Sastre v. Cessna Aircraft Co. ( 1999 )


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  •                                                                          F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    DEC 21 1999
    TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    LUIS SASTRE,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.                                             No. 98-3330
    CESSNA AIRCRAFT COMPANY,                      (D.C. No. 96-CV-1456-MLB)
    (D. Kan.)
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    Before BALDOCK, EBEL, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
    Plaintiff Luis Sastre appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment
    in favor of Defendant Cessna Aircraft Company on his claims of breach of
    implied duty of good faith, forfeiture, and unconscionability. We exercise
    jurisdiction pursuant to 
    18 U.S.C. § 1291
    , and affirm.
    I.
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
    generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
    and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    Plaintiff Luis Sastre was a Latin American sales representative for Cessna’s
    Citation jet aircraft until his termination, allegedly for filing false travel expense
    reports. Two documents, (1) the Statement of Understanding and (2) the annual
    Citation Marketing Sales Compensation Plan, contained the terms of Sastre’s
    employment. The Statement of Understanding provided that Sastre was an
    employee at will. The Compensation Plan, which Cessna presented to Sastre
    unilaterally, provided that a sales representative earns his commission for the sale
    of an aircraft in two halves: he earns the first, the advance commission payment,
    when the Citation Marketing Division Administration (“Marketing”) accepts the
    sale, and the second, the delivery commission payment, when Cessna delivers the
    aircraft to the customer. Finally, the Compensation Plan unambiguously provided
    that if a marketing representative were no longer an employee at the time
    Marketing accepted the sale or Cessna delivered the aircraft, the employee would
    not receive the advance or delivery commission, respectively.
    At the time Cessna terminated him, Sastre had already arranged the sale of
    several aircraft for which he had not yet earned the commissions, either because
    Marketing had not yet accepted the sales, or because Cessna had not yet delivered
    the aircraft. Sastre sued Cessna to recover these commissions, alleging (1) breach
    of an implied covenant of good faith, (2) forfeiture, and (3) unconscionability.
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    Cessna filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district court granted.
    Sastre appeals.
    II.
    We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,
    applying the same legal standard as the district court. See Anderson v. Coors
    Brewing Co., 
    181 F.3d 1171
    , 1175 (10th Cir. 1999). Summary judgment is
    appropriate if no genuine issue of material fact exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
    We view the evidence and draw inferences therefrom in the light most favorable
    to the nonmoving party. See Anderson, 
    181 F.3d at 1175
    .
    A. Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith
    Sastre argues that the district court should have read an implied covenant of
    good faith into the Compensation Plan. The Compensation Plan provided that a
    sales representative did not earn advance and delivery commissions until
    Marketing had accepted the sale and Cessna had delivered the aircraft,
    respectively. Cessna prepared a new Compensation Plan every year and presented
    it to its employees unilaterally.
    Under Kansas law, personnel rules that are unilaterally issued by the
    employer are not part of the employment contract and therefore cannot be the
    basis of an implied covenant of good faith. See Buckley v. Keebler Co., 
    1998 WL 314566
    , at *4 (10th Cir. 1998) (unpublished decision); Bartholomew v. City of
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    Burlington, Kansas, 
    5 F. Supp.2d 1161
    , 1171 (D. Kan. 1998); Kastner v. Blue
    Cross and Blue Shield of Kansas, Inc., 
    894 P.2d 909
    , 917 (Kan. App. 1995).
    Therefore, the district court correctly refused to imply a covenant of good faith on
    the basis of the Compensation Plan.
    B. Forfeiture
    Sastre next argues that the Compensation Plan effects a forfeiture in
    violation of Kansas law because it provides that a marketing representative does
    not receive the advance or delivery commission until Marketing accepts the sale
    or Cessna delivers the aircraft to the customer, respectively.
    The Kansas Wage Payment Act, 
    Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 44.313-327
    , provides
    that terminated employees are entitled to collect all of their “earned wages,” 
    id.
     at
    § 44.315(a), including commissions, see id. at § 44.313(c). However, an
    employment contract may create a condition precedent to the employee’s earning
    of wages. See Weir v. Anaconda Co., 
    773 F.2d 1073
    , 1084 (10th Cir. 1985);
    Smith v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 
    755 F. Supp. 354
    , 358 (D. Kan. 1990);
    Weinzirl v. Wells Group, Inc., 
    677 P.2d 1004
    , 1008 (Kan. 1984). A condition
    precedent is
    something that is agreed must happen or be performed before a right
    can occur to enforce the main contract. It is one without the
    performance of which the contract entered into between the parties
    cannot be enforced. A condition precedent requires the performance
    of some act or happening of some event after the terms of the
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    contract, including the condition precedent, have been agreed on
    before the contract shall take effect.
    Weinzirl, 677 P.2d at 1008.
    The Compensation Plan creates two conditions precedent to a marketing
    representative’s receipt of the advance and delivery commissions: first,
    Marketing must accept the transaction, and second, Cessna must deliver the
    aircraft to the customer. In addition, in order to receive the commissions, a sales
    representative must be an employee at the time the conditions precedent are
    satisfied. Because Sastre had not yet satisfied the conditions precedent when he
    was terminated, he had not yet “earned” his commissions under 
    Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44.315
    (a). Therefore, the district court correctly found that the Compensation
    Plan did not effect a forfeiture under the Kansas Wage Payment Act.
    C. Unconscionability
    Sastre finally argues that the Compensation Plan was unconscionable.
    Under Kansas law, a contract is unconscionable if it meets the following factors:
    1. The use of printed form or boilerplate contracts drawn
    skillfully by the party in the strongest economic position, which
    establish industry wide standards offered on a take it or leave it basis
    to the party in a weaker economic position;
    2. a significant cost-price disparity or excessive price;
    3. a denial of basic rights and remedies to a buyer of
    consumer goods;
    4. the inclusion of penalty clauses;
    5. the circumstances surrounding the execution of the
    contract, including its commercial setting, its purpose and actual
    effect;
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    6. the hiding of clauses which are disadvantageous to one
    party in a mass of fine print trivia or in places which are
    inconspicuous to the party signing the contract;
    7. phrasing clauses in language that is incomprehensible to a
    layman or that divert his attention from the problems raised by them
    or the rights given up through them;
    8. an overall imbalance in the obligations and rights imposed
    by the bargain;
    9. exploitation of the underprivileged, unsophisticated,
    uneducated and the illiterate; and
    10. inequality of bargaining or economic power.
    Wille v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 
    549 P.2d 903
    , 906-07 (Kan. 1976) (citations
    omitted).
    Sastre has not shown, either in the district court or on appeal, that the
    Compensation Plan was a contract. Even if the Compensation Plan is a contract,
    it is not unconscionable: factors 1-3 and 7-9, regarding consumer transactions,
    are not applicable, and Sastre has not presented evidence that supports a finding
    of unconscionability under factors 4 (penalty clauses), 5 (circumstances of the
    contract’s execution), or 6 (hidden language or fine print). The evidence
    supporting factor 10, that Cessna’s unilateral presentation of the Compensation
    Plan to Sastre demonstrated disparate bargaining power, is not alone enough to
    raise an issue of material fact regarding unconscionability. Accordingly, the
    decision of the district court is
    AFFIRMED.
    Entered for the Court,
    Bobby R. Baldock
    Circuit Judge
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