Palmer v. City and County of Denver ( 2020 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT April 13, 2020
_________________________________
Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court
MARK PALMER,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 19-1171
(D.C. No. 1:18-CV-01003-REB-STV)
THE CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER; (D. Colo.)
OFFICE OF ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT; WORKFORCE
INVESTMENT BOARD; VALERIE
MCNAUGHTON; WILLIAM
GLASSMAN; AMY EDINGER;
SUZANNE IVERSEN; GARRY
HINTERLITER; CHIQUITA MCGOWIN;
RANAE TAYLOR; REBECCA BALU;
KATHLEEN MCCLEARY; CINDY
ACKERMAN; RYAN BRAND;
KRISTEN MERRICK; CAREER
SERVICE AUTHORITY,
Defendants - Appellees.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before MATHESON, BALDOCK, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Pro se plaintiff Mark Palmer appeals the district court’s order adopting the
comprehensive and well-reasoned recommendation of the magistrate judge to dismiss
Palmer’s second amended complaint.1 Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, we affirm. Further, we deny Palmer’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis
(IFP) on appeal.
Palmer’s suit arose from the termination of his employment as a management
analyst with the City and County of Denver. On March 19, 2019, the magistrate
judge issued his recommendation and informed Palmer that unless he filed written
objections within fourteen days, he would waive his right to appeal the district
court’s judgment. Palmer did not file any objections. The district court, on
plain-error review, “agree[d] without reservation with each and all the magistrate
judge’s recommendations.” R. at 865. The court also denied Palmer’s motion to
proceed IFP on appeal on the grounds that an appeal would be frivolous and not
taken in good faith.
“We have adopted a firm waiver rule when a party fails to object to the
findings and recommendations of the magistrate.” Duffield v. Jackson, 545 F.3d
1234, 1237 (10th Cir. 2008) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). “The
failure to timely object to a magistrate’s recommendations waives appellate review of
both factual and legal questions.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
1
The district court dismissed some claims with prejudice, and others without
prejudice.
2
And because Palmer has not advanced a rational argument on the law and
facts, we deny his motion to proceed IFP on appeal. See DeBardeleben v. Quinlan,
937 F.2d 502, 505 (10th Cir. 1991) (“In order to succeed on his motion [to proceed
IFP], an appellant must show a financial inability to pay the required filing fees and
the existence of a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on the law and facts in support of
the issues raised on appeal.”). Palmer does not address the magistrate judge’s
recommendation or explain why he did not file any objections. He suggests the court
review over 200 pages in attachments to his brief in lieu of argument so that he need
not relive the underlying events. This is unsatisfactory.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed. We deny Palmer’s motion to
proceed IFP on appeal and remind him that he remains obligated to pay all appellate
fees to the district court.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
3