Metzler v. City of Colorado Springs ( 2021 )


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  •                                                                                  FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         Tenth Circuit
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                         January 15, 2021
    _________________________________
    Christopher M. Wolpert
    Clerk of Court
    JEFFERY WAYNE METZLER,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    v.                                                          No. 20-1079
    (D.C. No. 1:19-CV-00878-RM-KMT)
    CITY OF COLORADO SPRINGS, a                                  (D. Colo.)
    municipality; ELIZABETH REID, in her
    individual capacity; JOHN
    CHADBOURNE, in his individual
    capacity; CRAIG SIMPSON, in his
    individual capacity; KEVIN CLARK, in
    his individual capacity,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    _________________________________
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    _________________________________
    Before HARTZ, KELLY, and EID, Circuit Judges.
    _________________________________
    Jeffery Wayne Metzler appeals the district court’s order dismissing his suit
    under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     that asserts claims against the individual defendants for
    unlawful arrest and malicious prosecution and against the City of Colorado Springs
    *
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
    this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2): 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
    submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent,
    except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It
    may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
    and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
    (the City) under a theory of municipal liability. Exercising jurisdiction under
    
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , we affirm.
    I. BACKGROUND
    Because we are reviewing the dismissal of Mr. Metzler’s amended complaint
    for failure to state a claim, we assume the truth of the well-pleaded factual
    allegations in that pleading. See Wittner v. Banner Health, 
    720 F.3d 770
    , 774-75
    (10th Cir. 2013). The allegations paint a picture of an incompetent police
    investigation leading to the arrest and two-day incarceration of an innocent man.
    The events giving rise to Mr. Metzler’s suit began in August 2017. Law-
    enforcement personnel from the Colorado Springs Police Department (CSPD) and
    investigators from the Department of Homeland Security Investigations were
    conducting a joint sting operation to identify and arrest individuals seeking to
    purchase sex with underage girls.
    “As part of the operation, [Defendant CSPD] Detective Elisabeth Reid placed
    multiple ads for prostitution services on . . . a . . . website known for advertising
    prostitution services disguised as personal ads.” Aplt. App. at 36. When a potential
    customer called, Detective Reid would pose as “Lizzie” and attempt to arrange for
    the customer to have sex with her fictional 16-year-old sister. “If the customer
    agreed . . ., Detective Reid would [meet him at a hotel],” confirm he was there to
    have sex with a juvenile girl and had money, and then give him “a room key and
    condom.” 
    Id. at 37
    . “A team of other CSPD officers would surveil and cover
    Detective Reid during th[e] transaction. When the customer arrived at the hotel
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    room, a second team of uniformed officers would be waiting there to arrest him.” 
    Id.
    Defendant CSPD Detective John Chadbourne participated.
    “On August 9 . . . a man who identified himself as ‘Rick’ called the phone
    number listed in Detective Reid’s [ad]. . . . After a brief conversation with ‘Lizzie,’
    Rick agreed to pay for sex with Lizzie’s 16-year-old sister.” 
    Id.
     Later that day,
    Detective Reid (posing as “Lizzie”) met Rick in the hotel parking lot. After speaking
    with Rick and confirming that he had money, Detective Reid gave him a condom and
    room key, and then directed him to where he could find her sister. “Rick started
    walking up a flight of stairs toward the room. . . . However, . . . Rick stopped at a
    landing, turned around, and walked back down the stairs into the hotel complex.” 
    Id. at 38
    . “After a brief search, the CSPD personnel gave up on finding Rick.” 
    Id. at 39
    .
    “[CSPD] Sergeant [Craig] Simpson [who was voluntarily dismissed as a
    defendant] . . . instructed Defendant CSPD Analyst Kevin Clark to attempt to identify
    ‘Rick’ based on the phone number that had been used to contact Detective Reid.” 
    Id.
    Analyst Clark’s “search of a law enforcement database yielded that the phone number
    . . . [was] listed to a Jeffrey Wayne Metzler.” 
    Id. at 103
    . “CSPD personnel . . .
