Bramhall v. Salt Lake District Attorney's ( 2020 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT March 4, 2020
_________________________________
Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court
EARL E. BRAMHALL,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 19-4032
(D.C. No. 2:18-CV-00438-DB-EJF)
SALT LAKE DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S (D. Utah)
OFFICE; SIMARJIT S. GILL, Salt Lake
District Attorney; MELANIE M.
SERASSIO, Deputy District Attorney;
STEVEN C. GIBBONS, Deputy District
Attorney; NATHANIEL J. SANDERS,
Deputy District Attorney; ROBERT N.
PARRISH, Deputy District Attorney;
NATHAN J. EVERSHED, Deputy District
Attorney; CHOU CHOU COLLINS,
Deputy District Attorney; THOMAS V.
LOPRESTO, Deputy District Attorney;
CRAIG STANGER, Deputy District
Attorney; JARED W. RASBAND, Deputy
District Attorney; CHRISTINA P.
ORTEGA, Deputy District Attorney;
GREGORY N. FERBRACHE, Deputy
District Attorney; JARED N. PARRISH,
Deputy District Attorney; CYPRUS
CREDIT UNION, West Valley, Utah;
BROOK BENNION, Previous Branch
Manager, Cyprus Credit Union,
Defendants - Appellees.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent,
_________________________________
Before LUCERO, BALDOCK, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Earl Bramhall appeals from the district court’s order dismissing without
prejudice his complaint against various members of the Salt Lake District Attorney’s
Office (the “County Defendants”) as well as Cyprus Credit Union and Brook Bennion
(the “Bank Defendants”). We dismiss this appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
I
Bramhall was arrested on July 23, 2008, for aggravated robbery and making
threats against life or property. Officers from the West Valley City Police
Department believed Bramhall had called a branch of the Cyprus Credit Union earlier
that morning from a pay phone and told the branch manager, Bennion, that he wanted
$100,000 in cash, that he was a sharp shooter and watching her from a building
across the street, and that he had surrounded the bank with explosives. After
spending over fifty-three months in pretrial detention and undergoing multiple
competency evaluations, Bramhall was found not guilty by a jury in July 2017.
In June 2018, Bramhall filed an action against more than thirty defendants. He
alleged the County Defendants (1) committed prosecutorial misconduct, (2) subjected
him to cruel and unusual punishment, (3) violated his Fifth Amendment rights by
except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It
may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
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failing to indict him before a grand jury, (4) conspired to prosecute him despite a lack
of evidence, (5) attempted to coerce him into pleading guilty, (6) denied his right to a
speedy trial, (7) improperly subjected him to numerous competency evaluations, and
(8) improperly allowed a witness to remain in the courtroom during a preliminary
hearing. With respect to the Bank Defendants, he alleged that (1) Bennion made
false accusations against him and committed perjury at his trial and that (2) Cyprus
Credit Union was negligent in hiring, supervising, and retaining Bennion.
Bramhall voluntarily dismissed his claims against the Police Defendants.
After the County Defendants and Bank Defendants filed motions to dismiss, a
magistrate judge recommended granting the motions. The district court adopted the
magistrate judge’s recommendations and dismissed Bramhall’s claims against the
County Defendants and Bank Defendants.
Bramhall then filed (1) a motion for leave to file an amended complaint, (2) a
motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) for modification of the district court’s order,
and (3) a notice of appeal. We abated the appeal until the post-judgment motions
were resolved. The district court denied the motion for leave to amend, concluding it
was procedurally improper. It also denied in part and granted in part the Rule 60(b)
motion, discerning no factual or legal basis for altering the substance of its prior
ruling but modifying that ruling “to clarify that [Bramhall’s] claims are dismissed
without prejudice” and that he “may still pursue his claims in an appropriate manner
if he is able to allege sufficient facts to state a plausible claim for relief.” Bramhall
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filed an amended notice of appeal to include the district court’s post-judgment
rulings, and we lifted the abatement.
II
Bramhall contends the district court erred in dismissing his claims against the
County Defendants and Bank Defendants and in denying his motion for leave to
amend his complaint. Before addressing these claims, we must determine whether
we have jurisdiction over this appeal.
