Crownhart v. Jones ( 2020 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT January 15, 2020
_________________________________
Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court
EARL CROWNHART,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 19-1470
(D.C. No. 1:19-CV-03389-LTB)
CYNDI JONES, (D. Colo.)
Defendant - Appellee.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before MATHESON, McKAY, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.**
_________________________________
Plaintiff Earl Crownhart filed a pro se complaint against Defendant Cyndi
Jones alleging claims involving a residential lease and housing dispute. Based on
Plaintiff’s history of filing numerous frivolous actions, the district court, in a
previous case, permanently enjoined Plaintiff from filing any civil actions in the
District of Colorado without representation by a Colorado-licensed attorney unless he
first obtains leave of court from a judicial officer to proceed pro se. See Crownhart v.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for
its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
**
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
Suthers, No. 1:13-cv-00959-LTB (D. Colo. June 14, 2013). Because Plaintiff was not
represented by a Colorado-licensed attorney and had not sought or obtained leave of
court to proceed pro se, the court dismissed the action without prejudice.
On appeal, Plaintiff reiterates his complaint’s allegations and asserts without
explanation that the district court’s refusal to review the merits of his claims violates his
due-process rights. We review a district court’s application of a previously-imposed
filing restriction for abuse of discretion. See In re Peterson, 338 F. App’x 763, 764 (10th
Cir. 2009). We are satisfied that the court did not abuse its discretion because
Plaintiff failed to abide by the restriction, neither obtaining representation nor
seeking leave of court before filing the action, and he presents no explanation on
appeal as to how application of the restriction violated his due-process rights. See
Coando v. Dominion Expl. Prod., Inc., 171 F. App’x 253, 254 (10th Cir. 2006); see
also Smith v. Krieger, 389 F. App’x 789, 799 (10th Cir. 2010) (properly imposed
filing restrictions do not violate constitutional due-process rights).
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of the action. We
DENY Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal1 and remind him of
1
The district court denied Plaintiff’s application to proceed IFP and certified
that any appeal would not be taken in good faith, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), which
precludes IFP status on appeal unless we conclude that Plaintiff’s appeal contains a
nonfrivolous argument, Rolland v. Primesource Staffing, L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1077, 1079
(10th Cir. 2007). The appeal is frivolous because Plaintiff’s only challenge to the
court’s decision is his unexplained ipse dixit that dismissal violated his due-process
rights. See Crownhart v. Muller, 575 F. App’x 834, 836 (10th Cir. 2014); Crownhart
v. Suthers, 531 F. App’x 906, 907 (10th Cir. 2013).
2
his obligation to pay his appellate filing fee in full.
Entered for the Court
Monroe G. McKay
Circuit Judge
3