Dicesare v. Baldridge ( 1998 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
AUG 11 1998
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
JOSEPH ANGELO DICESARE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 97-5191
(D.C. No. 93-CV-507)
J.D. BALDRIDGE; CARL SLOAN; (N.D. Okla.)
CHARLIE DAVIS; BOB HUGHES,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BALDOCK, EBEL, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Plaintiff Joseph Angelo DiCesare, proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court’s order granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment on his claims
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for malicious prosecution and unlawful arrest in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiff was arrested and charged with the
Oklahoma crime of cultivation of marijuana. He spent three days in jail.
Thereafter, the charges were dismissed without prejudice. He then filed the
underlying lawsuit against the police officers involved in bringing the criminal
charges against him. We affirm the district court’s judgment.
As a threshold matter, we must determine whether the notice of appeal was
timely because the timely filing of a notice of appeal is mandatory and
jurisdictional. See Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 203
(1988). Judgment was entered March 18, 1997. On June 27, 1997, Plaintiff filed
a motion for appeal out of time, pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6), on the
ground that he had not received notice of the judgment. The motion was granted,
but plaintiff did not receive a copy of the order. Thereafter, on September 30,
1997, plaintiff filed another motion for appeal out of time, together with a notice
of appeal. The request for additional time was granted on October 6, 1997.
Plaintiff’s Rule 4(a)(6) motion to reopen the time for appeal was filed
within 180 days of entry of the judgment, as required by the rule. Even though
plaintiff’s notice of appeal was filed before the October 6, 1997 order granting his
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request for additional time, he was not required to file another notice of appeal
after the order was entered. See Hinton v. City of Elwood, 997 F.2d 774, 779
(10th Cir. 1993). We find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decisions
to grant plaintiff additional time to file a notice of appeal. See Ogden v. San Juan
County, 32 F.3d 452, 455 (10th Cir. 1994). For these reasons, we have
jurisdiction over this appeal.
On the merits, plaintiff claims the district court improperly granted
summary judgment in favor of defendants on his malicious prosecution and
wrongful arrest claims and failed to consider as one claim his malicious
prosecution and Fourth Amendment claims, contrary to Albright v. Oliver, 510
U.S. 266 (1994). We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary
judgment, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing
summary judgment. See McKnight v. Kimberly Clark Corp., No. 97-5179, 1998
WL 384608, at *1 (10th Cir. July 10, 1998). Summary judgment is appropriate if
there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
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One of the elements of a cause of action for malicious prosecution is a
successful termination of the underlying action in favor of the plaintiff. See
Parker v. City of Midwest City, 850 P.2d 1065, 1067 (Okla. 1993); see also
Taylor v. Meacham, 82 F.3d 1556, 1561 (10th Cir. 1996) (“[O]ur circuit takes the
common law elements of a malicious prosecution as the ‘starting point’ for the
analysis of a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, but always reaches the ultimate
question, which it must, of whether the plaintiff has proven a constitutional
violation.”). The criminal charges filed against plaintiff for cultivation of
marijuana were dismissed without prejudice. He argues that the case terminated
in his favor once the statute of limitations expired, preventing the charges from
being refiled.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has explained that a dismissal without
prejudice does not qualify as a favorable termination because it does not “reach
the substantive rights of the cause of action and thereby vindicate appellant as to
the underlying action.” Glasgow v. Fox, 757 P.2d 836, 839 (Okla. 1988).
Similarly, expiration of the statute of limitations does not depend on or reflect the
merits of the underlying action. Under Oklahoma law, “[d]ismissal without
prejudice is not a termination favorable to the malicious-prosecution plaintiff.”
Greenberg v. Wolfberg, 890 P.2d 895, 904 (Okla. 1994) (emphasis omitted).
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Because plaintiff has not established a prima facie case of malicious prosecution,
the district court properly granted summary judgment on that claim.
Plaintiff has clarified his claim based on unlawful warrants to refer to the
warrant for his arrest, which he alleges was obtained without probable cause in
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The warrant was obtained and
executed in August and September of 1988; plaintiff filed this action in June
1993, more than two years after the allegedly illegal actions occurred. Therefore,
this claim is barred by the two-year statute of limitations. See Meade v. Grubbs,
841 F.2d 1512, 1522-24 (10th Cir. 1988) (adopting two-year statute of limitations
for § 1983 claims in Oklahoma); Johnson v. Johnson County Comm’n Bd., 925
F.2d 1299, 1301 (10th Cir. 1991) (“Claims arising out of police actions toward a
criminal suspect, such as arrest, interrogation, or search and seizure, are presumed
to have accrued when the actions actually occur.”).
Finally, we reject plaintiff’s claim that the district court’s ruling was
contrary to Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (Fourth Amendment, rather than
substantive due process, is the source of the constitutional protection in a claim
for malicious prosecution). Plaintiff’s motion to supplement the record on appeal
is DENIED. The record is sufficient for our review of plaintiff’s claims of error.
All other pending motions are DENIED.
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The judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
Entered for the Court
Bobby R. Baldock
Circuit Judge
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