Janssen v. Cobe Laboratories ( 1999 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
NOV 24 1999
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
CANDACE JANSSEN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. Nos. 98-1065 & 98-1113
(D.C. No. 95-K-2890)
COBE LABORATORIES, INC., (D. Colo.)
a corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY , BRISCOE , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). These appeals are
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Candace Janssen appeals from the district court’s adverse summary
judgment ruling on the substantive merits of her employment discrimination
claims (appeal No. 98-1065) and from that court’s ruling awarding costs to
defendant (appeal No. 98-1113). Our jurisdiction over these appeals arises from
28 U.S.C. § 1291. We reverse and remand both cases to the district court for
further proceedings.
Plaintiff was terminated from her employment with defendant COBE Labs,
Inc., in 1995. She was told that her termination had nothing to do with her
performance, but was part of a reorganization following the company’s sale of
one of its service lines. Shortly prior to the announced sale and reorganization,
however, defendant had conducted a “critical skills evaluation” of its employees.
Plaintiff scored fairly low, but above two other employees who were not
terminated. She was not told about the skills evaluation or its results. She filed
charges of gender and disability discrimination with the EEOC, followed by this
lawsuit in district court.
Appeal No. 98-1065
Plaintiff challenges two rulings by the district court on her substantive
claims: the grant of summary judgment to defendant on her claims filed pursuant
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to Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) , 1 and the denial of
a motion to amend her pleadings to include age and race discrimination claims.
Both of the challenged rulings were contained in the magistrate’s report and
recommendation which was subsequently adopted by an order of the district court.
See Appellant’s App., Vol. VI at 1138-39.
1. Summary Judgment
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.
Applying this standard, we examine the factual record and reasonable
inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the nonmoving
party. We will uphold the decision only if no genuine issue of
material fact exists and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. A mere scintilla of evidence supporting the nonmoving
party’s theory does not create a genuine issue of material fact.
Instead, the nonmoving party must present facts such that
a reasonable jury could find in its favor.
Anderson v. Coors Brewing Co., 181 F.3d 1171, 1175 (10th Cir. 1999) (citations
omitted).
Our review of the record on appeal, applying the above standards,
convinces us that the district court erroneously applied the law and failed to
acknowledge material factual allegations in the record. Addressing plaintiff’s
1
Plaintiff originally brought additional claims pursuant to the Rehabilitation
Act and the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act, which were also denied by the
district court. However, she does not reassert these claims on appeal, thereby
waiving them. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Mhoon , 31 F.3d 979, 984 n.7
(10th Cir. 1994).
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ADA claim, the district court first concluded that plaintiff failed to establish that
she had a disability “which is substantial or effects [sic] a major life activity.”
Appellant’s App., Vol. VI at 1054. The court’s analysis in support of this
conclusion suggests a requirement that the alleged disability affect plaintiff’s
ability to work. Applicable law, however, does not require that the disability
affect a claimant’s work, only that it affect a major life activity. See McGuinness
v. University of N.M. Sch. of Med. , 170 F.3d 974, 978 (10th Cir. 1998)
(commenting that alleged disability need not “affect those aspects of a person’s
life that have a public or economic character”), cert. denied , 119 S. Ct. 1357
(1999). 2
In analyzing plaintiff’s alleged disability, the district court also minimized
her assertions that her TMJ affects her speaking, eating, walking, sleeping, and
having sexual relations, see Appellant’s Br. at 7-8, summarizing them as
“complaints . . . that she cannot ride a bicycle, must east [sic] soft food, has
trouble sleeping, has lost weight and experiences some pain in her jaw.” See
Appellant’s App., Vol. VI at 1054. This discussion appears to suggest that
2
Indeed, the Supreme Court recently noted that the EEOC itself “has
expressed reluctance to define ‘major life activities’ to include working and has
suggested that working be viewed as a residual life activity, considered, as a last
resort, only ‘[i]f an individual is not substantially limited with respect to any
other major life activity.’” Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. , 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2151
(1999) (citing 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(j)).
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plaintiff’s allegations do not support her claims of a substantial disability, but the
court did not expressly state this conclusion, analyze the allegations in light of
applicable law, or cite cases which would support such a conclusion.
Next, the district court concluded that, even if plaintiff were disabled under
the ADA, “[t]here is not one scintilla of evidence that [plaintiff’s] TMJ problem
was a determining factor in her termination.” See id. at 1055. The only statement
in support of this conclusion is the court’s assertion that none of the persons on
the committee which made the termination decisions was aware of any disability
problems related to plaintiff’s work. See id. However, record evidence
contradicts that statement. Plaintiff’s affidavit states that, prior to her
termination, she had met separately with Pat Hart and Teresa Blandford, both
members of the termination committee, and communicated to them her fears that
her health problems and resulting absences from work had affected how she was
being treated or would lead to her being fired. See id., Vol. IV at 602-03.
