United States v. Howard ( 2020 )


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  •                                                            FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS      Tenth Circuit
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                        April 13, 2020
    ___________________________________________
    Christopher M. Wolpert
    Clerk of Court
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.                                                  No. 19-6176
    (D.C. No. 5:18-CV-00897-D &
    TROY DEWAYNE HOWARD,                             5:13-CR-00165-D-1
    (W.D. Okla.)
    Defendant - Appellant.
    ___________________________________________
    ORDER
    ___________________________________________
    Before LUCERO, BACHARACH, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
    ___________________________________________
    This is Mr. Troy Dewayne Howard’s collateral challenge to a federal
    conviction. 1 A one-year limitations period applies, 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f), but
    Mr. Howard waited four years to begin this collateral challenge. The
    federal district court thus dismissed the challenge as untimely, and Mr.
    Howard wants to appeal.
    To appeal, he needs a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C.
    § 2253(c)(1)(B). We can grant the certificate only if Mr. Howard’s
    1
    The conviction was for distribution of child pornography. 18 U.S.C.
    § 2252A(a)(1).
    appellate argument is reasonably debatable. Slack v. McDaniel, 
    529 U.S. 473
    , 483–84 (2000).
    In the absence of tolling, the one-year period of limitations would
    have expired before Mr. Howard brought this challenge. The one-year
    period of limitations started when Mr. Howard’s conviction became final.
    See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1). 2 Mr. Howard’s sentencing took place on
    January 30, 2014, and Mr. Howard did not appeal, so his conviction
    became final on Monday, March 3, 2014. But Mr. Howard waited until
    September 5, 2018, to mail the collateral challenge to the court clerk. See
    Hoggro v. Boone, 
    150 F.3d 1223
    , 1226 n.3 (10th Cir. 1998) (stating that a
    prisoner’s habeas petition is deemed “filed” when placed in the prison’s
    mail system).
    Mr. Howard argues that the district court erred by failing to
    adequately consider the possibility of equitable tolling. Under equitable
    tolling, a claimant can obtain additional time by showing that (1) the
    claimant was pursuing his or her rights diligently and (2) the delay was
    caused by an “extraordinary circumstance” beyond his or her control.
    Holland v. Florida, 
    560 U.S. 631
    , 649 (2010).
    We have never found equitable tolling based on a claimant’s mental
    capacity. See Harms v. IRS, 
    321 F.3d 1001
    , 1006 (10th Cir. 2003). But we
    2
    In some circumstances, the one-year period runs from a different
    date. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). But these circumstances do not apply here.
    2
    can assume for the sake of argument that mental disease and intellectual
    deficits could justify equitable tolling. Even with this assumption,
    however, Mr. Howard would “bear a strong burden to show specific facts
    to support his claim of extraordinary circumstances and due diligence.”
    Yang v. Archuleta, 
    525 F.3d 925
    , 928 (10th Cir. 2008). Mr. Howard seeks
    to satisfy this burden based on a letter and psychological evaluation, but
    these documents would not trigger equitable tolling.
    In the letter, Mr. Howard requested an attorney. By the time of the
    letter, however, the limitations period had already expired. So equitable
    tolling would not have salvaged the collateral challenge. See Fisher v.
    Gibson, 
    262 F.3d 1135
    , 1142–43 (10th Cir. 2001) (concluding that a
    federal habeas petition was not tolled based on time in state collateral
    proceedings when the prisoner did not file in state court until expiration of
    the federal deadline).
    The psychological evaluation reflected diagnoses of borderline
    intellectual functioning, schizoaffective disorder, and bipolar disorder. But
    the psychological evaluation did not show that Mr. Howard was
    incompetent to participate in legal proceedings or unable to pursue his
    legal claims. Without such a showing, the court cannot toll the one-year
    period of limitations. See Biester v. Midwest Health Serv., Inc., 
    77 F.3d 1264
    , 1268 (10th Cir. 1998) (concluding that the limitations period was not
    3
    tolled in the absence of an adjudication of incompetency,
    institutionalization, or inability to pursue the claim). 3
    Given the indisputable failure to justify equitable tolling, no
    reasonable jurist could question the correctness of the district court’s
    ruling. We thus decline to issue a certificate of appealability. In the
    absence of a certificate, we also dismiss the appeal. See p. 1, above.
    Entered for the Court
    Robert E. Bacharach
    Circuit Judge
    3
    Mr. Howard does not present evidence that institutionalization
    prevented him from meeting the filing deadline. Although Mr. Howard has
    a history of mental health treatment, his last treatment reportedly occurred
    in 2009.
    4