Hopkins v. O'Melveny & Myers ( 1999 )


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  •                                                                         F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    DEC 22 1999
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    In re:
    RICHARD RAMSEY HOPKINS and
    CHERILYN BAKER HOPKINS,
    No. 99-1080
    Debtors.                               (D.C. No. 97-K-888)
    (D. Colo.)
    O’MELVENY & MYERS;
    GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER,
    LLP,
    Plaintiffs-Appellees,
    v.
    RICHARD RAMSEY HOPKINS,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT            *
    Before BALDOCK , PORFILIO , and BRORBY , Circuit Judges.
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
    generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
    and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
    argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
    therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
    Defendant, an attorney appearing     pro se , appeals the district court’s
    affirmance of the bankruptcy court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
    plaintiffs. The bankruptcy court granted plaintiffs’ motions for summary
    judgment in two adversary proceedings arising from two complaints filed by
    plaintiffs for determination of dischargeability of debts in defendant’s bankruptcy
    proceeding. In granting the motions, the bankruptcy court found that three
    sanctions entered by a California court against defendant were not dischargeable
    debts under 
    11 U.S.C. § 523
    (a)(6). Defendant appealed both summary judgments.
    The district court consolidated the appeals and agreed with the bankruptcy court
    that the debts were not dischargeable. Because this appeal involves only legal
    issues, our review is de novo. See Phillips v. White (In re White)   , 
    25 F.3d 931
    ,
    933 (10th Cir. 1994). We affirm.
    Before defendant filed for relief under the Bankruptcy Code, a California
    court entered sanctions against defendant, finding that he had violated California
    law by engaging in bad faith litigation tactics in representing a client who was
    ultimately found to be a vexatious litigant. When defendant sought to have the
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    sanction debts discharged in bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court held that the
    sanctions were nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6) because the sanctions were the
    result of willful and malicious injury by defendant. The bankruptcy and district
    courts found that defendant was collaterally estopped from denying
    nondischargeability of the debt because the California court findings, establishing
    that defendant engaged in sanctionable bad faith conduct, were equivalent to
    findings that defendant wilfully and maliciously injured plaintiffs within the
    meaning of § 523(a)(6).
    In its decision, the district court carefully considered the California court
    sanction orders, California law on bad faith, and federal law relating to willful
    and malicious conduct under § 523(a)(6). The court correctly found that the
    sanction orders contained particular and specific findings establishing willful and
    malicious conduct under § 523(a)(6). We agree with the district court that there
    may be cases in which a finding of bad faith litigation tactics under California
    law would not be the equivalent of finding willful and malicious conduct for
    purposes of § 523(a)(6), but   in this particular case   the findings in the two
    sanction orders are such that defendant is collaterally estopped from arguing that
    he did not willfully and maliciously injure the plaintiffs. The district court’s
    memorandum decision is thorough and well-reasoned, and any legal analysis we
    could offer would be redundant. Therefore, we affirm the district court judgment
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    for substantially the reasons stated in its memorandum decision of January 28,
    1999.
    Defendant raises one issue on appeal not addressed by the district court in
    its decision. He argues that the bankruptcy court erred in denying his motion to
    dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint to determine the dischargeability of two of the three
    sanction awards. Defendant maintains that the complaint should have been
    dismissed as untimely. Plaintiffs’ original complaint in Adversary Proceeding
    No. 96-1554 sought only determination of the dischargeability of one sanction.
    Plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint to include a request for determination
    of dischargeability of two later sanctions, and the bankruptcy court originally
    allowed amendment. Upon reconsideration, however, the bankruptcy court
    denied the amendment and ruled that the adversary proceeding would include
    determination of only the one sanction award included in the original complaint
    for determination of dischargeability.
    After the bankruptcy court denied amendment, defendant voluntarily
    converted his Chapter 7 bankruptcy to a Chapter 11 proceeding. The Notice Of
    Commencement of the Chapter 11 case set a new deadline for creditors to file
    a complaint to determine the dischargeability of debts. Plaintiffs filed their
    complaint for determination of the dischargeability of the remaining two sanctions
    in the new Chapter 11 proceeding well before the deadline. The conversion to
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    Chapter 11 constituted an order for relief, which required a new meeting of
    creditors, which, in turn, triggered a new sixty-day period in which creditors
    could file a complaint to determine dischargeability of a debt.   See 
    11 U.S.C. §§ 348
    (a); 341(a); Bankr. R. 4007(c)     F & M Marquette Nat’l Bank v. Richards     , 
    780 F.2d 24
    , 25 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding that “[t]he time fixed for filing a complaint
    to determine dischargeability of a debt is keyed to the first date set for the
    meeting of creditors,” and that, because creditor’s meeting held in previous
    proceeding is unrelated to creditor’s meeting required upon conversion, the
    creditor’s meeting set in the new proceeding is “the first date set for the meeting
    of creditors”); In re Stanton , 
    136 B.R. 562
    , 564-65 (D. Kan. 1992) (applying
    reasoning in F & M Marquette to case involving conversion from Chapter 7 to
    Chapter 13). The bankruptcy court was correct to deny the motion to dismiss the
    second complaint to determine dischargeability as untimely.
    Defendant’s request to proceed without prepayment of costs or fees and the
    motion to supplement the record are GRANTED. The judgment of the United
    States District Court for the District of Colorado is AFFIRMED for substantially
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    the same reasons stated in its order dated January 28, 1999. The mandate shall
    issue forthwith.
    Entered for the Court
    Wade Brorby
    Circuit Judge
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