Oates v. Englund ( 1999 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 4 1999
TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
DOUGLAS J. OATES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
No. 99-1187
(D.C. No. 97-N-2737)
ROSE ENGLUND, OFFICER
(Colorado)
HERERRA, OFFICER
SUMMERFIELD and ROY HAVENS,
Phisicians (sic) Assistant,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, BALDOCK and HENRY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Douglas J. Oates, a state prisoner, brought this pro se civil rights action
against employees of state correctional facilities in Colorado alleging various
violations of his Eighth Amendment rights. The matter was referred to a
magistrate judge, who recommended dismissal of all the claims. The district
judge adopted the recommendations and dismissed the case with prejudice. Mr.
Oates appeals and we affirm.
In his complaint, Mr. Oates alleged that nurse Rose England deliberately
infected him with hepatitis in July, 1991, while he was incarcerated. He alleged
that she was paid to do so by outside sources and that he did not learn he was
infected until several years later. Ms. England moved to dismiss the claim as
barred by two-year limitation period applicable to section 1983 claims in
Colorado. See Blake v. Dickason, 997 F.2d 749, 750 (10th Cir. 1993). In
response, Mr. Oates offered medical records showing that he tested positive for
hepatitis on February 20, 1992, although he asserted that he was not informed of
this fact by prison medical staff until March 15, 1997. On appeal, Mr. Oates
contends that his affidavit creates a genuine issue of fact as to when he knew or
should have known of the facts giving rise to his claim.
While we agree with Mr. Oates that “[m]aterial factual disputes cannot be
resolved at summary judgment based on conflicting affidavits,” it is also true that
“[t]o come within the protection of this rule . . . the nonmovant’s affidavits must
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be based upon personal knowledge and set forth facts that would be admissible in
evidence; conclusory and self-serving affidavits are not sufficient.” Hall v.
Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1111 (10th Cir. 1991) (emphasis added). Here Mr.
Oates has offered nothing to support his conclusory and self-serving allegation
that he was not told of his condition until some five years after he was tested. His
affidavit is thus not sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact and the claim
against Ms. England was therefore properly dismissed on the basis of the
applicable statute of limitations.
The claims against defendants Hererra, Summerfield, and Havens were also
properly dismissed. On September 12, 1997, after Mr. Oates apparently
complained of medical problems, Mr. Havens, a physician’s assistant, requested
that Mr. Oates be brought to the medical examination room. Prison officers
Hererra and Summerfield brought Mr. Oates to the room pursuant to prison
regulations. Defendants stated by affidavit that Mr. Oates demanded Mr. Havens
put on rubber gloves before the examination. When Mr. Havens was unable to
find any gloves, Mr. Oates refused to be examined and was taken back to his cell.
Mr. Oates, on the other hand, alleged that Mr. Havens hypnotized him and
performed a medical procedure upon him without his consent. Mr. Oates further
stated that his medical problems continued, and that tests by an outside hospital
revealed a cyst that required removal by surgery.
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To the extent Mr. Oates seeks monetary relief against these defendants in
their official capacities, the suit is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See White
v. State of Colorado, 82 F.3d 364, 366 (10th Cir. 1996). Moreover, the suit
against them individually was properly dismissed on the basis of qualified
immunity. Qualified immunity shields public officials from liability for civil
damages when their actions do not violate clearly established constitutional law
of which a reasonable person would have known. See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S.
226, 231 (1991). Mr. Oates’ allegations, even if taken as true, do not state a
constitutional violation. See id. at 232.
A prisoner states an Eighth Amendment violation if he alleges facts
sufficient to show that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his serious
medical needs. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). However, not
every claim by a prisoner that he has received inadequate medical treatment states
a constitutional violation. Id. at 105. Allegations of inadvertent failure to
provide adequate medical care or of negligent diagnosis or treatment do not
establish the requisite culpable state of mind. Id. at 105-06. The selection of
diagnostic techniques and treatment are matters of medical judgment, and are at
most claims of medical malpractice that do not rise to constitutional violations.
Id. at 107.
Here, viewing the record most favorably to Mr. Oates, it appears that the
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alleged hypnosis and treatment by Mr. Havens did not adequately treat Mr. Oates’
medical condition. As discussed above, however, these facts are not sufficient to
state an Eighth Amendment violation. Thus summary judgment was properly
granted in favor of Mr. Havens. To the extent Mr. Oates alleges that defendants
Hererra and Summerfield personally participated in the violation of his
constitutional rights by conspiring with Mr. Havens, summary judgment was
properly granted on that claim as well because Mr. Havens’ conduct was not
unconstitutional. 1
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephanie K. Seymour
Chief Judge
1
We conclude that the record before us is adequate to allow the proper
disposition of Mr. Oates’ claims and we therefore deny his requests for oral
argument, for entire transcripts, and for production of additional documents. We
affirm the denial under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) of his request to amend his
petition. We also affirm the dismissal as frivolous of Mr. Oates’ claim that
unnamed prison officials have implanted electronic devices under his skin and
have operated these devises remotely to administer pain and suffering. We
dismiss as moot Mr. Oates’ claim for injunctive relief requesting that he be
scheduled for surgery to alleviate his medical condition since the record indicates
that Mr. Oates’ surgery was scheduled for October, 1998. His request to be
transferred to another facility was properly denied as he has no right to
incarceration at any particular facility. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238,
247-48 (1983). His request for immediate release states a claim for habeas corpus
relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 that must be dismissed for failure to exhaust state
remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c).
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