defendants-Appellants.
Before ANDERSON, TACHA, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. *
TACHA, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff Rose Archuleta originally filed this action in New Mexico state
court, seeking damages for violations of federal and state law. After Defendants
removed the case to federal district court, Archuleta filed a motion to remand the
action to state court. The district court granted the motion, ruling that the
Eleventh Amendment barred some of the claims in federal court and further that
the entire action, including the federal claims not barred by the Eleventh
Amendment, should be remanded because removal was not authorized by 28
U.S.C. § 1441(a). Defendants seek to appeal the remand, or, alternatively, if we
determine that the remand order is reviewable but not appealable because it is not
a final order, they apply for a writ of mandamus reversing the remand. Because
the district court remanded this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c), however, we do
not have the power to review the remand order either through appeal or
mandamus. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). Consequently, we dismiss the appeal and
the application for mandamus.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Circ. R. 34.1.9. The case therefore is ordered
submitted without oral argument.
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Background
Rose Archuleta, the successor personal representative of the estate of
Marvin Archuleta, brought suit in the state district court for the Fourth Judicial
District, County of San Miguel, New Mexico, alleging that New Mexico State
Police officers used excessive force that resulted in the wrongful death of Marvin
Archuleta. Defendants include the chief of the New Mexico State Police, the
New Mexico State Police Department, the New Mexico Department of Public
Safety, and various New Mexico State Police officers. Archuleta’s amended
complaint asserted violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the New Mexico Tort
Claims Act, N.M. S TAT . A NN . § 41-4-12 (Michie Supp. 1996). Defendants
removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of New
Mexico by notice of removal filed on October 25, 1995, based on the federal
claims under § 1983. On October 31, 1995, Archuleta filed a motion to remand
the action to state court under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
In a Memorandum Opinion dated August 15, 1996, the district court
granted Archuleta’s motion to remand the entire action to state court. Citing
Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100-03 (1984),
and Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974), the court explained that the
Eleventh Amendment bars suits in federal court for damages against states, state
agencies, and state officials in their official capacities, unless the state
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unequivocally waives its immunity or Congress expressly abrogates the state’s
immunity in creating a statutory cause of action. See Archuleta v. Lacuesta, No.
6:95-CV-1274 MV/DJS, slip op. (unnumbered page 2) (D.N.M. Aug. 15, 1996).
The district court noted that Congress did not abrogate states’ Eleventh
Amendment immunity in enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Quern v. Jordan, 440
U.S. 332, 341 (1979), and that New Mexico has not waived its immunity from suit
in federal court, see N.M. S TAT . A NN . § 41-4-4(F) (Michie Supp. 1996). Thus,
the court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction over the claims against the state
defendants, including those against the individual state officials in their official
capacities, under the Eleventh Amendment. The court found that it only had
original jurisdiction over Archuleta’s federal claims against the state officials in
their individual capacities, though it could also have exercised supplemental
jurisdiction, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), over the state law claims against the
officials in their individual capacities. Nevertheless, the district court determined
that the entire action, including those claims over which it had jurisdiction, had to
be remanded to state court “because the Eleventh Amendment precludes this civil
action from being one which could have been originally filed in federal court”
and thus was not removable to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
Archuleta v. Lacuesta, slip op. (unnumbered page 6) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)).
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Discussion
The removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), states in relevant part, “. . .
[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the
United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the
defendants . . . .” Some courts, including the Fifth and Seventh Circuits, have
interpreted § 1441(a)’s reference to a “civil action” as requiring that the federal
district court to which the case is removed have original (or supplemental)
jurisdiction over the action in its entirety, foreclosing the possibility of piecemeal
removal. See McKay v. Boyd Constr. Co., 769 F.2d 1084, 1086-87 (5th Cir.
1985); Frances J. v. Wright, 19 F.3d 337, 340-42 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S.
876 (1994). According to Frances J. and McKay, “if even one claim in an action
is jurisdictionally barred from federal court by a state’s sovereign immunity, or
does not otherwise fit within the original or supplemental . . . jurisdiction of the
federal courts, then, as a consequence of § 1441(a), the whole action cannot be
removed to federal court.” Frances J., 19 F.3d at 341 (citing McKay with
approval).
