Coyle v. State Farm Fire ( 1997 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUL 29 1997
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
LELA COYLE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 96-7116
(D.C. No. CV-96-054-B)
STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY (E.D. Okla.)
COMPANY; STATE FARM MUTUAL
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY, EBEL, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Ms. Lela Coyle appeals the district court's October 8, 1996, Order granting
summary judgment in favor of State Farm Fire and Casualty Company and State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (collectively "State Farm") and
dismissing her claims.
On May 25, 1994, Ms. Coyle's daughter, Barbara Boteilho, was electrocuted
in the motor home owned by Ms. Coyle and her husband, Mr. Sid Coyle, and
insured by State Farm. 1 Thereafter, State Farm hired Mr. Dave Hallman to
investigate the incident.
On February 6, 1996, Ms. Coyle commenced this action against State Farm
for damages in relation to State Farm's breach of its duty to fairly investigate the
death of her daughter. 2 Ms. Coyle alleged State Farm directed Mr. Hallman to
1
It is undisputed State Farm Fire and Casualty Company insured the motor
home under the Coyle’s homeowners insurance policy. However, it is unclear
whether State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company also insured the
motor home. For purposes of our disposition, it is not necessary to resolve this
issue.
2
In her June 20, 1996, amended complaint, Ms. Coyle added a claim for
loss of consortium based on injuries suffered by Mr. Coyle as a result of Mr.
Hallman’s alleged alterations of the motor home. However on appeal, Ms. Coyle
does not challenge the district court’s dismissal of her loss of consortium claim.
Therefore, Ms. Coyle waived this issue. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v.
Mhoon, 31 F.3d 979, 984 n.7 (10th Cir. 1994).
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conduct the investigation in such a manner as to deprive her of her rights under
the insurance policy.
On October 8, 1996, the district court granted State Farm's motion for
summary judgment and dismissed Ms. Coyle's claim. The district court
determined Ms. Coyle's claim was a claim for breach of implied duty of good
faith and fair dealing brought as a third party claimant rather than a first party
insured. The district court, therefore, concluded Ms. Coyle may not recover on
her claim under Oklahoma law and dismissed the claim.
On appeal, Ms. Coyle contends the district court erred in determining she
could not bring a bad faith claim against State Farm for an alleged breach of its
duty to investigate. Ms. Coyle argues the district court erred in holding an insurer
owes no duty of good faith and fair dealing to an insured when the insured asserts
a claim against a co-insured or to a third party claimant. 3
We review the district court's grant or denial of summary judgment de
3
In its response, State Farm argues Ms. Coyle lacks standing to maintain a
claim for the wrongful death of her daughter. However, we need not address this
assertion in light of our disposition.
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novo, applying the same standard used by the district court. Applied Genetics
Int’l Inc. v. First Affiliated Sec., Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir. 1990).
Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Because the district court's jurisdiction over this matter
was based on diversity of citizenship, the district court must ascertain and apply
the substantive law of the forum state, Oklahoma, with the objective of reaching
the same result as that which would be reached in an Oklahoma court. See Brodie
v. General Chemical Corp., 112 F.3d 440, 442 (10th Cir. 1997); May v. National
Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 84 F.3d 1342, 1345 (10th Cir. 1996). We
review the district court's determinations of Oklahoma law de novo. Brodie, 112
F.3d at 442; May, 84 F.3d at 1345.
After a thorough review of the record, we hold the district court properly
applied Oklahoma law and agree with the district court's conclusion Ms. Coyle is
a third party claimant not entitled to recover on her claim against State Farm.
Under Oklahoma law, the duty of good faith and fair dealing arises from the
contractual relationship between the insurer and the insured. McWhirter v. Fire
Ins. Exch., Inc., 878 P.2d 1056, 1058 (Okla. 1994). Inasmuch as Oklahoma does
not recognize a duty for an insurance company to deal fairly and in good faith
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with an injured third party, there can be no bad faith claim arising from a breach
of this alleged duty. Id. at 1058-59. Although Ms. Coyle has a contractual
relationship with State Farm through her homeowners policy, her complaint prays
for damages as an injured third party. Her complaint claims "State Farm owed
[her] a duty to fairly investigate the [death of her daughter] and pay her for any
damages due to the liability of [her husband]." Therefore, although initially her
claim portends to rests on State Farm's duty to one of its insureds, her alleged
damages stem solely from the liability of her husband. While no Oklahoma case
directly addresses whether an insurer owes a duty of good faith and fair dealing to
an insured when the insured is acting as a third party claimant, we agree with the
district court that "plaintiff mistakenly centers on the fact that she has a contract
for insurance with State Farm Fire and thus may assert a claim with impunity
regardless of the capacity in which Plaintiff makes the claim." The fortuitous fact
that an insured person is making a liability claim against a policy of insurance
under which that person is also an insured is not the factor that determines either
the nature of the claim or the duty owed the claimant. To find a duty in this
situation would be an improper expansion of Oklahoma law. Accordingly, we
leave this decision to the Oklahoma courts.
Ms. Coyle's assertion the district court erred in holding an insurer owes no
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duty of good faith and fair dealing to an insured when the insured asserts a claim
against a co-insured misreads the district court's Order and is entirely without
merit. First, as stated above, the district court dismissed her claim based on
Oklahoma law that does not recognize a cause of action by a third party claimant
against an insurer, not on any theory regarding litigation between co-insureds.
Second, Ms. Coyle's claim was not brought against a co-insured, but rather
against the insurer.
Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated and substantially for the
reasons set forth in the district court's Order of October 8, 1996.
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
WADE BRORBY
United States Circuit Judge
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