Mallard v. Fields ( 1998 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
NOV 6 1998
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
GEORGE MALLARD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 98-7012
(D.C. No. 96-CV-415-S)
LARRY FIELDS, (E.D. Okla.)
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, BRORBY, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Therefore, the case is
ordered submitted without oral argument.
George Mallard, an Oklahoma state prisoner appearing pro se, appeals the
district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. We exercise jurisdiction
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
Mallard has been in the custody of the Oklahoma Department of
Corrections (DOC) since May 28, 1970, when he began serving a life sentence for
murder. Between September 14, 1994, and December 18, 1995, he was
transferred several times between DOC facilities. The transfers were the result of
an order by the governor requiring that inmates serving life sentences for murder
be assessed for security risks and ultimately housed in medium or maximum
security level facilities. Mallard was housed in the maximum security East Cell
House (ECH) at Oklahoma State Penitentiary (OSP) for approximately five days
in September 1994 and for approximately eighteen days in December 1995.
Mallard filed this § 1983 action against DOC Director Larry Fields and
unknown DOC employees on August 22, 1996. He alleged his transfers to ECH
(1) were unconstitutional because they were executed without a classification
hearing; (2) violated the district court’s orders in Battle v. Anderson , Case No.
79-096-B, which allegedly closed ECH due to unconstitutional conditions of
confinement; and (3) were in retaliation for the actions of two other inmates who
committed crimes while apparently confined in lower security level facilities.
Mallard further alleged the initial transfer to ECH was unconstitutional because it
deprived him of his opportunity to work for compensation at Oklahoma State
Industries. He alleged the conditions of confinement at ECH violated the Eighth
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Amendment because the facility was unfit for human habitation. He also alleged
he was denied access to the OSP law library while housed at ECH.
At the direction of the district court, Fields prepared and filed a Martinez
report. Fields filed a motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment. The court
allowed Mallard to respond and granted the motion, dismissing the action in its
entirety.
We review de novo the district court’s decision on a motion to dismiss or a
motion for summary judgment. See Swoboda v. Dubach , 992 F.2d 286, 289 (10th
Cir. 1993). Dismissal of a complaint is proper only where, after taking all well-
pleaded factual allegations as true, “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”
Conley v. Gibson , 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Summary judgment is appropriate
if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Because
defendant’s Martinez report may not be used to resolve factual disputes, see Hall
v. Bellmon , 935 F.2d 1106, 1111 (10th Cir. 1991), we treat the statement of facts
presented in Mallard’s verified complaint as true for purposes of reviewing
defendant’s motion and construe those facts and inferences reasonably made from
them in the light most favorable to Mallard. See Jaxon v. Circle K Corp. , 773
F.2d 1138, 1139 n.1 (10th Cir. 1985). However, Mallard’s failure to establish the
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existence of an element essential to his case on which he bears the burden of
proof at trial will result in a determination that no genuine dispute exists over
material facts. Celotex Cop. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
After reviewing the record on appeal, we agree with the district court that
Mallard has failed to establish a cognizable constitutional claim. Mallard has
clearly suffered no constitutional violation from the changes in his security
classification, his transfers to ECH, or the resulting loss of his prison job.
Generally speaking, prison inmates have no legally protected interest in a
particular security or job classification, or in the location of their confinement.
See Sandin v. Conner , 515 U.S. 472, 486 (1995); Ingram v. Papalia , 804 F.2d 595,
596 (10th Cir. 1986). Nothing presented by Mallard persuades us Oklahoma law
or DOC regulations otherwise create valid interests in these items.
Mallard has failed to offer any evidence in support of his conclusory
allegation that he was denied access to the OSP law library while housed at ECH.
In contrast, the evidence submitted by Fields indicates Mallard submitted no
requests for law library services while housed at ECH. We agree with the district
court that Mallard’s allegations of constitutional deprivations in this regard are
“unsubstantial.”
Although we disagree with the district court that Mallard’s Eighth
Amendment challenge to the conditions of confinement at ECH is precluded by
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the existence of an ongoing class action challenging those same conditions, see
McNeil v. Guthrie , 945 F.2d 1163, 1166 n.4 (10th Cir. 1991), we nevertheless
conclude Mallard’s allegations in this regard are vague, conclusory, and entirely
insufficient to support his burden of surviving summary judgment. Considering
his short stay at ECH, as well as the uncontroverted evidence presented by Fields
regarding conditions of confinement at ECH, there is no basis for a reasonable
factfinder to conclude Mallard was deprived of the “‘minimal civilized measure
of life’s necessities.’” Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (quoting
Rhodes v. Chapman , 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue
forthwith.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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