    [then] pulled Mr. Metzler’s driver’s license information and accessed his personal
    Facebook page to forward several photos of Mr. Metzler to the officers who had been
    on scene at the [hotel].” 
    Id. at 40
    . Detective Reid determined that Mr. Metzler’s
    driver’s license photo “matched” the individual Rick, and on August 30 she sought a
    warrant for his arrest. 
    Id. at 103
    . But the phone number in the law-enforcement
    database was outdated; it belonged to an employer-provided cell phone that
    3
    Mr. Metzler had turned in when he left his employment and had not used in several
    years.
    After the arrest warrant had issued, CSPD Officer Drew Jeltes called the phone
    number associated with Mr. Metzler to ask him to turn himself in. “A man answered,
    and Officer Jeltes inquired as to whether he was Jeffrey Metzler; the man stated that
    he was not. When Officer Jeltes identified himself as a police officer and asked if the
    man could provide contact information for Mr. Metzler, the man ended the call.” 
    Id. at 43
    . “Later that day, Officer Jeltes and Detective Chadbourne went to Mr.
    Metzler’s house in Colorado Springs. They were unable to contact Mr. Metzler or
    anyone else at his house, and instead began to interview his neighbors.” 
    Id.
     One of
    the neighbors gave him Mr. Metzler’s cell-phone number, which was different from
    the one used by Rick to contact Detective Reid. The officers did not ask the
    neighbors to confirm that Mr. Metzler looked like pictures taken of Rick or owned a
    truck like the one Rick drove.
    “Officer Jeltes called the number provided by the neighbor, and Mr. Metzler
    answered the phone and immediately identified himself.” 
    Id. at 44
    . Officer Jeltes
    told Mr. Metzler that there was a warrant for his arrest related to an incident on
    August 9 at a local hotel. “Officer Jeltes reported that Mr. Metzler sounded ‘puzzled’
    and said that he was not familiar with the location of the alleged crime.” 
    Id.
    CSPD Officer Matthew Peterson was the watch commander on duty when
    Mr. Metzler surrendered himself. He called Detective Reid to tell her Mr. Metzler
    had turned himself in but did not want to be interviewed by a detective. Reid
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    nevertheless went to the police station. While there she asked Peterson to review
    video of the August 9 incident and still shots of the suspect from the video. Peterson
    reported that “[t]he [man] in the video and photographs had similar characteristics to
    that of [Mr.] Metzler and the voice sounded similar.” 
    Id. at 42
     (internal quotation
    marks omitted). Mr. Metzler spent two days in jail before bonding out.
    As the investigation continued, evidence emerged, including information
    obtained through a search warrant for historical information for Rick’s phone and
    interviews with former and current employers and co-workers, that called into
    question Reid’s initial identification of Rick as Mr. Metzler. Ultimately, the district
    attorney filed a motion to dismiss, which recited that “[w]hile probable cause existed
    at the time of [Mr. Metzler’s] arrest and at [the] time of filing of charges, the District
    Attorney . . . moves to dismiss all counts against . . . [Mr.] Metzler . . . without
    prejudice. The People are unable to prove this case beyond a reasonable doubt at this
    time.” 
    Id. at 107
    .
    Mr. Metzler then filed this suit in which he alleged that “[t]hrough a
    combination of failures on the part of Defendants[,] . . . CSPD . . . misidentified Rick
    as Mr. Metzler,” and “then misrepresented evidence to a judge in order to acquire an
    arrest warrant.” 
    Id. at 34
    . He further alleged that the CSPD had a history of arresting
    suspects without probable cause and that the City’s failure to implement necessary
    policies and properly train law-enforcement personnel led to his unlawful arrest.
    The district court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Mr. Metzler
    appeals. As we proceed to explain, a botched police investigation, even one leading
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    to the arrest and confinement of an innocent man, does not necessarily violate the
    Constitution.
    II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    “This court reviews de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss
    based on qualified immunity.” Weise v. Casper, 
    593 F.3d 1163
    , 1166 (10th Cir.
