Swanson v. Ward ( 1997 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
AUG 27 1997
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
MICHAEL LEE SWANSON,
Petitioner - Appellant,
No. 97-6057
vs. (D.C. No. 96-CV-1033)
(W.D. Okla.)
RONALD WARD, Warden,
Respondent - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY, EBEL, and KELLY, Circuit Judges. **
Petitioner Michael Lee Swanson appeals the dismissal of his petition for a
writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We grant Mr. Swanson’s
application for a certificate of appealability, 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1), and affirm.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge panel
has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Facts
Mr. Swanson is currently serving a sentence in state prison in Oklahoma
pursuant to his conviction on February 8, 1988, on several counts of possession
and distribution of a controlled substance. In July 1995, Mr. Swanson filed an
application for post-conviction relief in Oklahoma state court, which was denied.
He filed this petition on June 27, 1996, contending that his guilty plea was not
knowing and voluntary, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. On
December 16, 1996, a magistrate recommended that the petition be denied. See
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). The district court adopted the magistrate’s
recommendation on January 17, 1997.
Discussion
The state contends that Mr. Swanson’s petition should be dismissed
because he failed to object to the magistrate’s recommendation within ten days of
its issuance. See Talley v. Hesse, 91 F.3d 1411, 1412-13 (10th Cir. 1996). As
Mr. Swanson has explained, however, his objections were filed within ten days,
albeit with the wrong file number. Under the circumstances, we will not apply
the waiver rule. See id. at 1413 (waiver rule does not apply “when the ends of
justice dictate otherwise”). We also note that the one-year period of limitation for
§ 2254 petitions does not apply to Mr. Swanson since he filed this petition on
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June 27, 1996. See United States v. Simmonds, 111 F.3d 737, 745-46 (10th Cir.
1997). We thus proceed to the merits.
Mr. Swanson argues first that his guilty plea was not knowingly and
voluntarily entered because the prosecution failed to inform him that three of the
eight convictions used to enhance his sentence were invalid. In order for a guilty
plea to be knowing and voluntary, it must be “done with sufficient awareness of
the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” McMann v. Richardson,
397 U.S. 759, 766 (1970) (quotation omitted). Mr. Swanson contends that his
plea was not knowing and voluntary because had he known the convictions were
invalid, he would not have pled guilty. Thus, he argues, by not informing him of
the allegedly invalid convictions, the government violated his rights to due
process. See Smith v. Secretary of N.M. Dep’t of Corrections, 50 F.3d 801, 823
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 272 (1995).
Mr. Swanson claims that three of the eight convictions supporting the
enhancement were overturned or modified, and that the sentencing court should
have considered two others as misdemeanors. However, even assuming Mr.
Swanson is correct, three convictions remain, which is enough to support
enhancement under Oklahoma state law. See Okla. Stat. Ann. tit 21, § 51 (West
Supp. 1997). Under § 51, the punishment would have been the same whether Mr.
Swanson had three, five, or eight previous convictions. The alleged invalidity of
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the convictions was thus irrelevant, and Mr. Swanson was sufficiently apprised of
all the relevant circumstances. McMann, 397 U.S. at 766. We are satisfied that
Mr. Swanson’s right to due process was not violated.
Mr. Swanson next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to
investigate the validity of his prior convictions. To establish ineffective
assistance, Mr. Swanson must demonstrate that his counsel’s performance “fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and that “there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s . . . errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984).
As discussed above, the result of the proceeding would not have been different
had Mr. Swanson known of the allegedly invalid convictions, and we therefore
reject his claim of ineffective assistance.
Finally, we note that Mr. Swanson also claims that the Strickland test
should not be applied in this case, as his attorney’s “chronic substance abuse and
chemical addiction,” Aplt. Br. at 13, rendered the entire process presumptively
unreliable. This claim was not raised in state court proceedings, and we thus
decline to hear it. Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 134 (1987).
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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