Whiteman v. Ortiz ( 1999 )


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  •                                                                           F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    DEC 30 1999
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    MICHAEL BRIAN WHITEMAN,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.                                                   No. 99-4029
    (D.C. No. 94-1014-B)
    RON ORTIZ, Officer, Utah State                         (D. Utah)
    Prison; (NFN) HUGHES,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT            *
    Before BRORBY , PORFILIO , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
    this appeal.   See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
    therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
    generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
    and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    Michael Brian Whiteman brought this action in December 1994 pursuant to
    
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     against defendants Ron Ortiz, Joe Hughes and others alleging
    that they violated his constitutional rights to be free from cruel and unusual
    punishment and to equal protection while he was incarcerated in the Utah State
    Prison. The district court granted summary judgment to Ortiz and Hughes and
    dismissed the claims against the other defendants under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (d) (now
    designated § 1915(e)). Whiteman appeals only the grant of summary judgment in
    favor of Ortiz on his Eighth Amendment claim.     1
    We review the district court’s
    grant of summary judgment de novo.        See Anderson v. Coors Brewing Co.    , 
    181 F.3d 1171
    , 1175 (10th Cir. 1999).
    We view the facts, supported by valid summary judgment evidence, in the
    light most favorable to Whiteman, the party opposing summary judgment.           See 
    id.
     ;
    Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).   2
    Following his conviction for murder, Whiteman began
    serving his sentence at the Utah State Prison on November 26, 1993. Ortiz’ only
    1
    In his reply brief, Whiteman stated that he was not appealing the summary
    judgment in favor of Hughes. He failed to file objections to the magistrate
    judge’s report, which the district court adopted, recommending that the other
    defendants be dismissed under § 1915(d). He therefore could not appeal, nor does
    he appear to try to appeal, the dismissal of those defendants.   See Moore v. United
    States , 
    950 F.2d 656
    , 659 (10th Cir. 1991). Finally, there is no indication in his
    appellate briefs that he is attempting to appeal the denial of his equal protection
    claim, and, for that matter, there is virtually nothing in his complaint to support
    such a claim.
    2
    Whiteman’s amended complaint was verified, and we therefore treat it as an
    affidavit. See Conway v. Smith , 
    853 F.2d 789
    , 792 (10th Cir. 1988).
    -2-
    involvement in Whiteman’s incarceration occurred in December 1993, when he
    conducted Whiteman’s intake into the prison’s Uintah III facility. During the
    intake, Whiteman informed Ortiz that he had been convicted of killing a
    “Mexican Gang Member,” and he requested verbally and in writing that he be
    housed in seclusion from known Mexican gang members.         See R. Vol. I, Doc. 14
    at 7-8. Ortiz told him that there were Mexican gang members throughout the
    Utah State Prison, and Ortiz assigned Whiteman to Uintah III, Section 2, which
    contained what Whiteman alleged were “known to be violent gang members.”
    See id. at 8. Whiteman did not object to being housed in this section, nor did he
    request a housing reassignment. Nearly six months later, “a high ranking gang
    member” was transferred to the same facility and several hours later, Whiteman
    was attacked and beaten by members of that gang, of which the individual
    Whiteman murdered was also a member.       See id. He contends that by assigning
    him to that particular section, Ortiz was deliberately indifferent to his safety and
    thereby violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual
    punishment. See Farmer v. Brennan , 
    511 U.S. 825
    , 832-34 (1994).
    “[P]rison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the
    hands of other prisoners.”   
    Id. at 833
     (quotation omitted). To prove a breach of
    this duty rising to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner must
    show both that he or she was “incarcerated under conditions imposing a
    -3-
    substantial risk of serious harm,”    
    id. at 834
    , and that the prison official acted with
    deliberate indifference, which means that the official
    knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety;
    the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference
    could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he
    must also draw the inference.
    
    Id. at 837
    .
    We agree with the district court that Whiteman’s generalized concern
    regarding his fear of “Mexican gang members” was insufficient to establish the
    substantial risk of serious harm necessary to support his claim.      See Riddle v.
    Mondragon , 
    83 F.3d 1197
    , 1204-06 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding, in affirming
    dismissal of complaint, conclusory allegation of fear due to sex offender status
    insufficient to establish substantial risk of serious harm);   Davis v. Scott , 
    94 F.3d 444
    , 447 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding no deliberate indifference where there was “no
    solid evidence . . . of an identifiable serious risk to [prisoner’s] safety”).
    Moreover, Ortiz’ minimal involvement in Whiteman’s incarceration, Whiteman’s
    failure to object to his placement in Section 2, and the lapse of time between the
    placement and the assault further support the conclusion that Ortiz was not
    deliberately indifferent to or aware of an excessive risk to Whiteman’s safety.
    Whiteman also challenges the district court’s refusal to appoint counsel to
    represent him. The district court has discretion to appoint counsel in a civil case,
    -4-
    see Shabazz v. Askins , 
    14 F.3d 533
    , 535 (10th Cir. 1994), and Whiteman has not
    demonstrated that the court abused its discretion in not appointing counsel here.
    Whiteman’s request to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED. The
    judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Utah is
    AFFIRMED.
    Entered for the Court
    Wade Brorby
    Circuit Judge
    -5-