Vann v. Fields ( 1999 )


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  •                                                             F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    MAR 17 1999
    TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    BOBBY BATTLE, et al.; UNITED
    STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiffs,
    v.                                 No. 98-7091
    (D.C. No. CV-72-95-B)
    LARRY FIELDS, Director; DAN                   (E.D. Okla.)
    REYNOLDS, Warden, Oklahoma State
    Penitentiary; CALVIN SAMUEL
    MUSE, JR., member of the Oklahoma
    Board of Corrections; HUGH REED,
    member of the Oklahoma Board of
    Corrections; WILLIAM EVANS,
    member of the Oklahoma Board of
    Corrections; PHIL DESSAUER; JOE
    R. MANNING, member of the
    Oklahoma Board of Corrections;
    GREGORY H. HALL, member of the
    Oklahoma Board of Corrections;
    DANIEL BLINTZ, member of the
    Oklahoma Board of Corrections,
    Defendants-Appellees,
    __________
    TONY LAMAR VANN,
    Movant-Appellant.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    Before ANDERSON, KELLY, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
    this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). Therefore, the
    case is ordered submitted without oral argument.
    Tony Lamar Vann, appearing pro se, appeals the district court’s denial of
    his motion to intervene and to amend the complaint in        Battle v. Anderson , CIV-
    72-095-B (E.D. Okla. 1972), a twenty-six-year-old class action involving
    conditions of confinement in Oklahoma prisons. We affirm.
    Vann, a prisoner in the custody of the Oklahoma Department of
    Corrections, apparently had been incarcerated at a private prison in Texas. On
    June 8, 1998, Vann filed a motion to intervene in       Battle , asserting his “over-
    crowded condition is similar, and or synonymous, with the above styled recent
    ruling.” Record I, Doc. 180. On June 12, he filed a separate motion to file an
    amended complaint in    Battle , seeking to add himself as a party and “amend[] the
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
    generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
    and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
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    whole cause” based on common questions of law or fact.           Id. , Doc. 181. The
    district court denied the motions. The court ruled Vann’s claims were associated
    with incarceration at a private prison in Texas and were unrelated to the specific
    class claims in Battle . The court noted it had dissolved many of the injunctions in
    Battle and that the issues asserted by Vann were not encompassed in the
    remaining issues. The court further found amendment of the twenty-six-year-old
    complaint would prejudice the parties.
    We review a ruling on a motion to intervene as of right de novo and review
    a ruling on a motion for permissive intervention for abuse of discretion.         Alameda
    Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Browner      , 
    9 F.3d 88
    , 90 (10th Cir. 1993). We review
    a ruling as to timeliness of a motion for intervention for abuse of discretion.        
    Id.
    Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) authorizes intervention as of right
    (1) when a statute of the United States confers an unconditional right
    to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to
    the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the
    applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a
    practical matter impair or impede the applicant’s ability to protect
    that interest, unless the applicant’s interest is adequately represented
    by existing parties.
    Rule 24(b) provides permissive intervention “(1) when a statute of the United
    States confers a conditional right to intervene; or (2) when an applicant’s claim or
    defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common.”
    Vann has not identified any statute giving him an unconditional or a
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    conditional right to intervene. His vaguely presented basis for intervention is that
    his conditions of confinement are constitutionally insufficient. Vann reasons he
    is entitled to intervene because   Battle is, in part, a conditions of confinement
    case. His claim does not arise from the same course of conduct or factual
    occurrences that gave rise to any of the claims in      Battle and his claim would be
    unaffected by any judgment entered in      Battle . Intervention is not appropriate.
    See Kiamichi R.R. Co. v. National Mediation Bd.         , 
    986 F.2d 1341
    , 1345 (10th Cir.
    1993); Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Hodel    , 
    821 F.2d 537
    , 539 (10th Cir. 1987).
    We review the district court’s denial of a motion to amend for abuse of
    discretion. See Las Vegas Ice and Cold Storage Co. v. Far West Bank          , 
    893 F.2d 1182
    , 1185 (10th Cir. 1990). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), as relevant
    here, provides that “a party” may amend the “party’s pleading only by leave of
    court or by written consent of the adverse party.” The court’s refusal of leave to
    amend is justified for, among other things, undue prejudice to the opposing party,
    untimeliness, or futility of amendment.     Castleglen, Inc. v. Resolution Trust
    Corp. , 
    984 F.2d 1571
    , 1585 (10th Cir. 1993);        Woolsey v. Marion Lab., Inc. , 
    934 F.2d 1452
    , 1462 (10th Cir. 1991). Vann was not a party or a class member in
    Battle and was not entitled to seek amendment of the complaint. The court did
    not abuse its discretion.
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    AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
    Entered for the Court
    Mary Beck Briscoe
    Circuit Judge
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