United States v. Ortiz ( 1999 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAY 20 1999
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 98-6271
v. (W.D. Oklahoma)
JAVIER ORTIZ, (D.C. No. CR-94-115-C)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before ANDERSON , KELLY , and BRISCOE , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Javier Ortiz seeks a certificate of appealability which would permit him to
appeal the district court’s decision to deny his motion, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
*
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
§ 2255, to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. For the reasons set forth
below, we deny Ortiz’s request for a certificate of appealability, and dismiss his
appeal.
BACKGROUND
This case began when Ortiz’s wife, a soldier stationed at Fort Sill,
Oklahoma, was murdered in April 1994. At the time, Ortiz was attending
Cameron University in Lawton, Oklahoma, on a military scholarship. On
September 8, 1994, after a joint investigation by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) and military officers, Ortiz and a co-defendant, Kevin Moore,
were charged with conspiracy to commit first degree murder, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1117, and with committing first degree murder, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1111, 7, and 2. The government’s theory of the case was that Moore killed
Ortiz’s wife on instructions from Ortiz, as part of a plot to obtain the benefits
from the victim’s military life insurance policies. In October 1994, Ortiz’s co-
defendant, Moore, was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder and conspiracy
to commit first-degree murder.
Even before the indictment against him was obtained, Ortiz sought private
legal representation. His family came up with the money to hire Mack Martin,
who represented himself to be one of the best defense attorneys in Oklahoma.
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Martin told Ortiz that his fee for pre-indictment representation would be $10,000.
Ortiz and his family paid this amount. After the indictment was issued, Martin
informed Ortiz that his fee for representation through trial would be another
$90,000. Ortiz and Martin entered into a contract for legal services, under which
Martin agreed to represent Ortiz through trial, and Ortiz agreed to pay the
$90,000. When this appeal began, Ortiz had paid Martin approximately $89,500
of the agreed-upon $100,000 legal fee.
On December 7, 1994, after a motion to suppress evidence was denied by
the district court, Ortiz entered into a plea bargain with prosecutors. Under the
terms of the plea agreement, the government dismissed all of the outstanding
counts against Ortiz, and obtained a new indictment against him on the lesser
charge of solicitation of a crime of violence, a violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 373(a)
and 7. Ortiz pled guilty to the lesser charge of solicitation.
Some months later, without firing Martin, Ortiz hired another attorney and
filed a motion to withdraw his plea of guilty. However, on March 1, 1995, only a
few days after filing the motion to withdraw, Ortiz withdrew the motion. On
March 10, 1995, the district court held a sentencing hearing at which it sentenced
Ortiz to twenty years’ imprisonment, the statutory maximum. In addition, the
district court sentenced Ortiz to three years’ supervised release, and imposed a
fine. The district court entered judgment in the case on March 16, 1995.
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Ortiz, who continues to maintain his innocence despite the guilty plea, did
not file a notice of appeal within the ten-day period following the entry of
judgment in his case. The reasons for this failure to mount a timely appeal
constitute the major issues of contention in this case.
Finally, on February 10, 1997, Ortiz filed a notice of appeal. We dismissed
his appeal as untimely on May 21, 1997. United States v. Ortiz , No. 97-6075, slip
op. (10th Cir. May 21, 1997); see Supp. R. Tab 269.
On March 10, 1997, Ortiz and his father filed a civil complaint in federal
court in Los Angeles, grounded in federal anti-racketeering law (RICO), against
attorney Martin and the other attorneys who had represented Ortiz in the criminal
case, United States District Judges Robin J. Cauthron and Wayne A. Alley, and
John and Jane Does 1-10, alleging a vast conspiracy to defraud Ortiz and his
family out of the $100,000 legal fee charged by Martin. In that action and in the
proceedings in this case before the district court below, Ortiz and his family
maintained that Martin had rendered sub-standard legal services, did not conduct
his own investigation of the events in question, and was generally overpaid for
the services he provided. The California district court dismissed the RICO
complaint in May 1997, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. Ortiz v.
Martin , 1998 WL 479445 (9th Cir. July 24, 1998).
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On April 21, 1997, 1
Ortiz filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his
sentence, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. In his motion, he asserted approximately
25 different grounds for relief. His chief complaints appeared to be ineffective
assistance of counsel, outrageous conduct on the part of the government, and lack
of jurisdiction over his criminal case. After filing his motion, Ortiz moved for an
evidentiary hearing, for appointment of counsel, and for recusal of district court
Judge Robin J. Cauthron on the ground that she was a named defendant in the
then-pending California civil case. The district court denied the motion for
recusal, but granted Ortiz’s motions for appointment of counsel and for an
evidentiary hearing.
After several continuances, the evidentiary hearing was held on June 17,
1998. By this time, after appointment of counsel, the issues in the case had been
distilled to one major issue: whether attorney Martin had been constitutionally
ineffective for failing to mount a timely appeal. Martin asserted that he had
explained to Ortiz the advantages and disadvantages of mounting an appeal in this
1
The motion was signed by Ortiz on April 21. It was not filed with the
court, however, until April 30. We have held that petitioners whose convictions
become final on or before April 24, 1996, “must file their § 2255 motions before
April 24, 1997.” United States v. Simmonds , 111 F.3d 737, 746 (10th Cir. 1997).
However, under the doctrine of Houston v. Lack , 487 U.S. 266 (1988), a pro se
prisoner’s notice of appeal is deemed “filed” when it is delivered to prison
officials for forwarding to the district court. Because the government has not
raised any timeliness issues in this case, we presume that Ortiz delivered his
motion to the proper prison authorities in a timely manner.
