Houck v. City of Prairie ( 1998 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
DEC 1 1998
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
JOHN F. HOUCK, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 97-3294
(D.C. No. 95-4066-RDR)
CITY OF PRAIRIE VILLAGE, (D. Kan.)
KANSAS; CHARLES F. GROVER,
Defendants-Appellees.
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JOHNSON COUNTY SHERIFF’S
DEPARTMENT,
Movant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before PORFILIO , KELLY , and HENRY , Circuit Judges.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff filed an action against the City of Prairie Village and Charles
Grover, the Chief of Police, alleging employment discrimination based on several
federal and state statutes. 1
The district court granted summary judgment in favor
of both defendants on all claims. On appeal, plaintiff argues error in the grant of
summary judgment on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against the City and Grover, as
well as his claim based on the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12101-12213. Plaintiff also argues on appeal that summary judgment was
improper because there was outstanding discovery by reason of the City’s failure
to comply with the magistrate judge’s order compelling discovery.
We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. See Jenkins v. Wood ,
81 F.3d 988, 990 (10th Cir. 1996). We apply the same standard as the district
court to determine whether there is a genuine issue as to any material fact and
whether defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See id. We view the
evidence and the inferences that can be drawn therefrom in the light most
1
Plaintiff’s action also named Barbara Vernon as a defendant. Plaintiff
conceded Vernon’s dismissal with prejudice in the district court. See Houck v.
City of Prairie Village , 912 F. Supp. 1428, 1430 (D. Kan. 1996).
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favorable to plaintiff. See id. Guided by these standards, we have reviewed the
evidence contained in the extensive record before us. We conclude the district
court was correct in its judgment, and, therefore, we affirm.
The district court has extensively detailed the facts of this case in three
published opinions, see Houck v. City of Prairie Village , 978 F. Supp. 1397(D. Kan. 1997); Houck v. City of Prairie Village , 942 F. Supp. 493 (D. Kan.
1996); Houck v. City of Prairie Village , 912 F. Supp. 1428 (D. Kan. 1996), and
we will not repeat them here. Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims are based on his allegation
that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs in not obtaining
immediate psychiatric treatment for him, but instead held him at the police station
for approximately two hours before he was transferred to the county facility. In
addition, plaintiff alleges violation of his rights as a result of defendants’ failure
to train officers to handle an incident involving arrest of a police officer with
psychiatric implications. Plaintiff also appeals the district court’s judgment on his
claim that defendants violated the ADA and discriminated against him on the basis
of his mental disability in their decisions regarding his arrest, treatment, and/or
employment.
In addition to these arguments on appeal, plaintiff argues that the district
court should have withheld a ruling on the City’s motion for summary judgment
because the City had failed to comply with the magistrate judge’s order
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compelling discovery. However, as defendants point out, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 has
a mechanism for just this situation. Subsection (f) of the rule provides that the
party opposing the summary judgment motion can file an affidavit stating the
reasons the party cannot present “facts essential to justify the party’s opposition.”
The rule provides that the court may then “refuse the application for judgment
or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions
to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f). Plaintiff failed to avail himself of this procedure as regards
the City’s motion. 2
In an apparent effort to excuse compliance with Rule 56(f), plaintiff cites
this court’s decision in Patty Precision v. Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co. , 742 F.2d
1260 (10th Cir. 1984), and the Ninth Circuit decision in Garrett v. City & County
of San Francisco , 818 F.2d 1515 (9th Cir. 1987). Neither case is helpful to
plaintiff. In Patty Precision , we held that the district court’s failure to exercise its
discretion and rule on the nonmovant’s Rule 56(f) affidavit was error. 742 F.2d at
1265. Plaintiff in this case did not file a Rule 56(f) affidavit, nor was there a
2
Plaintiff did file a Rule 56(f) affidavit in response to Grover’s summary
judgment motion. The district court, in its discretion, did not defer its summary
judgment ruling for additional discovery. Houck , 912 F. Supp. at 1437-38.
Plaintiff does not take issue with this ruling.
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pending motion before the court; this is not a situation where the district court has
failed to exercise its discretion.
Garrett is distinguishable on its facts. In that case, the nonmoving party
filed a motion to compel production of documents, which was still pending when
the district court granted summary judgment. The court held that “although not
formally denominated as a request under Rule 56(f), under Ninth Circuit precedent
Garrett’s discovery motion was sufficient to raise the issue of whether he should
be permitted additional discovery.” Garrett , 818 F.2d at 1518. After recognizing
that Rule 56(f) requires the opposing party to be clear about the information
sought and how it would preclude summary judgment, the court found that the
pending discovery motion satisfied the requirements of Rule 56(f). Id. at 1518-19.
This case does not involve a situation where the district court failed to
exercise its discretion on a pending motion. The magistrate judge granted the
motion to compel before the district court ruled on the City’s summary judgment
motion. Further, neither plaintiff’s summary judgment motion nor his motion to
compel or related responsive pleadings satisfied the Rule 56(f) requirements of
specifying how the disputed discovery would enable him to present essential facts
in opposition to the City’s motion for summary judgment. See Universal Money
Ctrs, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co. , 22 F.3d 1527, 1536 (10th Cir. 1994)
(recognizing that, even assuming strict compliance with Rule 56(f) is not required,
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the plaintiff failed to demonstrate in its motion to compel how additional time
would enable it to rebut the defendant’s allegations of no genuine issues of fact, as
required by Rule 56(f)). There is no requirement in Rule 56 that discovery be
complete before summary judgment can be entered. See Public Serv. Co. v.
Continental Cas. Co. , 26 F.3d 1508, 1518 (10th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff did not show
his inability to oppose the summary judgment motion without the discovery
sought, see id. , and the district court was within its discretion to decide the
summary judgment motion before the City had complied with the order to compel.
Plaintiff argues that the district court erred in granting defendants’ summary
judgment on his § 1983 claims. We agree with the district court that plaintiff
failed to meet his burden of showing that Chief Grover was deliberately
indifferent, either to plaintiff’s medical needs or in Grover’s alleged failure to
train, as well as the district court’s disposition of plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against
the City. We also agree with the district court’s findings and analysis on
plaintiff’s claims that the City violated the ADA by terminating his employment
because of his mental disability and retaliating against him for his disability leave
request and his administrative complaint. We affirm the district court’s
disposition of all these issues for substantially the same reasons relied on by the
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district court. See Houck , 942 F. Supp. at 497-98; 3
Houck , 978 F. Supp. at
1404-07, 1402-04. 4
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
3
Because we affirm the district court’s finding that plaintiff did not make the
necessary showings to sustain his § 1983 claim against Grover, we do not reach
the issue of Grover’s qualified immunity.
4
The district court made it clear that it was not basing its rejection of
plaintiff’s ADA claims on estoppel related to plaintiff’s receipt of Social Security
benefits. Consequently, we do not reach the issue on appeal.
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