Tice v. Dougherty ( 2021 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT February 24, 2021
_________________________________
Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court
SABRINA TICE,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 20-6062
(D.C. No. 5:18-CV-00974-R)
CHARLIE DOUGHERTY, (W.D. Okla.)
Defendant - Appellant,
and
BOARD OF COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS OF LINCOLN
COUNTY,
Defendant.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, BALDOCK, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Plaintiff Sabrina Tice began working for the Lincoln County, Oklahoma
Sheriff’s Department as a full-time deputy in 2012. At the time, and throughout the
pendency of this case, Defendant Charlie Dougherty was the elected Sheriff.
Plaintiff’s husband, John Tice, also worked as a deputy with the Sheriff’s
Department. In 2015, Mr. Tice was indicted on criminal charges related to an alleged
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law
of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
excessive use of force. Given the charges, the Sheriff’s Department terminated Mr.
Tice’s employment. Plaintiff was unhappy about the termination decision and
allegedly yelled at Defendant to express her disagreement, but Plaintiff was not
disciplined for the outburst. In September 2015, Plaintiff filed a complaint against
Captain Jack Johnson for making derogatory remarks about her husband. On the
same day, Plaintiff surreptitiously recorded a conversation with Captain Johnson.
Plaintiff also recorded conversations with several other officers. Although Plaintiff’s
direct supervisor was aware of her behavior, Plaintiff was not disciplined.
The charges against Mr. Tice were subsequently dismissed, and in April 2016,
Mr. Tice declared his candidacy for sheriff in the upcoming election. Plaintiff openly
supported her husband’s campaign. While Plaintiff concedes that Defendant treated
her well during the election, she contends that the undersheriff, Tim Donaldson,
acted hostilely toward her because she supported her husband’s candidacy.
Defendant won reelection, and the next day, he terminated Plaintiff’s employment.
After her termination, Plaintiff filed this § 1983 action in the Western District
of Oklahoma. As relevant here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated her First
Amendment right to association because he fired her for supporting her husband’s
candidacy for Lincoln County Sheriff. Defendant sought qualified immunity
claiming that he did not violate Plaintiff’s First Amendment right to association and
that, even if he did, the contours of the right were not clearly established. The
district court denied Defendant’s motion. The court held that a reasonable jury could
find (1) Defendant fired Plaintiff because of her political association, and (2) he
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would not have made the same termination decision absent Plaintiff’s protected First
Amendment activity. The court also held that Plaintiff’s First Amendment right to
political association was clearly established in November 2016, when her
employment was terminated.
This interlocutory appeal followed. Defendant argues the district court erred
in denying him qualified immunity. Specifically, he argues the court wrongly
concluded that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether he violated
Plaintiff’s First Amendment right. Defendant also contends that, even if he violated
Plaintiff’s First Amendment association right, the contours of that right were not
clearly established in November 2016, when the termination decision was made.
Because both arguments are unavailing, the district court properly denied qualified
immunity. Thus, exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §.1291, we affirm.
***
Before reaching the merits of the appeal, we pause to note our jurisdictional
limitations. In an interlocutory appeal challenging the denial of qualified immunity,
this court’s jurisdiction is limited to abstract questions of law. Henderson v. Glanz,
813 F.3d 938, 947 (10th Cir. 2015). Thus, we may review: “(1) whether the facts that
the district court ruled a reasonable jury could find would suffice to show a legal
violation, or (2) whether that law was clearly established at the time of the alleged
violation.” Id. at 948 (quotation marks omitted). We therefore have “jurisdiction
over appeals challenging the denial of a qualified-immunity-based motion for
summary judgment only if a defendant-appellant does not dispute the facts a district
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court determines a reasonable juror could find but, instead, ‘raises only legal
challenges to the denial of qualified immunity based on those facts.’” Ralston v.
Cannon, 884 F.3d 1060, 1067 (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting Henderson, 813 F.3d at 948).
Defendant recognizes this jurisdictional limitation. See Appellant’s Br. at 2–4.
And while Plaintiff contends Defendant challenges the district court’s factual
findings, the thrust of Defendant’s argument is that, even accepting the district
court’s factual findings as true, no reasonable juror could conclude he violated
Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights. We have jurisdiction to address this legal
question. We likewise have jurisdiction to consider whether Plaintiff’s asserted right
was clearly established at the relevant time.