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case, and that Ortiz had not asked Martin to file an appeal. Martin admitted that
there had been some discussion of an eventual § 2255 motion, but maintained that
Ortiz had never instructed him to mount a direct appeal. Ortiz, by contrast,
maintained that he had indeed asked Martin to file an appeal in his criminal case.
Thus, the district court’s task at the evidentiary hearing was to decide, after
hearing witness testimony and making credibility determinations, whether the
facts supported Martin’s or Ortiz’s version of the case.
Martin and Ortiz both testified at the hearing. Ortiz also produced several
other witnesses, who testified, in essence, that Ortiz had told them that he planned
to appeal his conviction. None of the offered witnesses, however, could testify
that Martin had personally told them that a direct appeal was pending, or that they
had overheard Ortiz instruct Martin to file an appeal.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court stated that it “believe[d]
Mr. Martin and [didn’t] believe Mr. Ortiz. And that [belief] is supported by
everything that has been submitted . . . .” III R. at 93. The district court further
found that “Mr. Martin fully explained the appeal rights to Mr. Ortiz as this case
proceeded” and that “at the entry of his plea and at the time of his sentence, [Mr.
Ortiz] was aware of his right to appeal and had declined it, had waived it, had
said no and had then had discussions with Mr. Martin regarding a future 2255
motion.” Id. at 93-94.
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Two days after the hearing, on June 19, 1998, the district court filed a
written order documenting its findings at the hearing, and formally denying
Ortiz’s § 2255 motion. The court stated again that Martin’s testimony was more
believable than Ortiz’s, and was supported by “the circumstances of defendant’s
very favorable plea agreement, [and] the withdrawal of defendant’s motion to
withdraw plea.” I R. Tab 321, at 2. Judgment was entered in the case that same
day.
Ortiz now appeals from the district court’s denial of his § 2255 motion.
Ortiz presents only one issue to us on appeal: whether Ortiz was denied his right
to effective assistance of counsel because Martin failed to mount a direct appeal.
DISCUSSION
“A defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel applies not just at
trial but also on direct appeal.” Romero v. Tansy , 46 F.3d 1024, 1030 (10th Cir.
1995) (citing Evitts v. Lucey , 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985)). In order to prevail on a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant ordinarily must show that
(1) his attorney’s representation “‘fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness,’” and (2) “his counsel’s deficiencies were prejudicial to his
defense.” Romero , 46 F.3d at 1029 (quoting Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S.
668, 688 (1984)). However, where a petitioner claims that his attorney was
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ineffective for failing to mount an appeal, prejudice is presumed, and the
petitioner need only show that his counsel’s performance was objectively
unreasonable. See Abels v. Kaiser , 913 F.2d 821, 823 (10th Cir. 1990). Thus, the
only question we must consider is whether Martin’s performance in failing to
perfect Ortiz’s direct appeal was objectively unreasonable.
We note that although the “ultimate question of whether a defendant
received ineffective assistance of counsel is an issue of law which we review de
novo,” we must give due deference to the district court’s findings of fact, and “we
review a district court’s factual findings based on live testimony presented at the
evidentiary hearing only for clear error.” Romero , 46 F.3d at 1028.
In the context of advising a client of appellate rights and mounting a direct
appeal, we have stated that an attorney’s performance is reasonable where the
attorney (1) “explain[s] the advantages and disadvantages of an appeal”; (2)
“provide[s] the defendant with advice about whether there are meritorious
grounds for appeal and about the probabilities of success”; and (3) “inquire[s]
whether the defendant wants to appeal the conviction; if that is the client’s wish,
counsel must perfect an appeal.” Baker v. Kaiser , 929 F.2d 1495, 1499 (10th Cir.
1991).
The district court found that Martin’s testimony that he had advised Ortiz
of his right to appeal, had discussed with him the merits of any such appeal, and
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that Ortiz at no time expressed to Martin a desire to mount a direct appeal was
highly credible and supported by other circumstances in the case. I R. Tab 321, at
2-3; III R. at 93-94. The district court’s determination that these events occurred
as Martin testified they did is a finding of fact to which we must defer. Ortiz
argues that “[a]n examination of the facts adduced at the evidentiary hearing show
the court’s finding was erroneous.” Appellant’s Br. at 12-13. We cannot agree.
Martin directly testified that he advised Ortiz of his right to appeal and
discussed with him the merits of such an endeavor. III R. at 47-48, 50-53, 61.
Martin also stated that Ortiz, after having been advised of his rights and appellate
prospects, did not instruct him to mount a direct appeal of his convictions. Id. at
43, 64. As indicated above, the district court stated that “at the entry of his plea
and at the time of his sentence, [Mr. Ortiz] was aware of his right to appeal and
had declined it, had waived it, had said no and had then had discussions with Mr.
Martin regarding a future 2255 motion.” Id. at 94. Thus, the record provides
support for the district court’s findings of fact. Such supported findings are not
clearly erroneous.
Thus, Martin met the standard articulated in Baker v. Kaiser . His
performance was not constitutionally ineffective. He told Ortiz of his right to
appeal and that his appeal would likely not succeed. Armed with this
information, Ortiz chose not to instruct his attorney to file a direct appeal, but
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rather to wait and file a § 2255 motion. Under such circumstances, the attorney’s
performance was within reasonable limits.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Ortiz has failed to make a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Accordingly, we
DENY Ortiz’s request for a certificate of appealability and DISMISS his appeal.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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