Capitol Indemnity v. Lowe ( 1998 )


Menu:
  •                                                                         F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    DEC 2 1998
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    CAPITOL INDEMNITY
    CORPORATION,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    No. 98-6011
    v.                                           (D.C. No. CIV-96-596-R)
    (W.D. Okla.)
    LARRY MITCHELL LOWE and
    CYNTHIA DIANE LOWE,
    individually, as husband and wife, and
    as parents and next friends of CARRA
    MICHELLE LOWE,
    Defendants-Appellees,
    and
    JAMES S. WOODS and TOM HILL,
    individually and d/b/a BOA PRIVATE
    INVESTIGATION AGENCY,
    Defendants.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT        *
    Before BALDOCK, EBEL, and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
    generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
    and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously to grant the parties' request for a decision on the briefs without oral
    argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
    ordered submitted without oral argument.
    Plaintiff Capitol Indemnity Corporation (Capitol) brought this diversity
    action under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 seeking a judgment declaring that the insurance
    policy issued to defendants James S. Woods and Tom Hill, doing business as
    BOA Investigative Agency (BOA), was either rescindable       ab initio or canceled
    before BOA allegedly injured defendants Larry Mitchell Lowe, Cynthia Diane
    Lowe, and Carra Michelle Lowe (the Lowes). The district court granted summary
    judgment in favor of the Lowes, and Capitol appeals. “Reviewing the district
    court’s grant of summary judgment and its interpretation of the insurance policy
    de novo,” MGA Ins. Co. v. Fisher-Roundtree     , Nos. 97-6391 & 97-6414, 
    1998 WL 758395
    , *1 (10th Cir. Oct. 30, 1998), we affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    In Oklahoma, private investigator licenses are issued by the Council on
    Law Enforcement Education and Training (CLEET).          See Okla. Stat. tit. 59,
    § 1750.5(A). CLEET will not issue a license without a showing that the applicant
    -2-
    has minimum general liability insurance coverage or a surety bond that protects
    the public by allowing recovery for “actionable injuries, loss, or damage as a
    result of the willful, or wrongful acts or omissions” of the licensee.   See 
    id. § 1750.5(J)(1).
    The statutorily required insurance policy or bond may “not be
    modified or canceled” unless ten days’ prior written notice is given to CLEET.
    
    Id. § 1750.5(J)(4).
    In order to meet this requirement, BOA applied for a Capitol liability
    policy, through Anderson Road Insurance Company, an independent broker.
    Oklahoma General Agency (OGA), Capitol’s general agent in Oklahoma,
    approved the application and issued a policy on behalf of Capitol, with an
    effective date of July 1, 1993. The Anderson Road Insurance Agency issued a
    “Certificate of Insurance” to CLEET, showing that BOA had a Capitol policy in
    the amount of $100,000 and stating, in conformity with Okla. Stat. tit. 59,
    § 1750.5(J)(4), that the issuing company may not cancel the policy except upon
    ten days written notice to CLEET. The terms of the policy, however, prescribed
    cancellation by mailing written notice to the named insured thirty days before the
    effective date of cancellation.
    On August 23, 1993, OGA sent a cancellation notice to BOA that the policy
    was canceled, effective September 27, 1993, based on an increased hazard related
    -3-
    to bodyguard service and subcontracted work. CLEET was not provided with
    notice of cancellation.
    On June 1, 1994, BOA conducted a raid at the home of the Lowes.
    Alleging that they had received injuries and sustained damages as a result of the
    raid, the Lowes filed suit in state district court. Capitol then filed this declaratory
    judgment action against the Lowes, Woods, Hill, and BOA, seeking a
    determination that Capitol was entitled to rescind the policy, based on alleged
    misrepresentations made by the insureds or, alternatively, that Capitol had
    effectively canceled the policy before the Lowes’ claims arose. Capitol and the
    Lowes moved for summary judgment. In an order filed October 3, 1997, the
    district court entered summary judgment in favor of the Lowes and against
    Capitol.
    Concerning Capitol’s claim for rescission, the district court recognized that
    an insurer is entitled to avoid its obligations under an insurance policy if the
    applicant made material misrepresentations in the application.     See Burgess v.
    Farmers New World Life Ins. Co.     , 
    12 F.3d 992
    , 993 (10th Cir. 1993). It
    concluded, however, that reasonable factfinders could differ as to whether the
    alleged misrepresentations were material. Moreover, the court determined that
    any such rescission could not affect the Lowes because it is well-settled that, as
    applied to a third-party claimant, an insurer cannot retroactively avoid coverage
    -4-
    under a compulsory insurance or financial responsibility law.     See, e.g. , Van Horn
    v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. , 
    641 A.2d 195
    , 203-07 (Md. 1994);    Ferrell v. Columbia
    Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. , 
    816 S.W.2d 593
    , 595-96 (Ark. 1991). Accordingly, the court
    denied Capitol’s motion for summary judgment.