***
We review the district court’s denial of summary judgment on qualified
immunity grounds de novo. Quinn v. Young, 780 F.3d 998, 1004 (10th Cir. 2015).
When a defendant asserts a qualified-immunity defense, the plaintiff must show that:
(1) the defendant violated a federal statutory or constitutional right; and (2) the right
was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s conduct. District of Columbia
v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018). Defendant contends Plaintiff failed to establish
either prong. We address each in turn.
A. First Amendment Violation
Under the first prong of qualified immunity, Plaintiff must demonstrate
Defendant violated a federal statutory or constitutional right. Id. As relevant to this
appeal, Plaintiff contends Defendant violated her First Amendment right to political
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association. “The First Amendment protects public employees from discrimination
based upon their political beliefs, affiliation, or non-affiliation unless their work
requires political allegiance.” Snyder v. City of Moab, 354 F.3d 1179, 1184 (10th
Cir. 2003). Accordingly, a public employee has a valid First Amendment claim if
she is discharged for her support of a particular candidate unless the employer can
show her position requires political allegiance. Id. at 1184–85.
In this case, Defendant does not suggest Plaintiff’s employment required
political allegiance. Therefore, Plaintiff must only show that her political affiliation
was a “substantial” or “motivating” factor behind Defendant’s termination decision.
Poindexter v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Cnty. of Sequoyah, 548 F.3d 916, 919 (10th
Cir. 2008). If Plaintiff carries this burden, Defendant may avoid liability if he
establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that he would have fired Plaintiff
even in the absence of her protected conduct. Walton v. Powell, 821 F.3d 1204, 1211
(10th Cir. 2016).
The district court concluded that a reasonable juror could find (1) Plaintiff’s
political affiliation was a substantial factor in her termination, and (2) Defendant
would not have fired Plaintiff absent the protected conduct. In doing so, the court
relied largely on the fact that Defendant was well aware of Plaintiff’s political
activities and fired her just one day after he won reelection. The court also found
that Plaintiff was fired in part because of the recommendation of undersheriff Tim
Donaldson, who had harassed Plaintiff for supporting her husband’s campaign.
Defendant presented some evidence he would have fired Plaintiff anyway, but the
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court determined the evidence was not sufficient to establish that “any reasonable
jury” would conclude Defendant would have taken the adverse action in the absence
of Plaintiff’s support of her husband’s campaign. From our de novo review, the
district court did not err when it found Plaintiff carried her burden of showing
Defendant violated her First Amendment right to political association.
An adverse employment action “in close proximity to protected speech[,]” plus
the employer’s knowledge of the protected conduct, may be sufficiently probative to
show the employee’s protected conduct was a substantial factor in the adverse
employment decision. Maestas v. Segura, 416 F.3d 1182, 1189 (10th Cir. 2005). In
this case, as the district court noted, Defendant fired Plaintiff the day after he won
reelection. Defendant argues the temporal proximity should be measured from the
day Mr. Tice announced his candidacy because Plaintiff supported her husband’s
campaign from the beginning. Using this measure, Defendant contends he didn’t fire
Plaintiff until more than six months after she engaged in protected conduct. And this
gap, he argues, is “too long, standing alone, to establish a causal link.”
Other record evidence undercuts Defendant’s argument. Defendant testified,
for example, that the only reason he didn’t fire Plaintiff during the election was
because it would look bad. Given Defendant’s admission that he would have fired
Plaintiff earlier if it wouldn’t have adversely affected his campaign, there is a clear
temporal proximity between Plaintiff’s protected conduct—supporting her husband’s
campaign—and her termination. It’s also undisputed that Defendant knew about
Plaintiff’s open support for Mr. Tice’s candidacy. Thus, the temporal proximity
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combined with Defendant’s knowledge of Plaintiff’s protected activity supports a
reasonable inference that Plaintiff’s political association was a substantial factor in
her discharge.
But that’s not all. Causation can also be shown where “the employer
expressed opposition to the employee’s speech . . . .” Id. Although Defendant
treated Plaintiff well during the election, undersheriff Tim Donaldson acted hostilely
toward her because of her political affiliation. For example, after Plaintiff
participated in a parade for her husband’s campaign, Donaldson texted Plaintiff a
picture of herself in the parade with the caption: “No loyalty, shameful &
embarrassing, guess you didn’t abstain from campaigning after all.” While
Defendant knew about Donaldson’s harassment, he still relied on Donaldson’s
recommendation in deciding to terminate Plaintiff’s employment. Thus, Defendant
may not have expressly opposed Plaintiff’s political association, but he tacitly
condoned Donaldson’s opposition to and harassment of Plaintiff by relying on his
recommendations to fire her.
