Winkel v. Hammond , 704 F. App'x 735 ( 2017 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
July 31, 2017
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
_________________________________ Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
ROBERT W. WINKEL,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 16-3290
(D.C. No. 5:13-CV-03103-SAC)
GEOFFERY HAMMOND, M.D., (D. Kan.)
Larned State Hospital; DILIP
PATEL, M.D., Larned State Hospital;
JOHN DOE, a/k/a (FNU) Oleachea;
JOHN DOES,
Defendants - Appellees.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before LUCERO, BALDOCK, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Proceeding pro se,1 El Dorado Correctional Facility prisoner Robert
Winkel appeals the district court’s dismissal of his civil action. In his
complaint brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Winkel alleges that while he
* After examining the brief and appellate record, this panel
unanimously determines that oral argument wouldn’t materially assist in
the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R.
34.1(G). This case is therefore submitted without oral argument. This
order and judgment isn’t binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. But it may be cited
for its persuasive value. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
1 We liberally construe Winkel’s pro se filings, but it’s not our role to
act as his advocate. James v. Wadas, 724 F.3d 1312, 1315 (10th Cir. 2013).
was under evaluation for competency to stand trial, certain employees at
the Larned State Security Hospital (LSSH) violated his constitutional due
process rights by forcibly administering antipsychotic medication.
The district court granted Winkel leave to proceed in forma pauperis
(IFP), directed service of process on the defendants, and requested that
officials at LSSH review Winkel’s allegations and prepare a report
pursuant to Martinez v. Aaron, 570 F.2d 317 (10th Cir. 1978).2
Three days after LSSH filed its Martinez report, the district court
sua sponte entered an order dismissing Winkel’s claim under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(b)(1) for “failure to state a claim for relief.” R. vol. 1, 161. Citing
facts from the Martinez report and its accompanying exhibits, the district
court concluded as follows:
Having considered the entire record, the [c]ourt concludes
plaintiff was afforded adequate due process in the two episodes
of forcible injections of medication. Staff repeatedly addressed
plaintiff, and there was consensus among medical staff that
the prescribed medication was both appropriate and necessary
to allow plaintiff to adequately care for himself and to avoid
any harm to others. The materials show the injections were
the result of an administrative determination that considered
the relevant aspects of plaintiff’s medical condition and the
need for the prescribed medication.
2 District courts order Martinez reports to aid in identifying and
clarifying the issues pro se plaintiffs raise in their complaints, to assist in the
court’s broad reading of pro se litigants’ pleadings, and to supplement
plaintiffs’ descriptions of the practices they contend are unconstitutional.
Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1112–13 (10th Cir. 1991).
2
R. vol. 1, 161. Based on this conclusion, the district court entered
judgment dismissing the case.
Winkel argues that the district court (1) improperly considered the
Martinez report in determining whether his complaint was sufficient to
state a claim, and, in doing so, (2) effectively issued a sua sponte summary
judgment ruling without providing him an opportunity to respond to the
facts contained in the Martinez report. We review de novo the district
court’s dismissal pursuant to § 1915A for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. McBride v. Deer, 240 F.3d 1287, 1289 (10th
Cir. 2001).
In determining whether a pro se complaint fails to state a claim,
courts apply the same standard applied under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See
Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007) (addressing standard
of review for dismissal of pro se complaint under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Thus, “we ‘look to the specific allegations in the
complaint to determine whether they plausibly support a legal claim for
relief.’” Id. at 1218 (quoting Alvarado v. KOB-TV, L.L.C., 493 F.3d 1210,
1215 n.2 (10th Cir. 2007)). In doing so, “we must accept the allegations of
the complaint as true and construe those allegations, and any reasonable
inferences that might be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff.” Gaines v. Stenseng, 292 F.3d 1222, 1224 (10th Cir. 2002).