Other circuits, however, have rejected this interpretation of § 1441,
requiring the district courts to remand those claims barred by the Eleventh
Amendment and retain jurisdiction over the claims not barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. See Kruse v. Hawaii, 68 F.3d 331, 334-35 (9th Cir. 1995); Henry v.
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Metro. Sewer Dist., 922 F.2d 332, 338-39 (6th Cir. 1990). In deciding to remand
this case in its entirety, the district court relied on other cases from the same
federal district, see, e.g., Flores v. Long, 926 F. Supp. 166 (D.N.M. 1995), appeal
dismissed, 110 F.3d 730 (10th Cir. 1997), and followed the approach of the Fifth
and Seventh Circuits. See Archuleta v. Lacuesta, slip op. (unnumbered page 4).
The Tenth Circuit has not yet had the opportunity to decide whether the
presence of claims barred by the Eleventh Amendment requires remand of an
entire civil case to the state court from which it was removed, or only remand of
the claims barred by the Eleventh Amendment. We do not determine today which
approach the Tenth Circuit will follow because, under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), we
lack jurisdiction to review the remand order.
This result is dictated by our decision in Flores v. Long, 110 F.3d 730 (10th
Cir. 1997). Flores involved facts nearly identical to those presented in this case.
The district court there had remanded the entire action to state court after
analyzing the split among the circuits on this issue and concurring with the
unitary “civil action” approach of Frances J. and McKay. Id. at 733. In
dismissing the defendants’ appeal and mandamus application in Flores, this court
addressed the threshold question of whether we had jurisdiction to review the
district court’s remand order in light of 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). Id. at 731. That
provision states in relevant part, “An order remanding a case to the State court
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from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise . . . .” The
Supreme Court has interpreted § 1447(d) more narrowly than its language
suggests, barring appellate review only if the district court remands on grounds
permitted by § 1447(c). Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 116 S. Ct. 494,
497 (1995); Thermtron Prod., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 345-46
(1976).
One of the grounds for remanding a case under § 1447(c) is the district
court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction. After examining the district court
order in Flores, we held in that case that we could not entertain the defendants’
appeal or mandamus application because the district court had based its remand
on its lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
A district court’s assertion that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and even
explicit references to § 1447(c), does not automatically render a remand order
nonreviewable under § 1447(d). See Flores, 110 F.3d at 732. In Flores, we
explained that we will determine by independent review the actual grounds upon
which the district court believed it was empowered to remand. Id. The district
court need not be correct in its determination that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction, however, so long as it made that determination in good faith. See id.
at 733.
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In Flores, we interpreted the ruling by the district court as a good faith
determination that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction for two
reasons. First, it was reasonable for the Flores district court to treat Eleventh
Amendment immunity as a jurisdictional bar because it is unclear whether the
Supreme Court would consider Eleventh Amendment immunity to be an
affirmative defense or a jurisdictional bar (which nonetheless can be waived) for
the purposes of the removal statute. Id. at 732. The Supreme Court has long
recognized that the Eleventh Amendment defense possesses qualities both of
subject matter jurisdiction, in that it can be raised for the first time on appeal, see,
e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677-78 (1974), and that of personal
jurisdiction, in that it can be waived by the affected party, Idaho v. Couer d’Alene
Tribe, 117 S. Ct. 2028, 2034 (1997). The Court has not directly determined how
it would treat Eleventh Amendment immunity for purposes of the removal statute.
Flores, 110 F.3d at 732-33.
Second, the district court, in the absence of guidance from this circuit and
in light of a split among the other circuit courts, was not unreasonable in
following the two circuits that have ruled that a district court lacks jurisdiction to
hear any part of a removed action when some of the claims are barred. See id. at
733. This court’s determination that the Flores district court made its
jurisdictional findings in good faith was unaffected by the fact that the court also
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referred to policy considerations such as preserving the plaintiff’s choice of
forum and judicial economy. See id.
Accordingly, we held:
The remand order was based to a fair degree upon the [district]
court’s finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the
case. Therefore, the district court remand was pursuant to § 1447(c)
and under § 1447(d) we have no jurisdiction to review the remand
order.
