Rodriguez v. Amtrak ( 2020 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT August 5, 2020
_________________________________
Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court
RODOLFO RODRIGUEZ,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 20-2053
(D.C. No. 1:19-CV-00111-MV-SMV)
AMTRAK; J. PERRY; C. CHAVEZ, (D.N.M.)
Defendants - Appellees.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before MATHESON, KELLY, and EID, Circuit Judges.**
_________________________________
Pro se1 plaintiff Rodolfo Rodriguez, a federal inmate, appeals the district
court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint for failure to pay filing fees.
Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we AFFIRM. We also grant
Rodriguez’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for
its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
**
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
1
Because Rodriguez is proceeding pro se, we liberally construe his
filings. United States v. Pinson, 584 F.3d 972, 975 (10th Cir. 2009). That said,
liberally construing a pro se filing does not include supplying additional factual
allegations or constructing a legal theory on the appellant’s behalf. Whitney v. New
Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173–74 (10th Cir. 1997).
I.
Rodolfo Rodriguez is a federal inmate incarcerated in the Torrance County
Detention Facility in Estancia, New Mexico. On February 8, 2019, Rodriguez filed
this suit against Amtrak and certain DEA agents alleging infringement of his Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Rodriguez’s complaint challenges the
circumstances of his arrest for heroin possession with intent to distribute, which
occurred while he was aboard an Amtrak train.
On July 2, 2019, the magistrate judge granted Rodriguez’s motion to proceed
in forma pauperis and ordered Rodriguez to make periodic payments of $15.76
toward the filing fee. The first payment of $15.76 was due no later than August 1,
2019, and the magistrate judge alerted Rodriguez that his suit could be dismissed if
he did not make the payment by that deadline. Rodriguez failed to make this
payment or show cause as to why he could not pay. Instead, he petitioned the district
court a second time for leave to appear in forma pauperis. The magistrate judge
dismissed this second petition on March 3, 2020, noting Rodriguez already had leave
to appear in forma pauperis.
On April 17, 2020, because Rodriguez still had not made the required payment
of $15.76 or shown cause as to why he could not, the district court dismissed his case
without prejudice under Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On May
20, 2020, the district court received a $16.00 partial filing fee payment from
Rodriguez.
2
II.
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, an indigent inmate appearing in
forma pauperis need not prepay federal court filing fees but may be ordered by the
court to make partial payments toward the filing fee. Cosby v. Meadors, 351 F.3d
1324, 1326 (10th Cir. 2003); 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915. When a district court requires
partial payments and the plaintiff has the means to make them but does not do so, the
court may dismiss the complaint for failure to comply with its order. Cosby, 351
F.3d at 1327. Even if a plaintiff eventually pays the overdue fee, the court still has
the authority to dismiss the complaint without prejudice. Love v. Werholtz, 113 F.
App’x 362, 363 (10th Cir. 2004).
Before dismissing a complaint without prejudice for failure to comply with a
court order, a court should ordinarily consider the factors outlined by Ehrenhaus v.
Reynolds: “(1) the degree of actual prejudice to the defendant; (2) the amount of
interference with the judicial process; . . . (3) the culpability of the litigant; (4)
whether the court warned the party in advance that dismissal of the action would be a
likely sanction for noncompliance; and (5) the efficacy of lesser sanctions.” 965 F.2d
916, 921 (10th Cir. 1992) (internal citations omitted); see also Mobley v. McCormick,
40 F.3d 337, 340–41 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding the Ehrenhaus factors apply to Rule
41(b) involuntary dismissals).
We review a district court’s dismissal for failure to comply with a court order
for abuse of discretion. Cosby, 351 F.3d at 1326. A district court abuses its
discretion when it “makes a clear error of judgment or exceed[s] the bounds of
3
permissible choice in the circumstances.” Ecclesiastes 9:10-11-12, Inc. v. LMC
Holding Co., 497 F.3d 1135, 1143 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted).
III.
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing
Rodriguez’s claim for nonpayment. On appeal, Rodriguez primarily reiterates the
merits of his case and never disputes that he failed to pay the filing fee by the August
19, 2019, deadline. Instead, Rodriguez argues that he failed to pay the filing fee on
time because his mail had been delayed due to a change in his place of incarceration.
R. at 173. He claims that this prevented him from receiving notice of his case’s
pending dismissal until after it was already dismissed. Id. Rodriguez’s argument is
unpersuasive, however, because he did not file a change of address with the court
until February 11, 2020—six months after payment was due. Id. at 2–3, 158; see
Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(C). While Rodriguez did eventually make a partial payment,
it was nine months overdue. See Love, 113 F. App’x at 364 (affirming the district
court’s Rule 41(b) dismissal where the plaintiff “eventually paid the $24.00 fee . . .
five months too late”).
Furthermore, we agree with the district court that the Ehrenhaus factors weigh
in favor of dismissal. Ehrenhaus, 965 F.2d at 921. Although the first factor—the
degree of prejudice to the defendants—weighs against dismissal because the
defendants had not been served and the court had not completed screening, this does
not overcome the weight of the other four factors. See Cosby, 351 F.3d at 1333; see
4
also Garcia v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co. Of Am., 569 F.3d 1174, 1182 (10th Cir. 2009)
(upholding dismissal when most, but not all the Ehrenhaus factors were met).
With respect to the second factor, Rodriguez’s nonpayment hindered the
ability of the court to move forward on his case. As to the third factor, Rodriguez
neither paid nor provided a valid reason for his failure to pay the fee for over nine
months. As to the fourth factor, Rodriguez was repeatedly warned that he must pay
the fees and still failed to do so. Finally, as to the fifth factor, the district court was
within its discretion in concluding Rodriguez would not have complied with lesser
sanctions such as fines.
In sum, because Rodriguez did not make the required payment until nine
months after the deadline—once his case had already been dismissed—and he
provided no justification for his nonpayment, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in dismissing his complaint. See Kouris v. Gurley, 272 F. App’x 724, 726
(10th Cir. 2008).
IV.
For these reasons, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
dismissing Rodriguez’s complaint for nonpayment. We therefore AFFIRM the
judgment of the district court. We also grant Rodriguez’s motion to proceed in forma
5
pauperis and remind him of his obligation under § 1915(b) to make payments until
the appellate filing fee is paid in full.
Entered for the Court
Allison H. Eid
Circuit Judge
6