Tarver v. Chater ( 1996 )


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  •                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    Filed 9/17/96
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
    CLINTON TARVER, for Prentice S.
    Tarver, a minor,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    No. 96-5033
    v.                                            (D.C. No. CV-94-826-J)
    (N.D. Okla.)
    SHIRLEY S. CHATER,
    Commissioner, Social Security
    Administration, *
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT **
    Before PORFILIO, LOGAN, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
    *
    Effective March 31, 1995, the functions of the Secretary of Health and
    Human Services in social security cases were transferred to the Commissioner of
    Social Security. P.L. No. 103-296. Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c), Shirley S.
    Chater, Commissioner of Social Security, is substituted for Donna E. Shalala,
    Secretary of Health and Human Services, as the defendant in this action.
    Although we have substituted the Commissioner for the Secretary in the caption,
    in the text we continue to refer to the Secretary because she was the appropriate
    party at the time of the underlying decision.
    **
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
    generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
    and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
    argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34 (f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is
    therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
    Plaintiff Prentice Tarver, a minor child, appeals from a judgment of the
    district court that affirms the decision of the Secretary of Health and Human
    Services to deny him Children’s Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits.
    Plaintiff claims he is disabled due to a seizure disorder. The administrative law
    judge (ALJ) denied benefits at step four of the sequential process for determining
    disability for children. See 20 C.F.R. 416.924(b)-(f). The ALJ determined that
    plaintiff did not have an impairment of comparable severity to that which would
    disable an adult, and that plaintiff was therefore not disabled. The Appeals
    Council denied review, making the ALJ's determination the final decision of the
    Secretary.
    On appeal, plaintiff contends the ALJ erred because: (1) evidence the ALJ
    accepted as true shows that in spite of his medication, plaintiff had seizures
    within twelve months of the denial of benefits, so the ALJ’s finding that
    medication controlled his seizures is not supported by substantial evidence; and
    (2) the ALJ failed to properly evaluate claimant’s allegations of stomach aches,
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    leg pain, drowsiness, and mood swings under Luna v. Bowen, 
    834 F.2d 161
     (10th
    Cir. 1987), after plaintiff showed a nexus between these side-effects and his
    seizure medication.
    We have jurisdiction under 
    42 U.S.C. § 405
    (g) and 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
     to
    review the Secretary's decision to determine only whether it is supported by
    substantial evidence and whether the correct legal standards were applied. See
    Goatcher v. United States Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
    52 F.3d 288
    , 289
    (10th Cir. 1995). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable
    mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales,
    
    402 U.S. 389
    , 401 (1971)(quotation and citation omitted). Evidence is not
    substantial if it is overwhelmed by other evidence or is mere conclusion.
    Musgrave v. Sullivan, 
    966 F.2d 1371
    , 1374 (10th Cir. 1992). We may not
    reweigh the evidence or substitute our discretion for that of the Secretary. Kelley
    v. Chater, 
    62 F.3d 335
    , 337 (10th Cir. 1995).
    We have reviewed the briefs and the record on appeal, and are not
    persuaded by plaintiff’s claims of error. The magistrate judge 1 thoroughly
    addressed the arguments plaintiff raises on appeal, and we affirm for substantially
    1
    The parties consented to disposition of this case by the magistrate judge.
    See 
    28 U.S.C. § 636
    (c)(3).
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    the same reasons as set forth in the magistrate judge’s order filed on
    November 30, 1995.
    AFFIRMED.
    Entered for the Court
    James K. Logan
    Circuit Judge
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