Id. Flores, then, stands for the proposition that where a district court in good
faith remands a case for lack of jurisdiction under § 1447(c), we do not have the
power to review the remand. We lack this power even where the district court
may have employed erroneous principles in concluding that remand is required.
Gravitt v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 430 U.S. 723, 723-24 (1977) (per
curiam); FDIC v. Alley, 820 F.2d 1121, 1123 (10th Cir. 1987). Thus, even if
Eleventh Amendment immunity does not act as a jurisdictional bar for purposes of
the removal statute, and even if the unitary “civil action” approach upon which
the Flores district court relied is incorrect, until the Tenth Circuit or the Supreme
Court has an opportunity to address these issues and decides otherwise, a district
court’s reliance on these theories as a basis for remanding an entire case is
beyond our power of review. This reasoning was the basis of our dismissal of the
appeal in Flores, and it likewise is the basis of our dismissal of the appeal in this
case.
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The district court here employed the same reasoning as the Flores district
court in concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case. See
Archuleta, slip op. (unnumbered page 4) (applying unitary “civil action” theory).
Here, as in Flores, we find that the district court made its jurisdictional
determinations in good faith. As in Flores, the court below bolstered its remand
decision with references to judicial economy and deference to the plaintiffs’
choice of forum. See id. (unnumbered pages 4-5). While these considerations, by
themselves, are not valid grounds for remand under § 1447(c), see Thermtron, 423
U.S. at 351, here they were not the exclusive grounds for the remand, but rather
were in addition to the jurisdictional grounds. Because the remand decision was
based to a fair degree on jurisdictional findings, we are precluded by § 1447(d)
from reviewing that decision, on appeal or otherwise.
Conclusion
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), we lack the power to review the district court’s
remand order in this case. Accordingly, we dismiss Defendants’ appeal and
application for mandamus.
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No. 96-2221, Archuleta v Lacuesta
BALDOCK, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
Assuming, as the court’s opinion does, that the Eleventh Amendment is a
limit on a federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction rather than a waivable
affirmative defense, a debatable assumption at best, the court correctly concludes
that under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), we do not have the power to review the district
court’s remand of the claims barred by the Eleventh Amendment. My agreement
with the court’s opinion ends with this conclusion. The court then conveniently
avoids the question of whether 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) requires remand of the entire
case where a portion of its claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, by
holding that the district court determined in good faith that it lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over the entire case. The court’s reading of the district court’s
order in this case is untenable. Contrary to the court’s opinion, we have both the
power and duty to review the district court’s remand of the claims which are not
barred by the Eleventh Amendment, because the district court’s remand order was
not, “to a fair degree,” based upon a lack of subject matter jurisdiction as required
by 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Flores v. Long, 110 F.3d 730, 733 (10th Cir. 1997).
Therefore, I dissent.
A.
Under § 1447(d), an order remanding an action on a ground authorized by
§ 1447(c) is immune from review. See Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 116
S. Ct. 494, 497 (1995). Only two grounds for remand exist under § 1447(c),
namely, (1) a lack of subject matter jurisdiction and (2) “any defect other than
lack of subject matter jurisdiction,” i.e., a procedural or nonjurisdictional defect. 1
Because this court dismisses the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, its
opinion does not address any other possible defect in Defendants’ removal. At
the outset, then, we are concerned only with the first ground for remand under
§ 1447(c)--the district court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the case.
As the court correctly notes, if a district court makes a “good faith”
determination that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a particular action,
despite relying on erroneous principles in doing so, then the remand order is
immune from review under § 1447(d). See Flores, 110 F.3d at 732-33. The court
also correctly notes that a district court’s assertion that it lacks subject matter
jurisdiction, even with reference to § 1447(c), does not per se render a remand
order unreviewable under § 1447(d). Rather, as we recognized in Flores,
“‘[P]owerful policy considerations and persuasive authority support our power--
and responsibility--to look past contextually ambiguous allusions and even
specific citations to § 1447(c) to determine by independent review of the record
the actual grounds or basis upon which the district court considered it was
1
On October 1, 1996, Congress amended § 1447(c) by removing the language
“any defect in removal procedure,” and replacing it with “any defect other than lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.” Pub. L. No. 104-219, 110 Stat. 3022 (1996).
