United States v. Davis ( 1999 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JAN 26 1999
TENTH CIRCUIT
__________________________ PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 97-3322
(D. Kan.)
JIMMY T. DAVIS, (D.Ct. No. 96-CR-10071-02-WEB)
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before PORFILIO, BRORBY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
Mr. Davis appeals his conviction for bank robbery, use of a firearm during
the commission of that bank robbery, and possession of a firearm after a prior
felony conviction. He asserts (1) the district court erred in admitting highly
suggestive and unreliable pre-trial identification evidence; (2) the district court
erred in denying his motion to dismiss the robbery and use of a firearm during a
robbery counts on double-jeopardy grounds; (3) there was insufficient evidence to
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
sustain the jury’s verdict; (4) the district court erroneously instructed the jury an
element of count four – that Mr. Davis previously had been convicted of a felony
– was deemed proven by a stipulation of the parties; and (5) the district court
erroneously determined Mr. Davis was competent at the time of trial and
sentencing. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and affirm.
BACKGROUND
The facts surrounding Mr. Davis’ conviction are fully set forth in this
court’s opinion affirming Mr. Davis’ co-defendant’s conviction and sentence. See
United States v. Haslip, 160 F.3d 649 (10th Cir. 1998). Thus, for purposes of this
order and judgment, we provide only a brief factual summary.
Mr. Davis was one of two men who eye witnesses identified as having
robbed the Fall River State Bank in Fall River, Kansas, on the morning of
October 17, 1996. Mr. Davis entered the bank, approached Alicia Ashenfelter,
the teller stationed closest to the front door, and requested two rolls of dimes. A
second man, Mr. Steven Haslip, approached tellers Peggy Anderson and Christine
Burt at the next teller window. As Ms. Ashenfelter turned to Ms. Anderson to
request two rolls of dimes, she noticed Mr. Haslip was pointing a gun at Ms.
Anderson and instructing her to “give [him] all of the money.” Mr. Davis then
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instructed Ms. Ashenfelter to place all the money from her teller station into a
blue plastic bag. Prior to leaving, the two men locked the three tellers in the bank
vault.
Law enforcement officers apprehended Mr. Davis later that day, after a
Highway Patrol trooper and K-9 unit found him hiding in trees and bushes near a
vehicle officers previously observed turning around to avoid a roadblock placed at
a main junction outside Fall River. Police found a blue plastic bag containing
two loaded guns, and a white plastic bag containing all but $1,000 of the money
stolen from the Fall River State Bank, in the trunk of that vehicle. Mr. Haslip had
been arrested a few hours before, after officers found him lying along a fence row
in the same vicinity.
The government tried Mr. Davis and Mr. Haslip together, on a superseding
indictment charging each with (1) bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2113(a), (2) using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of
violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), and (3) possession of a firearm
after being previously convicted of a felony in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
The jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged on both defendants.
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After trial and prior to sentencing, defense counsel requested a
determination of Mr. Davis’ competency to stand trial and to proceed to
sentencing. This request stemmed from counsel’s discovery, just one week prior
to trial in this case, that Mr. Davis had been found incompetent to stand trial in
1993 and 1995, on unrelated charges. In response to defense counsel’s request,
the district court ordered psychiatric examinations and heard testimony from
psychologists for both parties. Mr. Davis presented the testimony of Dr. Marc
Quillen, who opined that an injury Mr. Davis suffered in a car accident in 1993 so
affected his memory that he could not assist in the preparation of his defense, and
therefore, was incompetent to stand trial. The Government presented the
testimony of Dr. Scott Duncan, a Bureau of Prisons psychologist, who concluded
Mr. Davis was competent to stand trial and to proceed to sentencing. After
hearing this testimony, the district court found Mr. Davis to be competent, denied
his motion for new trial, and sentenced him to 322 months imprisonment.