    With regard to the Lowes’ motion, the district court applied another
    established rule: where statutory provisions require notice to a government
    agency before cancellation of a policy, an attempted cancellation which does not
    comply with the notice provisions is ineffective, at least against third parties
    seeking to recover against the insured.    See, e.g. , Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v.
    Garrett , 
    70 F.2d 969
    , 975-76 (10th Cir. 1934) (holding oral notice of cancellation
    inadequate where an administrative rule, made in conformity with an Oklahoma
    statute, required written notice);   see also Lee R. Russ & Thomas F. Segalla,
    Couch on Insurance, § 31:19 (3d ed. 1997) (setting out the general rule that
    “[w]here statutory provisions require notice to a government agency in order to
    effect a cancellation of a policy, such notice must be given to effect a
    cancellation, and conversely there is no cancellation where notice is given merely
    in accordance with the provisions of the policy”). The court, therefore,
    determined that OGA’s attempt at cancellation was ineffective because CLEET
    had never received the written notice required by Okla. Stat. tit. 59,
    § 1750.5(J)(4). It granted the Lowes’ motion for summary judgment and, later,
    -5-
    granted Capitol’s request for entry of final judgment,     see Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
    This appeal followed.
    DISCUSSION
    On appeal, Capitol argues that the district court erred in its basic
    determination that the Capitol policy is “compulsory insurance,” and,
    consequently, reached flawed conclusions concerning the impermissibility of
    rescission and the need to comply with statutory cancellation requirements. After
    reviewing the record, the case law, and the relevant statutes, we agree with the
    analysis set out in the district court’s thoughtful order.
    Capitol’s argument that the policy is not “compulsory insurance” may be
    quickly discounted. “A compulsory insurance statute in effect declares a
    minimum standard which must be observed. . . .”          Rohlman v. Hawkeye-Security
    Ins. Co. , 
    502 N.W.2d 310
    , 315 n.10 (Mich. 1993). Section 1750.5(J)(2) requires
    Oklahoma-licensed investigators to carry a minimum amount of insurance
    coverage. Although the term “compulsory insurance” is frequently applied to
    mandated coverage for motor vehicles, it is not confined to that use.       See MGA
    Ins. Co. , 
    1998 WL 758395
    , at *3 (“[W]e see no indication that Oklahoma treats
    compulsory insurance requirements mandated as part of a permitting scheme
    [regarding the retail sale of liquified petroleum] any differently from those
    imposed for motor vehicle liability coverage. . . .”). Additionally, the fact that
    -6-
    BOA could have satisfied licensing requirements with a bond, rather than
    insurance, is of no consequence to the determination.     See Halpin v. American
    Family Mut. Ins. Co. , 
    823 S.W.2d 479
    , 481 (Mo. 1992);       see also Allstate Ins. Co.
    v. Brown , 
    920 F.2d 664
    , 668 (10th Cir. 1990) (“Oklahoma’s compulsory liability
    insurance statutes require that all vehicle owners maintain liability insurance or
    other authorized security. . . .”). Plainly, the liability insurance policy covering
    BOA is required under a compulsory insurance statute.
    Because of the compulsory nature of the insurance, Capitol is not entitled
    to rescind its policy as to the Lowes, who are third-party claimants. To the extent
    that Capitol argues that it has shown entitlement to rescind as to Woods, Hill, and
    BOA, we note that the district court denied Capitol’s motion for summary
    judgment on this issue. “Denial of [a] summary judgment motion is not properly
    appealable.” Roberts v. Roadway Express, Inc.      , 
    149 F.3d 1098
    , 1103 (10th Cir.
    1998).
    Finally, we reject Capitol’s contention that it had canceled the policy before
    the Lowes’ claims arose. By statute, this policy may not be modified or canceled
    without prior written notice to CLEET.      See Okla. Stat. tit. 59, § 1750.5(J)(4).
    The statutory requirement is “incorporated into the policy as a matter of law and
    override[s] any conflicting policy provision.”    MGA Ins. Co. , 
    1998 WL 758395
    ,
    *4.
    -7-
    [It is] reasonable to place the notice burden on the [insurance] carrier
    since it is clearly in the carrier’s best interest to give notice.
    Otherwise the carrier runs the risk of continuing to be liable under
    the policy. There is also the consideration that the carrier will know
    exactly when the [cancellation] occurs and can promptly give notice
    to protect itself, whereas an insured may not be immediately aware of
    the lapse.
    Jarboe v. Shelter Ins. Co. , 
    819 S.W.2d 9
    , 11 (Ark. 1991).
    Here, it is undisputed that CLEET was not notified of Capitol’s intended
    cancellation, by either Capitol or BOA. The district court correctly concluded
    that the attempted cancellation was ineffective.
    CONCLUSION
    For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s order granting the
    Lowes' motion for summary judgment and denying Capitol's motion for summary
    judgment against the Lowes.
    Entered for the Court
    David M. Ebel
    Circuit Judge
    -8-