Lister v. City of Wichita , 666 F. App'x 709 ( 2016 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
TENTH CIRCUIT November 15, 2016
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
JAMES LEE LISTER,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 16-3229
(D.C. No. 6:16-CV-01038-JTM-GEB)
CITY OF WICHITA, KANSAS, (D. Kan.)
Defendant - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before LUCERO, MATHESON, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.
James L. Lister, proceeding pro se,1 appeals from the district court’s dismissal of
his complaint against his former employer, the City of Wichita, Kansas. Exercising
*After examining Mr. Lister’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not
binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed.
R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
1
Because Mr. Lister is proceeding pro se, we construe his pleadings and
arguments on appeal liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per
curiam); see also United States v. Pinson, 584 F.3d 972, 975 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e
must construe [a pro se litigant’s] arguments liberally; this rule of liberal construction
stops, however, at the point at which we begin to serve as his advocate.”).
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On October 13, 2015, Mr. Lister filed a charge of discrimination with the Kansas
Human Rights Commission, the state agency with authority to investigate employment
discrimination claims brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In it, he
alleged the City of Wichita violated Title VII by discriminating against him because of
his race and retaliating against him for complaining about such discrimination. Mr.
Lister listed the date of discrimination as September 23, 2014, the date the City fired him.
Mr. Lister’s charge of discrimination was dismissed as untimely because it was not filed
within the 300-day statutory filing period calculated from Mr. Lister’s allegedly unlawful
termination.
On February 4, 2016, Mr. Lister filed a complaint in the United States District
Court for the District of Kansas making largely the same allegations.2 He also filed a
motion for appointment of counsel, which the court denied because it suspected Mr.
Lister’s claims were time-barred.
On March 11, 2016, the City filed a motion to dismiss the complaint as time-
2
In the complaint, Mr. Lister said the discrimination occurred between July 2015
and September 2015, rather than September 23, 2014, the date he listed in his charge. As
the district court acknowledged, Mr. Lister must have misstated the year, as the
documents attached to his complaint showed he was fired in 2014, not 2015. See App. at
32 (letter from the City of Wichita attached to the complaint listing the date of
termination as September 22, 2014—a year before the dates listed in his complaint, and a
day before the date listed in his charge).
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barred because Mr. Lister had not filed his charge of discrimination within the statutory
filing period. On June 23, 2016, the court granted the motion, agreeing with the City that
Mr. Lister’s claims were time-barred. The court entered judgment that same day.
On July 12, 2016, Mr. Lister filed a motion to amend or alter the court’s judgment
under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The motion included a request
under Rule 15 to amend his complaint. The document was titled: “Memorandum in
Support of Defendant’s Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment[;] Appeal to
10th Circuit Court of Appeals.” App. at 67. As we discuss below, this document
attempted to do two things: (1) move for relief from the judgment under Rule 59,
including a chance to amend his complaint, and (2) provide notice of his appeal to this
court.
On July 22, 2016, the district court denied Mr. Lister’s Rule 59 motion to alter or
amend the judgment. Mr. Lister did not appeal that denial.
In this appeal from the June 23, 2016 order granting the City’s motion to dismiss,
Mr. Lister raises several arguments that his termination by the City was unlawful. He
also argues the district court erred by determining that he had not exhausted his available
administrative remedies before filing his lawsuit, not giving him “a chance to re-do [his]
lawsuit,” not appointing counsel, and “fail[ing] to hear [his] case.” Aplt. Br. at 2, 4. He
asks us to reverse the district court’s judgment and remand for trial.
II. JURISDICTION
This case presents two jurisdictional questions. First, did Mr. Lister file a
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sufficient notice of appeal? Second, what is the scope of our jurisdiction?
We answer yes to the first question. A notice of appeal must specify (1) “the party
or parties taking the appeal,” (2) the “judgment, order, or part thereof being appealed,”
and (3) “the court to which the appeal is taken.” Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(A)-(C). Courts
“liberally construe the requirements of Rule 3.” Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248
(1992). “Thus, when papers are technically at variance with the letter of Rule 3, a court
may nonetheless find that the litigant has complied with the rule if the litigant’s action is
the functional equivalent of what the rule requires.” Id. (brackets and quotations
omitted). Although not perfect, Mr. Lister’s notice of appeal was the “functional
equivalent” of what Rule 3 requires, as it specified that (1) he was the party taking the
appeal, (2) he appealed the “judgment” of the district court entered on June 23, 2016, and
(3) he intended to take his appeal to the Tenth Circuit. It was therefore sufficient to give
the City notice of his intent to appeal the district court’s judgment to our court. His
appeal was also timely filed within 30 days of the district court’s judgment. See Fed. R.
App. P. 4(a)(1)(A).
The answer to the second question is mixed. Mr. Lister’s notice was sufficient to
appeal the district court’s June 23, 2016 judgment, which included its order dismissing
his claims and its order denying his motion to appoint counsel. See Cole v. Ruidoso Mun.