DISCUSSION
Identification Evidence
Mr. Davis asserts his due process rights were violated by the admission of
testimony concerning a pre-trial show-up identification by Ms. Ashenfelter when
FBI agents brought him to the front door of the bank shortly after his arrest, and
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after Ms. Ashenfelter and the other tellers had an opportunity to hear pre-arrest
events unfold on a police radio. The constitutionality of pre-trial identification
procedures is a mixed question of law and fact we review de novo. Archuleta v.
Kerby, 864 F.2d 709, 710-11 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1084 (1989).
As the district court correctly noted, we first determine whether the
identification procedure used was unnecessarily suggestive. If the procedure was
unnecessarily suggestive, we then weigh the corrupting influence of the procedure
against the reliability of the identification itself. Id.; Manson v. Brathwaite, 432
U.S. 98, 114 (1977). In evaluating reliability, we apply the following factors: the
witness’ opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; the witness’
degree of attention; the accuracy of the witness’ prior description; the witness’
level of certainty at the time of the confrontation; and the length of time between
the crime and the confrontation. United States v. Smith, 156 F.3d 1046, 1051
(10th Cir. 1998) (citing Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972)), cert.
denied, ___ S. Ct. ___, 1999 WL 8729 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1999) (No. 98-7100). A
defendant’s due process rights are violated only if the identification procedure is
so unnecessarily suggestive as to be “conducive to irreparable mistaken
identification.” Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 691 (1972).
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Mr. Davis’ claim fails to meet this standard. Although we agree with Mr.
Davis that the one-person “show-up” on the day of the robbery was suggestive,
the record nevertheless reflects ample indicia of reliability to outweigh the
suggestiveness of that initial identification procedure. Ms. Ashenfelter clearly
had a good opportunity to view Mr. Davis during the course of the robbery. Mr.
Davis stood directly in front of Ms. Ashenfelter while she placed money into the
bag he provided. There is no evidence Ms. Ashenfelter’s attention was distracted
during this time. To the contrary, she recalled a number of descriptive details
concerning the robbery and the two suspects. Indeed, after being ordered into the
bank vault, Ms. Ashenfelter and the other two tellers prepared a description of
both Mr. Davis and Mr. Haslip. Although Mr. Davis attacks the accuracy of the
witness’ descriptions, we do not find the discrepancies to be significant,
particularly in light of the certainty with which Ms. Ashenfelter positively
identified Mr. Davis just hours after the crime. Under these circumstances, we
believe Ms. Ashenfelter’s identification of Mr. Davis as one of the robbers was
reliable. See Archuleta, 864 F.2d at 711-12. Furthermore, we agree with the
district court that the photo line-up conducted the day following the robbery was
not unnecessarily suggestive. Accordingly, we hold the admission of
identification evidence did not deprive Mr. Davis of due process.
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Double Jeopardy
Mr. Davis argues his convictions for bank robbery and using or carrying a
firearm during the bank robbery violate the double-jeopardy clause. He concedes
this court’s decisions in United States v. Overstreet, 40 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1113 (1995), and United States v. Lanzi, 933 F.2d
824 (10th Cir. 1991), hold to the contrary, but asserts that the reasoning in those
decisions is flawed and seeks to preserve the issue for further review on a petition
for certiorari to the Supreme Court.
The resolution of this issue in Overstreet and Lanzi controls absent en banc
reconsideration or a superseding contrary decision by the Supreme Court. See In
re Smith, 10 F.3d 723, 724 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1033 (1994).
We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of Mr. Davis’ motion to dismiss on
double-jeopardy grounds.
Sufficiency of Evidence
Mr. Davis challenges the sufficiency of the government’s evidence to
support both the robbery and firearms convictions. We reverse a conviction for
insufficient evidence “only if no rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v.