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empowered to remand.’” Id. at 732 (quoting Mangold v. Analytic Serv. Inc., 77
F.3d 1442, 1450 (4th Cir. 1996)) (emphasis added).
But the court then reasons, erroneously, that because in Flores we construed
the district court’s remand order as concluding that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over the entire case, we are bound to read the district court’s remand
order in this case the same way. Not so. The availability of appellate review of a
particular remand order is determined by reference to that particular order, not an
order in an entirely different case. See Flores, 110 F.3d at 732. The district court
in this case never ruled it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action in its
entirety. Unlike our reading of the district court’s order in Flores v. Long, 926 F.
Supp. 166 (D.N.M. 1995), appeal dismissed 110 F.3d 730 (10th Cir. 1997), which
I am bound to accept, no reasonable reading of the district court’s remand order in
this case even remotely suggests that the district court remanded the case because
it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action in its entirety.
The district court ruled that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction only over
the claims against the state agencies, including the official-capacity claims
against the state officials, under the Eleventh Amendment. The district court
further ruled that it had original subject matter jurisdiction over the remaining
federal claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and supplemental jurisdiction over the
state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The court wrote: “It is therefore clear
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that the Court has original jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against the
named individual state officers in their individual capacities. Accordingly, the
Court would also have supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims
against the named individual state officials in their individual capacities.”
Archuleta v. Lacuesta, No. CV-95-1274-MV, unpub. order at 3-4 (D.N.M., filed
Aug. 15, 1996) (reproduced as Appendix I). The district court nevertheless
decided that 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) required it to remand the action in its entirety
because the Eleventh Amendment barred a portion of the claims. 2 The district
court supported its decision to remand the entire action with various policy
considerations having nothing to do with subject matter jurisdiction. The court
cited the policies of avoiding the additional costs, res judicata problems, and
possible prejudice to both parties engendered by parallel federal and state court
proceedings, as well as the policy of protecting Plaintiff’s choice of forum.
The only language in the district court’s order which even hints of a
purported lack of subject matter jurisdiction reads: “The Court further concludes
2
Section 1441(a) reads:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil
action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United
States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the
defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and
division embracing the place where such action is pending.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)
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that Defendants removed this case improvidently and without jurisdiction because
the Eleventh Amendment precludes this civil action from being one which could
have originally been filed in federal court.” Archuleta, unpub. order at 6
(emphasis added). Such language cannot justify this court’s conclusion that the
district court’s remand was based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. First,
the “improvidently and without jurisdiction” language was deleted from 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447 by the Judicial Improvement and Access to Justice Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-702, § 1016(c), 102 Stat. 4642, 4670 (1988), and could not have been
relied upon by the district court in good faith. Second, taken literally, the district
court’s statement is manifestly incorrect and cannot be relied upon in good faith
because civil actions containing claims barred by the Eleventh Amendment are
routinely filed in federal court. Only those claims barred by the Eleventh
Amendment are dismissed, not necessarily the entire action. See Pennhurst State
School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 121 (1984) (Eleventh
Amendment bars claims, not cases); Mascheroni v. Board of Regents, 28 F.3d
1554, 1558 (10th Cir. 1994) (same). Third, the only logical way to read the
district court’s statement is in the context of the district court’s reasoning as to
why it remanded the entire case. The district court remanded the case because it
believed 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) did not authorize the action’s removal from state
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court in the first place, not because the district court believed it lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over the action.
This court’s blind reliance on Flores forces us to ascribe a legal error to the
district court in this case that the district court never made–specifically, the error
that a removal in purported violation of § 1441(a) somehow deprived the district
court of subject matter jurisdiction. One cannot reasonably argue that the
removal statutes, including § 1441(a), set forth principles of subject matter
jurisdiction, although that’s what this court says the district court opined. The
unreasonableness of this court’s position is not surprising, but rather apparent,
because the removal statutes are solely procedural in nature. See e.g., Mackay v.