Further, other evidence supports plaintiff’s contentions that her disability may
have been a factor in her termination. For example, the supervisor who rated her
for the critical skills evaluation testified in his deposition that he knew these
kinds of evaluations had affected people in past reorganizations and did not have
reason to assume this one would be different. See id. at 691. Plaintiff’s affidavit
averred that this supervisor had made several negative comments with regard to
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her TMJ problems and resulting absences from work, see id., Vol. III at 371-72,
Vol. IV at 604-05, and that his rating of her on the critical skills evaluation was
much more negative than his later deposition testimony about her performance,
see id. at 677-78. This evidence could support a finding that her disability was a
factor in her termination.
On plaintiff’s gender discrimination claim, she bears the initial burden of
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973). To establish a prima facie case of gender
discrimination, the plaintiff must show that: (1) she belonged to the protected
class; (2) she was adversely affected by the employment decision; (3) she was
qualified for her position; and (4) she was treated less favorably than her male
counterparts. See Cole v. Ruidoso Mun. Schs. , 43 F.3d 1373, 1380 (10th Cir.
1994). If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the defendant can rebut the
presumption of discrimination by producing some evidence that it had legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for its action. See Sorensen v. Aurora , 984 F.2d 349,
352 (10th Cir. 1993). If the defendant meets "its burden of production, the
McDonnell Douglas framework--with its presumptions and burdens--is no longer
relevant." St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks , 509 U.S. 502, 510 (1993). The
plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate
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reasons offered by the defendant were a pretext for discrimination. See McCue v.
Kansas Dep’t of Human Resources , 165 F.3d 784, 789 (10th Cir. 1999).
The district court was critical of plaintiff’s complaint as setting out only
conclusory allegations and failing to identify on which theory she was proceeding.
The court concluded that plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case of gender
discrimination, see Cole, 43 F.3d at 1380, because she did not demonstrate either
that she was discharged despite adequate work (the third prong) or that she was
replaced by or treated differently than a similarly situated employee of the
opposite sex (the fourth prong). See Appellant’s App., Vol. VI at 1056-57. 3
The court stated that plaintiff did not satisfy the third prong because the
evaluating supervisor was not part of the termination committee, and because the
committee’s decision was based on other factors, assumably the critical skills
evaluation. Although we agree that many of plaintiff’s allegations were vague
and conclusory, she did assert that this supervisor disliked women, and treated her
differently than male employees. In her opposition brief to defendant’s summary
judgment motion, plaintiff provided several detailed examples of how the
3
Because we are reversing the district court's determination that plaintiff did
not establish a prima facie case, and remanding for further proceedings, we do
not reach the second and third factors of the McDonnell Douglas
framework--whether the defendant had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for
its action, see Sorensen , 984 F.2d at 352, or whether the plaintiff can establish
that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were a pretext for
discrimination, see McCue , 165 F.3d at 789.
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supervisor treated her differently than male employees. She also provided
citations to affidavits and interrogatory responses which set out others in still
more detail. See Appellant’s App., Vol. III at 423-27. The record contains
evidence that plaintiff complained to Hart and Blandford that her supervisor
treated her negatively because she is a woman. See id., Vol. IV at 592-94. These
specific allegations, combined with her supervisor’s knowledge that the critical
skills evaluations had been used to terminate people in prior reorganizations,
constitute evidence of causation between the alleged gender discrimination by the
supervisor and plaintiff’s termination.
The district court concluded that plaintiff did not meet the fourth prong of
the applicable test because she was replaced by another woman. That prong
requires that a claimant was either replaced by or treated differently than
a similarly situated employee of the opposite sex. In discussing plaintiff’s
allegations of discriminatory treatment, the court limited its recitation to
comments that her supervisor referred to women as idiots and rolled his eyes
at her. As noted above, however, the record contains specific allegations that
plaintiff was treated differently than male employees in comparable positions.
This evidence could satisfy the fourth prong. Plaintiff also notes on appeal that,
although she was replaced by a woman, two male employees who scored lower
on the critical skills evaluation were retained.
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In considering the merits of plaintiff’s claims, the district court stated that
it would ignore plaintiff’s references to prior successful employment
discrimination lawsuits against defendant. See id., Vol. VI at 1051 n.2. The
court simply stated that such references were irrelevant. However, evidence of
the continuation of prior practices which have been found to be discriminatory or
suspect can be relevant. See Phillip v. ANR Freight Sys., Inc., 945 F.2d 1054,
1056 (8th Cir. 1991). Defendant’s use of the critical skills evaluation has been
condemned by the district court in other cases similar to plaintiff’s. See
Appellant’s Br. at 28-29; Appellant’s App., Vol. III at 393-98. The court
improperly failed to consider these cases as evidence of past discriminatory
practices which may be relevant to plaintiff’s claims.
In summary, the district court improperly applied the law and failed to
acknowledge many of plaintiff’s specific factual allegations, basing its analysis
on facts which were contradicted on the record. We reverse the grant of summary
judgment. Our conclusion regarding this case at the summary judgment stage
should not be read as implying plaintiff will ultimately prevail on her claims.