    2010). We likewise review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss a
    claim for municipal liability. See Mocek v. City of Albuquerque, 
    813 F.3d 912
    , 921
    (10th Cir. 2015).
    “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must state a claim to relief that is
    plausible on its face.” 
    Id.
     (internal quotation marks omitted). “A claim has facial
    plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
    reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 
    Id.
    (internal quotation marks omitted).
    III. ANALYSIS
    A. Qualified Immunity
    “When a defendant raises the qualified-immunity defense, the plaintiff
    must . . . establish (1) the defendant violated a federal statutory or constitutional right
    and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s conduct.”
    Ullery v. Bradley, 
    949 F.3d 1282
    , 1289 (10th Cir. 2020). “We may address the two
    prongs of the qualified-immunity analysis in either order: If the plaintiff fails to
    establish either prong of the two-pronged qualified-immunity standard, the defendant
    6
    prevails on the defense.” Cummings v. Dean, 
    913 F.3d 1227
    , 1239 (10th Cir. 2019)
    (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).
    1. Unlawful Arrest
    An arrest must be based on probable cause. “Probable cause is not a precise
    quantum of evidence—it does not, for example, require the suspect’s guilt to be more
    likely true than false. Instead, the relevant question is whether a substantial
    probability existed that the suspect committed the crime, requiring something more
    than a bare suspicion.” Stonecipher v. Valles, 
    759 F.3d 1134
    , 1141 (10th Cir. 2014)
    (internal quotation marks omitted). Even when an affidavit for an arrest warrant
    states probable cause on its face (which is not disputed in this case), an arrest under
    the warrant may be unlawful. On occasion, errors in the affidavit may invalidate the
    warrant. An affiant seeking an arrest warrant violates the Fourth Amendment when
    she knowingly, or with reckless disregard for the truth, includes material false
    statements in a supporting affidavit or omits information that, if included, would
    prevent the warrant from lawfully issuing. See Franks v. Delaware, 
    438 U.S. 154
    ,
    171 (1978); Beard v. City of Northglenn, 
    24 F.3d 110
    , 114 (10th Cir 1994).
    “The burden is on the plaintiff to make a substantial showing of deliberate
    falsehood or reckless disregard for truth by the officer seeking the warrant.”
    Stonecipher, 759 F.3d at 1142 (internal quotation marks omitted). Proof of “reckless
    disregard in the presentation of information to a . . . judge [requires] evidence that the
    officer in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of [her] allegations.” Id.
    (internal quotation marks omitted). “The failure to investigate a matter fully, to
    7
    exhaust every possible lead, interview all potential witnesses, and accumulate
    overwhelming corroborative evidence rarely suggests a knowing or reckless
    disregard for the truth. To the contrary, it is generally considered to betoken
    negligence at most.” Id. (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). “A
    reviewing judge may infer recklessness from circumstances evincing obvious reasons
    to doubt the veracity of the allegations . . . ; [b]ut this is not a mandatory or automatic
    inference.” Kapinski v. City of Albuquerque, 
    964 F.3d 900
    , 908 (10th Cir. 2020)
    (internal quotation marks omitted).
    We can quickly dispose of the claims against Detective Chadbourne and
    Analyst Clark. “[I]n order for liability to arise under § 1983, a defendant’s direct
    personal responsibility for the claimed deprivation of a constitutional right must be
    established.” Porro v. Barnes, 
    624 F.3d 1322
    , 1327 (10th Cir. 2010) (internal
    quotation marks omitted). Such responsibility includes “set[ting] in motion a series
    of events that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known would cause
    others to deprive the plaintiff of her constitutional rights.” Buck v. City of
    Albuquerque, 
    549 F.3d 1269
    , 1279-80 (10th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks
    omitted). The gist of the claim against Chadbourne appears to be only that if he had
    performed his job better, he would have discovered evidence of Mr. Metzler’s
    innocence in time to prevent the arrest. But there is no allegation that he participated
    in the preparation of the affidavit for the arrest warrant or was otherwise directly
    personally responsible for the detention. As for Clark, he was the one who reported
    that Rick’s phone number belonged to Mr. Metzler. The amended complaint,
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    however, gives us no reason to believe that Clark (who had no possible motive for
    misidentifying the owner of the cell-phone number) did not check the law-
    enforcement database, that he misread the database, or that he was anything more
    than merely negligent if he did misread the database. Therefore, the claims against
    Chadbourne and Clark were properly dismissed.