Uinta Development Co., 229 U.S. 173, 176 (1913) (“Removal proceedings are in
the nature of process to bring the parties before the United States court.”);
Peterson v. BMI Refractories, 124 F.3d 1386, (11th Cir. 1997) (“Supreme
Court has long treated the technical requirements of the federal removal statutes
as procedural, not jurisdictional.”); Korea Exchange Bank v. Trackwise Sales
Corp., 66 F.3d 46, 49 (3d Cir. 1995) (“Supreme Court [has] consistently refused
to treat the removal statutes as imposing independent jurisdictional
requirements.”). Even assuming § 1441(a) did not authorize the action’s removal,
the district court still had subject matter jurisdiction over those claims not barred
by the Eleventh Amendment. The district court expressly recognized this in its
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remand order. Archuleta, unpub. order at 3-4. In relying on § 1441(a) to remand
the entire action, the district court at most recognized a procedural or
nonjurisdictional defect in Defendants’ removal. See supra, note 1. Whether
Defendants’ removal of this action from state court was improper is a question
separate and apart from the question of the district court’s subject matter
jurisdiction. If the removal statutes were a source of subject matter jurisdiction,
then every defect in removal procedure would amount to an unwaivable lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. But this is not the case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)
(after 30 days, failure to object to a procedural or nonjurisdictional defect in
removal constitutes waiver). Thus, it escapes me how this court concludes that
the district court ruled in good faith that 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) somehow deprived
it of subject matter jurisdiction over the entire action.
B.
The only logical construction of the district court’s remand order is that
“the federal removal statute does not countenance piecemeal removal of particular
claims, and that ‘civil’ action under the removal statute [28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)]
refers to the entire case filed in state court.” Archuleta, unpub. order at 4.
Because, contrary to this court’s opinion, the district court clearly did not remand
the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and could not have done so in
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good faith, the court should address the issue of whether the presence of claims
barred by the Eleventh Amendment required the district court to remand the entire
action.
To resolve this issue, the court first should ask whether § 1441(a)
proscribes removal of an action where one portion of the action is within the
original subject matter jurisdiction of the district court, but the remaining portion
is not. If the answer to this first question is no, our inquiry there ends because we
undoubtedly have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to conclude that
the district court committed reversible error in remanding to state court the
federal claims against the state officials in their individual capacities. See
Quackenbush, 116 S. Ct. at 1718-20 (Because the district court’s remand order
was not properly based on § 1447(c) and put the litigants “effectively out of
court,” surrendering jurisdiction of a federal suit to a state court, the remand
order was final and appealable.).
If the answer to the first question is yes, however, the court next should ask
whether failure to meet the requirements of § 1441(a) constitutes a procedural or
nonjurisdictional defect under § 1447(c). If the answer to this second question is
no, the court likewise has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to affirm the
district court because a remand based upon a failure to meet the requirements of
§ 1441(a) is not an unreviewable order under § 1447(d). See Things
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Remembered, 116 S. Ct. at 497 (only an order remanding an action under §
1447(c) is immune from review under § 1447(d)).
If the answers to both the first and second questions are yes, the court then
should ask whether Plaintiff raised the § 1441(a) objection within thirty days of
removal as required by § 1447(c). If the answer is no, then Plaintiff has waived
the defect, and the court should issue a writ of mandamus directing the district
court to exercise jurisdiction over the federal claims. While this court has not
addressed the issue of whether, absent a timely objection, a district court is
empowered to remand an action sua sponte for a procedural or nonjurisdictional
defect under § 1447(c), every circuit to have considered the issue has held that a
district court lacks this power and issued a writ of mandamus directing the district
court to exercise jurisdiction. See e.g., In re First Nat’l Bank of Boston, 70 F.3d
1184, 1187-90 (11th Cir. 1995), vacated upon settlement 102 F.3d 1577 (11th Cir.
1996); Page v. City of Southfield, 45 F.3d 128, 132-33 (6th Cir. 1995); In re
Continental Cas. Co., 29 F.3d 292, 294-95 (7th Cir. 1994); In re Allstate Ins. Co.,
8 F.3d 219, 222-23 (5th Cir. 1993). See also Thermtron Products, Inc. v.
Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 352-53 (1976) (“[U]se of mandamus [is proper] to
prevent nullification of the removal statutes by remand orders resting on grounds
having no warrant in law.”).
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Finally, if the answer to all three questions is yes, the court would not have
jurisdiction to review the district court’s remand of this action under § 1447(d).