Ordinarily, only “final decisions” of the district court are appealable.
28 U.S.C. § 1291. “To be final under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, an order must end the
litigation on the merits and leave nothing for the court to do but execute the
judgment.” Alexander v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 514 F.3d 1083, 1087 (10th Cir. 2008)
(quotation and alterations omitted). “[A] dismissal without prejudice is usually not a
final decision,” Amazon, Inc. v. Dirt Camp, Inc., 273 F.3d 1271, 1275 (10th Cir.
2001), but may be final “depending upon the circumstances,” Moya v.
Schollenbarger, 465 F.3d 444, 448 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted). If the
dismissal of Bramhall’s claims without prejudice was not a final order, “then we lack
jurisdiction to hear the appeal.” Id.
At the outset, we note that Bramhall contends “this Court already ruled” it has
jurisdiction because the court’s order lifting the abatement of his appeal indicated the
district court’s order was final. Nevertheless, “we have an independent duty to
examine our own jurisdiction,” Amazon, 273 F.3d at 1274, even if it requires us to
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reconsider prior determinations on appellate jurisdiction, see Kennedy v. Lubar,
273 F.3d 1293, 1299-1300 (10th Cir. 2001).
When assessing whether a dismissal is final and appealable, “we look to the
substance and objective intent of the district court’s order, not just its terminology.”
Moya, 465 F.3d at 449 (emphases omitted). When reviewing an ambiguous order,
we must “determine as best we can whether the district court’s order evidences an
intent to extinguish the plaintiff’s cause of action, and whether the plaintiff has been
effectively excluded from federal court under the present circumstances. If so, then
our appellate jurisdiction is proper.” Id. (quotations, citations, and alterations
omitted). We employ a “practical approach” guided by “the following principles”:
(1) “if a district court order expressly and unambiguously dismisses a plaintiff’s
entire action, that order is final”; (2) if “a district court dismissal expressly denies the
plaintiff leave to amend, or the district court’s grounds for dismissal are such that the
defect cannot be cured through an amendment to the complaint, that dismissal (even
if it is ambiguous or nominally of the complaint) is for practical purposes of the
entire action and therefore final”; and (3) if “the dismissal order expressly grants the
plaintiff leave to amend, that conclusively shows that the district court intended only
to dismiss the complaint” and that the dismissal is not final. Id. at 450-51 (quotations
and emphases omitted).
The first and third principles do not apply in this case. The district court did
not grant leave to amend or “expressly and unambiguously dismiss[] [Bramhall’s]
entire action.” Id. at 450. Instead, the court’s order expressly states that
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Mr. Bramhall’s “claims are dismissed without prejudice” and that the court’s original
ruling “dismissed the operative Complaint in its entirety.” See id. at 449 (“[W]hether
an order of dismissal is appealable generally depends on whether the district court
dismissed the complaint or the action. A dismissal of the complaint is ordinarily a
non-final, nonappealable order (since amendment would generally be available),
while a dismissal of the entire action is ordinarily final.” (quotation omitted)).
Finality in this case thus hinges on the second principle in Moya. Although
the district court denied Bramhall’s motion to amend, it explained that allowing him
“to file his proposed Amended Complaint would be futile” because the proposed
amended complaint did nothing to cure the original complaint’s defects. Moreover,
the court suggested the defects could be cured, stating Bramhall “may still pursue his
claims in an appropriate manner if he is able to allege sufficient facts to state a
plausible claim for relief.” By inviting Bramhall to continue to “pursue his claims,” 1
the district court plainly did not exclude him from federal court. See id. at 450, 454.
1
Bramhall interpreted this statement as “direct[ing] the filing of a new
Complaint with a new case number and new date-time-stamp.” He has done just that,
filing a new complaint in district court against the County Defendants and the Bank
Defendants in Case Number 2:19-cv-00477-RJS-CMR. As of the filing of this order
and judgment, a dispositive ruling has not been entered in that action.
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III
Accordingly, the district court’s order dismissing Bramhall’s claims without
prejudice was not a final order. We therefore DISMISS the appeal for lack of
appellate jurisdiction.
Entered for the Court
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
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