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2. Motion to Amend
Defendant responded to plaintiff’s EEOC charges in a letter dated April 20,
1995, but did not then mail a copy of its response to either plaintiff or her
counsel. Plaintiff filed suit in district court on November 21, 1995. In February
1996, defendant provided its disclosure as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a),
which included an oblique reference to its EEOC response letter. However, in
that disclosure, as in its answer and other pleadings in the district court,
defendant maintained that plaintiff was discharged as part of a reorganization, and
did not mention the critical skills evaluation.
During depositions held in mid-July 1996, defendant’s HR employees
testified that plaintiff had been terminated during the reorganization on the basis
of her score on the critical skills evaluation, and that two other employees scoring
lower than plaintiff were retained. According to the HR employees who made the
termination decisions, these two other employees were retained because one was
an older woman and the other a black male. See Appellant’s App., Vol. I at 69-
73, 90-94. On July 29, 1996, plaintiff filed a motion to amend her complaint to
add age and race claims. In a hearing on the motion to amend, plaintiff’s counsel
stated that he did not receive a copy of the EEOC file until shortly before taking
depositions of defendant’s HR employees, and defendant’s counsel conceded that
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they did not send a copy of the EEOC response letter to plaintiff’s counsel until
after the depositions.
On January 8, 1998, the magistrate court issued an order denying
the motion. The court stated that plaintiff was on notice as of April 20, 1995 (the
date of the EEOC response letter) and as of February 1996, when defendant
provided its Rule 26(a) disclosure to plaintiff’s counsel. The court did not say
why plaintiff was deemed to be on notice as of these dates. The court also
concluded that the proposed new claims were not reasonably related to the
charges plaintiff had filed with the EEOC, and that defendant “has never deceived
Plaintiff either as to the procedural requirements of filing or the reasons for the
retention of [the other two employees].” Id., Vol. II at 182.
We conclude that this ruling was an abuse of the district court’s discretion.
No facts support the magistrate court ’s finding that plaintiff’s counsel was on
notice or should have been on notice of defendant’s EEOC response letter on
either April 20, 1995, or as a result of defendant’s disclosure in February 1996.
The disclosure certificate obliquely refers to “COBE’s response [to the EEOC
charge],” see id. at 251, and does not mention the critical skills evaluation, the
retention of employees who scored lower than plaintiff, or the bases for their
retention. The EEOC response letter was not attached to the disclosure
certificate.
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We also disagree with the magistrate court’s conclusion that equitable
tolling does not apply. Applicable case law supports plaintiff’s argument that she
was not required to file a separate EEOC complaint alleging age and race
discrimination. In light of the deposition testimony of defendant’s HR employees,
it is clear that these claims are “reasonably related” to the discrimination claims
plaintiff had already filed because the “conduct alleged would fall within the
scope of an EEOC investigation which would reasonably grow out of the charges
actually made.” Strub v. Public Serv. Co., 863 F. Supp. 1352, 1355 (D. Colo.
1993) (further quotations omitted). Further, the court’s statement that there was
no evidence defendant deceived plaintiff about the reasons for the retention of the
two employees who scored lower on the critical skills evaluation is belied by
record evidence. It is undisputed that defendant did not tell plaintiff about the
evaluation or its results when she was terminated and did not later put plaintiff on
notice by sending her a copy of the EEOC response letter or by attaching one to
its disclosure certificate.
Motions to amend should be freely granted unless the proposed amendment
would result in prejudice to the non-movant or would be futile. See Moore v.
Reynolds, 153 F.3d 1086, 1116 (10th Cir. 1998) (prejudice), cert. denied,
119 S. Ct. 1266 (1999); Drake v. City of Fort Collins, 927 F.2d 1156, 1163
(10th Cir. 1991) (futility). We also agree with plaintiff’s argument that the court
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failed to support its ruling with a finding of prejudice to appellee. Further, in
light of the court’s recitation of undisputed facts in his order granting summary
judgment, it is clear that amendment to add race and age discrimination claims
would not be futile. See Appellant’s App., Vol. VI at 1050.
Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s ruling denying plaintiff’s
motion to amend. Upon remand, the district court should allow plaintiff to amend
her complaint to add claims of race and age discrimination. 4
Appeal No. 98-1113
This appeal is from the district court’s summary award of costs to
defendant in connection with plaintiff’s substantive claims. Rule 54(d) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure creates a presumption that costs will be
awarded to the prevailing party. See AeroTech, Inc. v. Estes, 110 F.3d 1523, 1526
(10th Cir. 1997). Because we reverse the district court’s grant of summary
judgment on plaintiff’s substantive claims, we also reverse the court’s fee ruling.
Defendant’s request for attorney’s fees to defend this appeal is denied. Plaintiff’s
motion requesting leave to file two deposition notices with this court that were
not before the district court is also denied. See Boone v. Carlsbad
4
Appellee’s motion to supplement the appendix in this appeal is granted.
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Bancorporation, Inc., 972 F.2d 1545, 1549 n.1 (10th Cir. 1992) (stating appellate
court will not review documents not before the district court).
REVERSED AND REMANDED for further proceedings.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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