Sch., 43 F.3d 1373, 1382 n.7 (10th Cir. 1994) (“[A] notice of appeal that names the final
judgment is sufficient to support review of all earlier orders that merge in the final
judgment under the general rule that appeal from a final judgment supports review of all
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earlier interlocutory orders.” (quotations omitted)). But Mr. Lister’s notice of appeal was
insufficient to appeal the court’s July 22, 2016 order denying Mr. Lister’s Rule 59(e)
motion because his notice of appeal, filed in the same document as his Rule 59(e) motion
on July 12, 2016, was filed before the court issued a final order on that motion. See
Coll v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 642 F.3d 876, 884-85 (10th Cir. 2011). To appeal the
court’s ruling on his Rule 59(e) motion, Mr. Lister was required to file a second notice of
appeal after the court issued its final order on his motion. See id. at 885 (citing Fed. R.
App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii)). But Mr. Lister did not file a second notice.
Thus, although we have jurisdiction to consider the district court’s June 23, 2016
judgment, including both its dismissal of Mr. Lister’s claims and its denial of his motion
for appointed counsel, we have no jurisdiction to review the district court’s July 22, 2016
order denying his Rule 59(e) motion, which included a request to amend his complaint
under Rule 15. See Coll, 642 F.3d at 886; see also Breeden v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 115
F.3d 749, 752 (10th Cir. 1997) (exercising jurisdiction over the underlying case but not
over an order disposing of a Rule 59(e) motion filed after the notice of appeal because the
appellant did not amend his notice of appeal).
III. DISCUSSION
As noted above, we construe Mr. Lister’s brief on appeal as challenging the
district court’s orders (1) dismissing Mr. Lister’s claims, (2) denying his motion to
appoint counsel, and (3) denying his Rule 59(e) motion, which sought to amend his
complaint under Rule 15. But, as noted, we do not have jurisdiction over the third order
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denying his Rule 59(e) motion, so we do not review it here.
A. Dismissal Order
1. Standard of Review
We review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Gorsuch, Ltd., B.C. v. Wells Fargo
Nat’l Bank Ass’n, 771 F.3d 1230, 1236 (10th Cir. 2014). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, a complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
2. Legal Standard
To bring a lawsuit, an employee must file a charge of discrimination with the
Equal Opportunity Employment Commission or appropriate state agency within a
specified statutory timeframe “after the unlawful employment practice occurred.” 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). That timeframe is 300 days for employees living in states, like
Kansas, with agencies that have authority to investigate employment discrimination. Id.;
Proctor v. United Parcel Serv., 502 F.3d 1200, 1206 n.3 (10th Cir. 2007). The timeframe
begins when the Title VII claim accrues, typically “on the date the employee is notified
of an adverse employment decision by the employer.” Proctor, 502 F.3d at 1206(quotations omitted).
Failure to comply with Title VII’s timely filing requirement bars an employee
from filing a claim in district court. See Montes v. Vail Clinic, Inc., 497 F.3d 1160, 1167
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(10th Cir. 2007).
3. Analysis
Mr. Lister’s discrimination claims allege both that he was harassed during his
employment between August 2014 and September 2014 and that he was unlawfully fired
“[o]n or about September 23, 2014.” App. at 16. Mr. Lister’s claims accrued no later
than September 23, 2014—the date of his termination—Mr. Lister had until July 20,
2015, to file his charge of discrimination to satisfy the 300-day statutory filing period.
But Mr. Lister waited to file his charge until October 13, 2015—85 days past the filing
period. The district court therefore did not err in dismissing Mr. Lister’s claims as time-
barred. See Montes, 497 F.3d at 1167.
B. Denial of Appointment of Counsel
1. Standard of Review
A district court’s decision on whether to appoint counsel in a Title VII action is
ordinarily reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Castner v. Colo. Springs Cablevision, 979
F.2d 1417, 1422-23 (10th Cir. 1992). “Such a review, however, presupposes the
application of a reasoned and well-informed judgment, guided by sound legal principles.”
Id. at 1423.
2. Legal Standard
“A plaintiff asserting an employment discrimination claim has no constitutional or
statutory right to appointed counsel.” Castner, 979 F.2d at 1420. Under 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f)(1), “[u]pon application by the complainant and in such circumstances as the
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court may deem just, the court may appoint an attorney for such complainant.” “The
discretion granted to the district court [under the statute] is extremely broad.” Castner,
979 F.2d at 1420. To guide such discretion, courts look to (1) the plaintiff’s ability to
afford counsel; (2) the plaintiff’s diligence in searching for counsel; (3) the merits of the
plaintiff’s case; and, for close cases, (4) the plaintiff’s capacity to prepare and present the
case without the aid of counsel. Id. at 1420-21.
3. Analysis
Following Mr. Lister’s motion to appoint counsel, the district court reviewed the
four factors outlined in Castner, and, “[a]fter careful consideration,” declined to appoint
Mr. Lister counsel. App. at 47. The court found that the first two Castner factors—his
ability to afford counsel and his diligence in searching for counsel—weighed in favor of
Mr. Lister. But the court had “misgivings” about the merits of Mr. Lister’s claims
because the court suspected they were time-barred. Id. The court left open the
possibility of appointing counsel at a future date if Mr. Lister’s claims progressed.
As discussed above, the court’s concern about the merits of Mr. Lister’s claims
were well-founded. The court’s decision was also well-reasoned, well-informed, and
guided by the principles of Castner. Because we cannot say the district court abused its
discretion by not appointing counsel for Mr. Lister, we affirm. Castner, 979 F.2d at
1423.
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IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the district court’s judgment.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Scott M. Matheson, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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