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Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453, 1462-63 (10th Cir. 1995). When evaluating the record, we
view the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the
light most favorable to the government. See United States v. Wolny, 133 F.3d
758, 760 (10th Cir. 1998). We “may neither weigh conflicting evidence nor
consider the credibility of witnesses.” United States v. Pappert, 112 F.3d 1073,
1077 (10th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
As we discussed in Haslip, the evidence in this case established that two
bank tellers who were present when the Fall River Bank was robbed described the
robbery in detail and positively identified Mr. Haslip and Mr. Davis as the
robbers. Like Mr. Haslip, Mr. Davis had full opportunity to cross-examine these
witnesses as to the certainty of their identification. Mr. Davis does not contest
the fact he was arrested after being found hiding in trees and bushes near the
place where law enforcement found a car that had fled from a roadblock. Police
retrieved the plastic bags used in the robbery, the bank’s bait money, and two
loaded handguns from that same car. Viewing this evidence and the reasonable
inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the government,
we conclude a rational jury could have found Mr. Davis robbed the Fall River
Bank in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). Accordingly, we hold the evidence was
sufficient to support Mr. Davis’ robbery conviction.
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We further hold the evidence was sufficient to support Mr. Davis’ felon in
possession of a firearm conviction. Mr. Davis correctly asserts there is no direct
evidence which places a gun in his hands. He further asserts the government
failed to prove constructive possession because it showed no evidence of any
connection between him and the guns seized from the vehicle found near where
he was hiding prior to his arrest. We agree that in order to prove constructive
possession when there is joint occupancy of a vehicle, the government must
present direct or circumstantial evidence to show some connection or nexus
individually linking the defendant to the contraband. See United States v. Mills,
29 F.3d 545, 549 (10th Cir. 1994). There must be some evidence to support at
least a plausible inference the defendant had knowledge of and access to the
weapon. Id. at 549-50. We disagree, however, with Mr. Davis’ assessment of the
evidence, and conclude the record here supports such an inference.
The record establishes that Ms. Ashenfelter identified Mr. Haslip as the
bank robber who brandished a gun and demanded money from Ms. Anderson’s
station. She identified Mr. Davis as the man who demanded money from her
teller’s station and instructed her to put the money in a blue plastic bag he was
carrying. Both men then acted in concert to lock the tellers in the bank vault.
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A short time later, law enforcement officers observed a Ford Probe with
two people inside abruptly turn to avoid a roadblock. Officers later found Mr.
Davis hiding near the abandoned Ford. They seized a blue plastic bag containing
a loaded Smith and Wesson Silver 9mm and a loaded Dan Wesson .357 magnum
revolver from the trunk of that same car. They also found a white plastic bag
containing most of the bank’s bait money. A jury could reasonably infer from this
evidence that Mr. Davis was not only aware of the guns, but also had possession
of, or at least a right of physical access to, the guns found in the bag he had
carried in the bank. Accordingly, we uphold the firearm conviction.
Jury Instruction Regarding Stipulated Element
Mr. Davis claims the district court committed reversible error by instructing
the jury that the parties’ stipulation that Mr. Davis previously had been convicted
of a felony sufficed to prove the first essential element of the offenses in counts 3
and 4 of the indictment beyond a reasonable doubt, without any further evidence. 1
1
The challenged instruction states:
Similarly, with respect to count 4 of the indictment, the defendant Jimmy
Davis and the government have stipulated to the fact that prior to October
17, 1996, Jimmy Davis had been convicted of a crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. In view of these stipulations,
you should find that the first essential element of the offenses in counts 3
and 4 has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt without any further
evidence on the subject.
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Notwithstanding his stipulation, Mr. Davis now challenges the instruction,
claiming the “Constitution gives a criminal defendant the right to demand that a
jury find him guilty of all the elements of the crime with which he is charged.”
United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 511 (1995). As is evident from our
holding in United States v. Mason, 85 F.3d 471, 472-74 (10th Cir. 1996), Mr.
Davis’ reliance on Gaudin is misplaced. This panel agrees with and is bound by
the holding in Mason. In re Smith, 10 F.3d at 724. The challenged jury
instruction was consistent with Mr. Davis’ right to a jury determination on every
element of his crime and his decision to waive that right by stipulation. See
Mason, 85 F.3d at 472-74.