Finally, Defendant correctly points out that there is evidence in the record to
support the conclusion that he would have fired Plaintiff even if she hadn’t
campaigned on behalf of her husband. That evidence, however, is not sufficient to
command the conclusion that Defendant would have taken the adverse action absent
Plaintiff’s protected conduct. Although Plaintiff allegedly engaged in some
unbecoming behaviors, nothing was said to her in the eighteen-month period during
which she engaged in the behaviors. Nor was she subject to any discipline prior to
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her termination. It’s tough to say Defendant would have fired Plaintiff anyway when
he hadn’t even disciplined her up to that point. Accordingly, Defendant failed to
meet his burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he would have
fired Plaintiff regardless of her political association.
In sum, a reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff’s political affiliation was a
substantial or motivating factor in her termination and that Defendant would not have
made the same decision absent the protected conduct.
B. Clearly Established
Defendant nonetheless argues he is entitled to qualified immunity because,
even if he did violate Plaintiff’s First Amendment right to association, the contours
of that right were not clearly established. “A clearly established right is one that is
‘sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he
is doing violates that right.’” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015) (per curiam)
(quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)). “To be clearly established,
a legal principle must have a sufficiently clear foundation in then-existing
precedent.” Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 589. Though “a case directly on point” is not
required, “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional
question regarding the illegality of the defendant’s conduct beyond debate.”
Cummings v. Dean, 913 F.3d 1227, 1239 (10th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Cummings v. Bussey, 140 S. Ct. 81 (2019). Ordinarily, “there must be a Supreme
Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the clearly established weight of
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authority from other courts must have found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains.”
Toevs v. Reid, 685 F.3d 903, 916 (10th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks omitted).
As relevant here, the First Amendment has long “protect[ed] public employees
from discrimination based upon their political beliefs, affiliation, or non-affiliation
unless their work requires political allegiance.” Mason v. Okla. Tpk. Auth., 115 F.3d
1442, 1451 (10th Cir. 1997) (overruled on other grounds). This court has more than
a few published cases explaining that an employer may be liable to an employee in a
§ 1983 action when the employer takes an adverse employment action based
substantially on the employee’s political affiliation. See id.; Jantzen v. Hawkins, 188
F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 1999); Dickeson v. Quarberg, 844 F.2d 1435 (10th Cir. 1988);
Francia v. White, 594 F.2d 778 (10th Cir. 1979). And this general rule has been
applied specifically in cases where, like here, a sheriff’s deputy is fired after
campaigning for another candidate for sheriff. See Jantzen, 188 F.3d at 1259;
Francia, 594 F.2d at 779. We therefore agree with the district court that the contours
of Plaintiff’s First Amendment right to political association were clearly established
when she was terminated in November 2016.
Defendant’s sole argument to the contrary is without merit. According to
Defendant, the law is not clearly established because of a factual distinction between
this case and Jantzen. In Jantzen, the sheriff explicitly told his employees that
anyone who openly opposed his reelection would be fired, see 188 F.3d at 1250,
whereas here, Defendant never directly told Plaintiff he terminated her employment
because she supported her husband’s campaign.
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This distinction is of no moment for purposes of our clearly-established law
analysis. If anything, the distinction may impact Plaintiff’s ability to establish the
constitutional violation, but it does not change whether the constitutional right itself
is clearly established. That is, without the direct evidence that she was fired because
of her political affiliation, Plaintiff may struggle to persuade a jury her political
association was a substantial or motivating factor in her termination. But assuming
she does convince the jury, Defendant is not shielded from liability merely because
he more carefully hid his alleged motive for terminating Plaintiff’s employment.
***
For the reasons provided herein, we agree with the district court that a
reasonable jury could find Plaintiff’s political association was a substantial or
motivating factor in her termination, and that Defendant would not have made the
same termination decision absent the protected conduct. We further conclude the
contours of Plaintiff’s First Amendment right to association were clearly established
when she was terminated in 2016. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district
court.
Entered for the Court
Bobby R. Baldock
Circuit Judge
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