    Turning to Detective Reid, Mr. Metzler failed to establish any deliberate
    falsehoods in her affidavit. To the contrary, Reid truthfully described the sting
    operation, her interaction with Rick, Analyst Clark’s search of the law-enforcement
    database, and her identification of Mr. Metzler as Rick from his driver’s license
    photo.
    We also reject Mr. Metzler’s further argument that Reid knowingly or
    recklessly omitted material facts in her affidavit—most notably that she had “doubts”
    about her identification of Mr. Metzler as Rick, Aplt. Opening Br. at 15, and “sought
    to arrest [him] not because she believed she had probable cause to believe he was
    Rick, but rather for the sole purpose of identification—to determine whether [he] was
    Rick,” id. at 16-17 (internal quotation marks omitted). This contention is based on
    Detective Reid’s actions following Mr. Metzler’s arrest when she showed Officer
    Peterson the video of her encounter with Rick and still shots from the video so that he
    could confirm that Mr. Metzler was Rick.
    To be sure, if the affiant for a warrant possesses information that would cast
    substantial doubt on the existence of probable cause, that information should not be
    intentionally withheld from the judge asked to approve the warrant. But Detective
    9
    Reid’s affidavit discloses how she made the identification, so any weaknesses of the
    procedure were apparent to the judge. See Neil v. Biggers, 
    409 U.S. 188
    , 199–200
    (1972) (setting forth factors to be considered in assessing accuracy of eyewitness
    identification of suspect). Here, Reid, by asking Peterson to look at the video, was
    performing the sort of double-check that Mr. Metzler (properly) contends should
    have been conducted throughout the investigation. We do not think that Reid’s
    request to Peterson can support a reasonable inference that she had sufficient doubt
    about her identification to undermine the probable cause stated in her affidavit—
    particularly in light of the (now-known-to-be incorrect) attribution of Rick’s phone
    number to Mr. Metzler.
    Because there was no Fourth Amendment violation, Detective Reid was
    entitled to qualified immunity.
    2. Malicious Prosecution
    “We have repeatedly recognized in this circuit that, at least prior to trial, the
    relevant constitutional underpinning for a claim of malicious prosecution under
    § 1983 must be the Fourth Amendment’s right to be free from unreasonable
    seizures.” Becker v. Kroll, 
    494 F.3d 904
    , 914 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation
    marks omitted). The seizure requirement is incorporated into a Fourth Amendment-
    based malicious-prosecution claim under § 1983, which includes the following
    elements: “(1) the defendant caused the plaintiff’s continued confinement or
    prosecution; (2) the original action terminated in favor of the plaintiff; (3) no
    probable cause supported the original arrest, continued confinement, or prosecution;
    10
    (4) the defendant acted with malice; and (5) the plaintiff sustained damages.”
    Stonecipher, 759 F.3d at 1146 (internal quotation marks omitted). As previously
    explained, there was probable cause to arrest Mr. Metzler, and therefore his
    malicious-prosecution claim necessarily failed.
    B. Municipal Liability
    Mr. Metzler alleged that the City, as “policymaker” for the CSPD, Aplt. App.
    at 56, failed to implement policies or adequately train its law-enforcement officers to
    overcome a pattern of arresting suspects without probable cause, which in turn led to
    the violation of his constitutional rights. But “a municipality . . . may not be held
    liable where there was no underlying constitutional violation by any of its officers.”
    Donahue v. Wihongi, 
    948 F.3d. 1177
    , 1199 (10th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks
    omitted). Because we conclude that there was no constitutional violation,
    Mr. Metzler failed to state a claim for municipal liability.
    CONCLUSION
    The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
    Entered for the Court
    Harris L Hartz
    Circuit Judge
    11