United States v. Fields ( 2020 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS August 7, 2020
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 19-2081
v. (D.C. No. 2:02-CR-02262 JAP-3)
(D.N.M.)
WILLIAM MACK FIELDS,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, SEYMOUR and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
William Mack Fields appeals the dismissal of his motion for sentence reduction
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B) and § 404 of the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L.
No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (enacted December 21, 2018). We dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction because Mr. Fields has completed his prison sentence and the appeal is moot.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered
submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent,
except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may
be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
I.
On April 29, 2003, Mr. Fields pled guilty to seven counts charged in a second
superseding indictment, including conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute less than
5 grams of crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, possession with intent to
distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) &
(b)(1)(A), possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i), and other related crimes. Mr. Fields had a prior drug
felony conviction which doubled the mandatory minimum sentence. As a part of his
plea, Mr. Fields stipulated pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C) that a sentence of
twenty years (240 months) was appropriate. On October 3, 2003, the district court
accepted the plea agreement and sentenced Mr. Fields to 20 years imprisonment and 10
years of supervised release.
On December 31, 2018, following enactment of the First Step Act, Mr. Fields filed
a motion for sentence reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B) and § 404 of the
First Step Act. Section 404 authorizes a sentencing court to impose a reduced sentence
for crack cocaine offenses as if the lower penalties of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010,
Pub. Law 111-220; 124 Stat. 2372, were in effect at the time of the original sentencing.1
Mr. Fields’s only prayer for relief was that the court reduce his 20-year sentence to time
1
Relevant here, section two of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 increased the
amount of cocaine base required to trigger a mandatory minimum sentence under 21
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). Pub. Law 111-220; 124 Stat. 2372.
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served. The district court denied Mr. Fields’s motion and he appeals. After filing this
appeal, Mr. Fields was released from prison and began a 10-year term of supervised
release on October 1, 2019.2
II.
We cannot consider the merits of an appeal unless we first establish jurisdiction to
hear the case. United States v. Vera-Flores, 496 F.3d 1177, 1180 (10th Cir. 2007).
Under Article III of the Constitution, federal judicial power is limited to “Cases” or
“Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. “This case-or-controversy requirement subsists
through all stages of federal judicial proceedings, trial and appellate.” Spencer v. Kemna,
523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (citation omitted). “Article III requires a party seeking relief to have
suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the appellee and likely to be
redressed by a favorable judicial decision by the appeals court.” Vera-Flores, 496 F.3d at
1180 (citation, brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). A case becomes moot
when a plaintiff no longer suffers a redressable injury. Iron Arrow Honor Soc’y v.
Heckler, 464 U.S. 67, 70 (1983). If a case is moot, federal courts do not have subject
matter jurisdiction and must dismiss the case. See Schell v. OXY USA Inc., 814 F.3d
1107, 1114 (10th Cir. 2016).
“When an incarcerated criminal defendant appeals his conviction, the ongoing
incarceration constitutes an injury from which the defendant seeks relief in satisfaction of
2
When he filed his appeal, Mr. Fields had served sixteen years of his sentence.
3
Article III.” United States v. Meyers, 200 F.3d 715, 718 (10th Cir. 2000). But if the
defendant’s prison sentence has expired, a challenge to the conviction is moot unless
there is an ongoing collateral consequence of the conviction, Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7, “that
can be redressed by a favorable judicial decision,” Rhodes v. Judiscak, 676 F.3d 931, 933
(10th Cir. 2012) (quoting Iron Arrow Honor Soc’y, 464 U.S. at 70 ).
In Rhodes, a habeas petition was filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging the
Federal Bureau of Prisons’ calculation of the defendant’s sentence. Id. at 932–33. After
learning that Mr. Rhodes had been released from prison, the district court dismissed the
petition as moot, notwithstanding his unexpired term of supervised release. Id. at 933.
We affirmed on appeal, clarifying that “[t]he question is not whether the [§ 2241]
petition, which challenges only the calculation of Rhodes’ prison sentence, asserts a
collateral consequence, but whether it asserts a redressable collateral consequence.” Id.
In analyzing this question, we recognized that any modification of Mr. Rhodes’
supervised release term was “wholly within the discretion of the sentencing court.” Id. at
935. We explained that the court could decide to reduce his sentence based upon
equitable considerations that he overserved his sentence. But we noted that the
sentencing court could also “refuse to terminate his supervised release—even in light of
an overlong sentence,” so it was “entirely speculative whether a declaration from this
court stating that Rhodes’ sentence was excessive [would] aid him in the future.” Id.
In the present case, Mr. Fields contends that his mandatory minimum sentence
under the First Step Act would have been twenty years instead of thirty years. If that had
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been the case, he argues, he likely could have gotten the government to stipulate to a
“sentence of less than sixteen years.” Aplt. Br. at 10. Even assuming this is correct, the
only relief Mr. Fields sought was to reduce his sentence to time served, which is mooted
by his release.
Mr. Fields asserts that his appeal is not moot because he is still subject to the
collateral consequence of supervised release. In support of this argument, he cites our
opinion in United States v. Sandoval-Enrique, 870 F.3d 1207 (10th Cir. 2017). In that
case, however, the defendant did not challenge his sentence but rather sought to withdraw
his guilty plea and have his conviction vacated. Id. at 1210. When a defendant
challenges his conviction, we “presume that a defendant remains subject to collateral
consequences that continue to flow from the existence of the challenged conviction even
after the sentence has been served.” Id. at 1211. Here, because Mr. Fields challenged his
sentence, not his conviction, he is not entitled to that presumption and therefore must
“show that he remains subject to collateral consequences,” which are redressable by this
court. Id. at 1210.
While Mr. Fields’ “liberty is affected by ongoing obligations to comply with
supervised release conditions and restrictions,” Rhodes, 676 F.3d at 933 (citation
omitted), he has failed to establish that this collateral consequence is redressable by this
court. He argues that a favorable ruling by us could potentially reduce his ten-year
supervised release term. For drug offenses, however, mandatory minimum terms for
supervised release are established by statute, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), and were not
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changed by the First Step Act. Therefore, we cannot “give [Mr. Fields] a judicial make-
up call by shortening his supervised release term.” Rhodes, 676 F.3d at 935. “[T]he best
this court could do for [Mr. Fields] would be to declare that he spent longer in prison than
he should have. It is merely speculative, however, that such a declaration could redress
[his] injury.” Id
Mr. Fields also contends that a determination by us that he overserved time in
prison could result in “credit towards a sentence for any future violation of supervised
release.” Aplt. Rep. Br. at 3. This argument fails for two reasons. First, it is “entirely
speculative whether a declaration from this court stating that [Mr. Fields’] sentence was
excessive will aid him in the future.” Rhodes, 676 F.3d at 935. Second, the hypothetical
collateral consequence is “contingent upon [Mr. Fields] violating the law,” and he is
obligated by law “to prevent such a possibility from occurring.” Spencer, 523 U.S. at 15
(citation omitted). We cannot agree that the case-or-controversy requirement can be
satisfied by speculation that a defendant will break the law in the future. Cf. id. (“[W]e
are . . . unable to conclude that the case-or-controversy requirement is satisfied by general
assertions . . . [that] respondents will be prosecuted for violating valid criminal laws.”)
(quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 497 (1974) (first omission in original)).
In sum, we do not have jurisdiction over this appeal because Mr. Field’s release
from prison rendered his § 3582(c)(1)(B) motion for sentence reduction moot.
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Accordingly, we do not reach the merits of any issue raised on appeal, including the
applicability of § 404 of the First Step Act.
Entered for the Court
Stephanie K. Seymour
Circuit Judge
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