Red Wing Products v. Burris ( 1996 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Filed 7/10/96
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
______
RED WING PRODUCTS, INC.; KEY )
TEMPORARY PERSONNEL, INC., )
)
Plaintiffs-Appellants, )
)
v. ) No. 96-5010
) (D.C. No. 95-C-295-K)
LEANN BURRIS, ) (N. Dist. Okla.)
)
Defendant-Appellee. )
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ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
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Before ANDERSON, BARRETT, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
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After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this
panel has determined unanimously to honor the parties’ request for
a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App.
P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered
submitted without oral argument.
Red Wing Products, Inc. and Key Temporary Personnel, Inc.
*
This Order and Judgment is not binding precedent, except
under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation
of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may
be cited under the terms and conditions of Tenth Cir. R. 36.3.
(appellants) appeal from the district court’s sua sponte order
granting summary judgment in favor of Leann Burris (Burris).
On March 29, 1995, appellants filed this declaratory judgment
action seeking a declaration that Burris’ activities arguably fell
within the scope of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA); hence,
her state law wrongful discharge claim was preempted by the NLRA.
In addition, appellants sought a declaration that (a) application
of Oklahoma law to Burris’ claim violated the Supremacy Clause of
the United States Constitution, (b) the state district court was
without subject-matter jurisdiction, and (c) the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) had exclusive jurisdiction over Burris’
wrongful discharge claim.
Upon its own motion, the district court granted summary
judgment in favor of Burris, concluding that her claim was not
preempted by the NLRA and should properly remain in state court.
On appeal, appellants contend that: (1) the district court
erred in denying its motion for summary judgment; (2) the district
court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Burris
pursuant to the court’s sua sponte motion; (3) Burris’ conduct
could arguably be characterized as “concerted activity” within the
scope of the NLRA; (4) once the district court recognized that
Burris’ conduct could arguably be characterized as “concerted
activity” within the scope of the NLRA, it lacked jurisdiction to
make a final determination as to whether certain conduct qualified
- 2 -
as “concerted activity” under the NLRA.
We review the district court’s grant or denial of summary
judgment de novo, applying the same legal standard used by the
district court. Lancaster v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n Int’l, 76 F.3d
1509, 1516 (10th Cir. 1996).
After careful consideration, we affirm on the basis of the
well-reasoned opinion of the district court in its November 30,
1995, Order. See also Peabody Galion v. Dollar, 666 F.2d 1309,
1313-1319 (10th Cir. 1981) (no NLRA preemption).
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court:
James E. Barrett,
Senior United States
Circuit Judge