The court does have jurisdiction, however, to answer these questions for only then
can we determine whether the court actually lacks appellate jurisdiction to review
a remand based upon a timely objection to a procedural or nonjurisdictional defect
under § 1447(c). See Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308
U.S. 371, 376 (1940) (Federal courts have authority “to determine whether or not
they have jurisdiction to entertain the cause and for this purpose to construe and
apply the statute[s] under which they are asked to act.”).
C.
In this case, the court need not answer the second and third questions for its
answer to the first question should be a resounding no. Because § 1441(a) does
not proscribe removal of the federal claims against the state officials in their
individual capacities, the district court committed reversible error in remanding
these claims to state court. The court need not inquire further.
As the court’s opinion notes, the circuits are divided over this first question
of whether the presence of claims barred by the Eleventh Amendment requires
remand of an entire civil case to state court or only remand of the barred claims.
The Fifth and Seventh Circuits held the former. McKay v. Boyd Constr. Co., 769
F.2d 1084, 1086-87 (5th Cir. 1985); Francis J. v. Wright, 19 F.3d 337, 340-42
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(7th Cir. 1994). The Sixth and Ninth Circuits held the latter. Henry v. Metro
Sewer Dist., 922 F.2d 332, 338-39 (6th Cir. 1990); Kruse v. Hawaii, 68 F.3d 331,
334-35 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Brewer v. Purvis, 816 F. Supp. 1560, 1570-71
(M.D. Ga. 1993), aff’d w/o opinion, 44 F.3d 1008 (11th Cir. 1995). I believe the
latter is the better view.
McKay and Francis J. erroneously equate the requirements of the removal
statutes, specifically § 1441(a), (or what they call “removal jurisdiction”), which
are waivable, with original subject matter jurisdiction, which is not waivable. As
explained, § 1441 does not prescribe separate rules of subject matter jurisdiction.
Rather, § 1441 merely provides a procedural mechanism for a party to remove a
qualifying case to federal court. See Baris v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., 932 F.2d 1540,
1543-46 (5th Cir. 1991) (distinguishing improper removal from lack of subject
matter jurisdiction). Thus, both McKay and Francis J. improperly raised sua
sponte what at most was a procedural or nonjurisdictional defect which plaintiffs
had long since waived. This is simply wrong.
Perhaps the greater problem with McKay and Francis J., however, is the
construction that these cases place upon 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Section 1441(a)
states that “any civil action brought in State Court of which the district courts . . .
have original jurisdiction, may be removed . . . .” Both McKay and Francis J.
construe § 1441(a) to say that a district court must have original subject matter
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jurisdiction over a civil action in its entirety before removal is permitted.
Section 1441(a) cannot reasonably be read to say this.
A “civil action” is no less a civil action because it contains claims barred
by the Eleventh Amendment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 2 (“There shall be one form of
action to be known as ‘civil action.’”) A civil suit in federal court is a “civil
action,” whether the suit is originally filed in or removed to federal court. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(c) (“These rules apply to civil actions removed to the United
States district courts from the state courts.”). Had Plaintiff originally filed this
action in district court, the court undoubtedly would have maintained jurisdiction
over the federal law claims against the state officials in their individual capacities
under its original subject matter jurisdiction and would have dismissed the claims
barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Plaintiff might then have brought her
Eleventh Amendment claims in state court. In Pennhurst, the Supreme Court
recognized that application of the Eleventh Amendment may result in the trial of
claims arising out of a common incident in both federal and state court. 465 U.S.
at 121-22.
Second, a fully consistent reading of § 1441(a) under the logic of McKay
and Frances J. would bar removal of any civil rights action containing both
federal claims cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and state claims cognizable
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under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 3 This is because the term “original jurisdiction” as used
in § 1441(a) cannot be reasonably construed to include supplemental jurisdiction.
Supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367 differs unmistakably from original
jurisdiction. Yet, civil actions containing both federal and state law claims are
removable under § 1441(a). See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (permitting removal of
claims within the district court’s supplemental jurisdiction); H.R. Rep. No. 101-
734, at 22-23 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860, 6868-69 (indicating
claims within federal courts’ supplemental jurisdiction are removable). Thus, the
court should construe § 1441(a) to permit a defendant to remove those portions of
a federal civil rights action over which the district court has original subject
matter jurisdiction.