Competency Determination
Finally, defense counsel argues Mr. Davis is incompetent, and thus was
tried and sentenced in violation of his Fifth Amendment due process rights. In
support of this claim, counsel relies heavily on the fact Mr. Davis twice was
deemed incompetent to stand trial in unrelated proceedings. Those prior
determinations, as well as the present allegation of incompetency, are related to
documented organic brain damage, including information processing deficits and
memory limitations, which resulted from head injuries Mr. Davis suffered in a
1993 automobile accident.
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Defense counsel does not dispute that the district court applied the correct
legal test to determine competency – “‘whether [the defendant] has sufficient
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding – and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of
the proceedings against him.’” United States v. Williams, 113 F.3d 1155, 1159
(10th Cir. 1997) (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960)); see
also 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d). Nor is there any dispute as to the evidence relevant to
the court’s competency determination. See Castro v. Ward, 138 F.3d 810, 818
(10th Cir.) (“‘evidence of a defendant’s irrational behavior, his demeanor at trial,
and any prior medical opinion on competence to stand trial are all relevant in
determining whether further inquiry is required’” (quoting Drope v. Missouri, 420
U.S. 162, 180 (1975))), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 422 (1998). Rather, counsel
challenges the district court’s finding, based on all the evidence presented, that
Mr. Davis was indeed competent. Because the actual competency determination
is a factual issue, Maggio v. Fulford, 462 U.S. 111, 116-17 (1983), we will set
aside the district court’s competency determination only upon a showing that
determination was clearly erroneous. See United States v. Thody, 978 F.2d 625,
629 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 907 (1994); United States v. Franzen,
842 F.2d 189, 192 (7th Cir. 1988); cf. Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546, 1550 (10th
Cir. 1991) (“competence is a factual issue, ... [t]he content of the standard of
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competency is ... a question of law which we review de novo”), cert. denied, 504
U.S. 911 (1992).
The district court recognized the law does not favor retrospective
competency decisions, but appropriately concluded that such a determination was
possible in this case and conducted an evidentiary hearing toward that end.
Together with his own observations of Mr. Davis, the district court judge
considered the testimony and reports of two psychologists who examined Mr.
Davis after trial, but prior to the hearing, and the two prior competency
evaluations. The court’s order determining Mr. Davis was competent carefully
analyzed the conflicting evidence and provided reasons for giving greater
credence to the evidence supporting its finding that Mr. Davis was fit to stand
trial. Our careful review of the record reveals no clear error in that finding.
Defense counsel cites Sena v. New Mexico State Prison, 109 F.3d 652, 655
(10th Cir. 1997), for the proposition that his prior competency adjudications gave
rise to a rebuttable presumption of incompetence in this case. We agree that prior
adjudications of incompetency constitute relevant evidence which warrants
careful consideration; however, we need not go so far as to extend Sena to create
a rebuttable presumption of incompetency in all cases in which there have been
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prior incompetency determinations. This record contains ample evidence to
support the district court’s competency finding regardless of whether we begin by
presuming Mr. Davis was competent or incompetent.
Additionally, while we acknowledge that cognitive limitations related to
memory could affect competency, we note this court previously has rejected the
argument that memory loss or amnesia creates a per se deprivation of due process.
United States v. Borum, 464 F.2d 896, 900 (10th Cir. 1972). Instead, we should
evaluate such claims on a case-by-case basis, giving particular attention to the
following factors: (1) defendant’s ability to testify and otherwise participate in
his defense; (2) the permanency of the memory loss; (3) whether the crime and
defendant’s whereabouts, including any facts giving rise to a defense, can be
accurately reconstructed without the defendant’s testimony; (4) whether access to
government files would aid in preparing for trial; and (5) the strength of the
government’s case against the defendant. United States v. Rinchack, 820 F.2d
1557, 1569 (11th Cir. 1987); Wilson v. United States, 391 F.2d 460, 463-64 (D.C.
Cir. 1968); accord Borum, 464 F.2d at 900. The district court properly concluded
these factors weigh against finding Mr. Davis incompetent.
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For all the foregoing reasons, Mr. Davis’ conviction and sentence are
AFFIRMED.
Entered by the Court:
WADE BRORBY
United States Circuit Judge
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