3
Generally, “the sufficiency of a complaint must rest on its contents
alone.” Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1186 (10th Cir. 2010). While there
are limited exceptions, Martinez reports don’t fall within those exceptions
“unless ‘the plaintiff challenges a prison’s policies or established
procedures and the Martinez report’s description of the policies or
procedures remains undisputed after plaintiff has an opportunity to
respond.’” Id. (quoting Hall, 935 F.2d at 1112).
Here, Winkel’s complaint doesn’t challenge LSSH’s policies or
established procedures. And even if it did, the district court didn’t give
Winkel an opportunity to respond to the Martinez report. Moreover, the
district court impermissibly used the Martinez report to resolve factual
disputes. See Swoboda v. Dubach, 992 F.2d 286, 290 (10th Cir. 1993) (“In
determining whether a plaintiff has stated a claim, the district court may not
look to the Martinez report, or any other pleading outside the complaint
itself, to refute facts specifically pled by a plaintiff, or to resolve factual
disputes.”). Therefore, we conclude the district court erred in using the
Martinez report to dismiss Winkel’s complaint for failure to state a claim.
Next, we examine the complaint without reference to the Martinez
report to determine whether Winkel plausibly alleged a due process violation.
See Gee, 627 F.3d at 1187 (noting that district court’s reliance on outside
materials in granting motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim isn’t
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reversible error if dismissal can be justified without considering outside
materials).
Accepting Winkel’s alleged facts as true, we conclude that he states a
plausible Fourteenth Amendment violation. “The Due Process Clause permits
the state to treat a prison inmate who has a serious mental illness with
antipsychotic drugs against his will, if the inmate is dangerous to himself or
others and the treatment is in the inmate’s medical interest.” Washington v.
Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 227 (1990). Further, under certain circumstances, the
state may involuntarily medicate non-dangerous pretrial detainees with
antipsychotics in order to restore competency before trial. See United States
v. Bradley, 417 F.3d 1107, 1116 (10th Cir. 2005). To ensure due process under
these circumstances, however, the trial court ordering competency
restoration is required to determine whether “involuntary administration of
antipsychotic drugs ‘is necessary significantly to further important
governmental trial-related interests.’” Id. at 1113 (quoting Sell v. United
States, 539 U.S. 166, 179 (2003)). Thus, the trial court is required to consider
whether the state, “in light of the efficacy, the side effects, the possible
alternatives, and the medical appropriateness of a particular course of
antipsychotic drug treatment, [has] shown a need for that treatment
sufficiently important to overcome the individual’s protected interest in
refusing it[.]” Sell, 539 U.S. at 183.
5
Winkel’s complaint alleges that LSSH employees violated his due
process rights by forcibly medicating him with antipsychotics because (1) he
wasn’t dangerous and (2) the trial court failed to hold a hearing to determine
whether forcibly medicating Winkel—a non-dangerous pretrial detainee—
was necessary and appropriate.3 Winkel alleges that this forced
administration “was to make Winkel ‘more receptive’ and discourage his
refusal[]” to take prescribed medication. Reviewing Winkel’s complaint
without referencing the Martinez report, Winkel states a plausible claim
for violation of his due process rights. Accordingly, the district court erred
in dismissing his complaint. Thus, we reverse and remand for further
proceedings.4
The district court granted Winkel’s motion to proceed IFP on appeal,
and we remind Winkel that he must continue making partial payments
3 Winkel’s complaint attaches the trial court’s order committing him
to LSSH for pre-trial competency evaluation and treatment. The order and
an expert’s letter, which the order references, are silent regarding
involuntary administration of antipsychotics or consideration of the Sell
factors.
4 Winkel appeals from a number of other district court orders, and
seeks miscellaneous relief associated with those orders. Because we find
dismissal for failure to state a claim wasn’t appropriate here, we don’t
reach these arguments.
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until he has paid the full amount of his fees and costs.
Entered for the Court
Nancy L. Moritz
Circuit Judge
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