The court’s interpretation of § 1441(a) should afford closer parity in the
treatment of removed actions and original actions. Reasonably construed,
§ 1441(a) authorizes a defendant to remove any case which a plaintiff could have
3
Section 1367(a) provides:
Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided
otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district courts
have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental
jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action
within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or
controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (emphasis added).
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originally filed in federal district court. The court should read § 1441(a) as a
pass-through provision authorizing removal of a case which could have been
originally filed in federal court, and not as a provision providing different rules of
subject matter jurisdiction in removed cases. While the removal statute does not
countenance the partial removal of civil actions, the remand of only some of an
action’s claims clearly is permitted. See Westinghouse Credit Corp. v.
Thompson, 987 F.2d 682, 685 (10th Cir. 1993); Texas Hosp. Ass’n v. National
Heritage Ins. Co., 802 F. Supp. 1507, 1515-16 (W.D. Tex 1992) (collecting
cases). Because the Eleventh Amendment is a jurisdictional bar against specific
claims, not entire actions, it does not deprive a federal court of otherwise proper
jurisdiction over the remainder of the action.
D.
Understandably, the federal district judges in New Mexico are not
enthusiastic about adding more cases to their already crowded dockets. Not
surprisingly then, New Mexico’s federal district judges uniformly hold that the
district court’s lack of jurisdiction due to Eleventh Amendment immunity over
some but not all claims in a civil rights action bars removal of any part of the
action, and therefore remand the entire action. In addition to Flores and
Archuleta, also see Jackson v. Central New Mexico Correctional Facility, No.
CV-93-1384-PJK, unpub. order (D.N.M., filed March 15, 1996); Hill v. New
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Mexico, No. CV-95-0117-M, unpub. order (D.N.M., filed March 13, 1996); Atwa
v. New Mexico Highway & Transportation Dept., No. CV-95-948-JC, unpub.
order (D.N.M., filed Dec. 11, 1995); Fay v. Davis, No. CV-95-949-JP, unpub.
order (D.N.M., filed Dec. 5, 1995). But as the Supreme Court has admonished the
district courts: “[A]n otherwise properly removed action may be no more
remanded because the district court considers itself too busy to try it than an
action properly filed in the federal court in the first instance may be dismissed or
referred to state courts for such reason.” Thermtron Products, 423 U.S. at 344.
Federal district courts “have a strict duty to exercise the jurisdiction that is
conferred upon them by Congress.” Quackenbush, 116 S. Ct. at 1720-21. While
this duty is not absolute, a district court may decline to exercise its original
subject matter jurisdiction only in exceptional circumstances. See id. The
existence of a parallel state proceeding and the problems it engenders alone are
insufficient to support a decision to remand claims within a district court’s federal
question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The district court in this case based
its remand order largely on what it labeled “equitable and practical
considerations.” Archuleta, unpub. order at 4. Such considerations, however,
provide no basis for remanding an otherwise properly removed action for
damages. See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 116 S. Ct. 1712, 1728 (1996)
(“[F]ederal courts have the power to . . . remand cases based on abstention
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principles only where the relief being sought is equitable or otherwise
discretionary.”). In this case, I would direct the district court to exercise its
Congressionally-mandated jurisdiction over the federal claims against the state
officials in their individual capacities. 4 Accordingly, I dissent.
4
The district court remanded the state law claims against the officers in their
individual capacities even though the court recognized that these claims fell within its
supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The district court did not abuse its
discretion in remanding these claims. See King Fisher Marine Svc., Inc. v. 21st Phoenix
Corp., 893 F.2d 1155, 1158 (10th Cir. 1990). A district court may remand claims within
its supplemental jurisdiction when the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction is
inappropriate. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 351 (1988). The
district court may exercise this discretion to remand even when federal claims remain in
the suit. See Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Thompson, 987 F.2d 682, 684-85 (10th Cir.
1993). In this case, the Eleventh Amendment required remand of the state law claims
against the state officials in their official capacities. The district court did not abuse its
discretion in remanding the state law claims against the officials in their individual
capacities as well.
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