United States v. Shayesteh ( 2000 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FEB 1 2000
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. Case No. 99-4032
AHMAD SHAYESTEH, (D.C. 95-CR-106-S)
(District of Utah)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR , Chief Judge, BALDOCK , and HENRY , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
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Ahmad Shayesteh was convicted of two counts of possessing a controlled
substance with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)(A) and
(C). The first count involved cocaine and the second methamphetamine. Mr.
Shayesteh was sentenced to a total term of imprisonment of 262 months, five
years’ supervised release, and a fine of $10,000.00. Mr. Shayesteh appealed, and
on October 6, 1998, this court entered an order and judgment affirming the
convictions. See United States v. Shayesteh , No. 97-4111, 1998 WL 694500(10th Cir. Oct. 6, 1998). We granted Mr. Shayesteh’s Petition for Rehearing of
that Order and Judgment for the limited purpose of considering Mr. Shayesteh’s
alleged sentencing errors on the merits. See Rec. vol. I, doc. 93 (Order on Reh’g
No. 97-4111, filed Nov. 24, 1998).
Mr. Shayesteh argues that his role was merely that of a drug courier,
thereby entitling him to an offense level reduction for his role as a “minor
participant” under USSG § 3B1.2. See United States v. Ballard , 16 F.3d 1110,
1114 (10th Cir. 1994). In addition, Mr. Shayesteh contends that the district court
erred in its finding of perjury in support of an obstruction of justice enhancement
under USSG § 3C1.1. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and, for
the reasons set forth below, affirm.
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I. “Minor participant” under USSG § 3B1.2
We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error, and its
exercise of discretion in applying the guidelines to those facts with “due
deference.” United States v. James , 157 F.3d 1218, 1219 (10th Cir. 1998); see
also 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (stating “due deference” standard). The district court’s
exercise of discretion to reduce an offense level is case-specific. See USSG §
3B1.2 cmt. Background. In addition, Mr. Shayesteh has the burden of proving his
entitlement to a § 3B1.2 reduction by a preponderance of the evidence. See
United States v. Lockhart , 37 F.3d 1451, 1455 (10th Cir. 1994).
A defendant is not entitled to a minor participant reduction by virtue of his
apparent paid courier status. See, e.g. , United States v. McCann , 940 F.2d 1352,
1359 (10th Cir. 1991). Rather, we look to the defendant’s “‘culpability, not
courier status.’” United States v. Pelayo-Munoz , 905 F.2d 1429, 1431 (10th Cir.
1990) (quoting United States v. Bueniostro , 868 F.2d 135, 138 (5th Cir. 1989)).
We consider a sentence reduction appropriate “‘where an individual was recruited
as a courier for a single smuggling transaction involving a small amount of
drugs.’” United States v. Martinez , 983 F.2d 968, 977 (10th Cir. 1992) (quoting
USSG § 3B1.2 cmt. 1). Here, the record indicates that the amount of
methamphetamine totaled approximately four and a half to five pounds, and that
the cocaine totaled about a pound and a half, neither of which is a negligible
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quantity. See Rec. vol. I, doc. 8 (Indictment); vol. VII, ¶ 5 (Presentence report).
There is no evidence in the record of the involvement of any other persons apart
from Mr. Shayesteh.
The district court reasoned as follows in denying Mr. Shayesteh a minor
participant reduction: “[T]he court finds that the amount of drugs found was
significant, that [Mr. Shayesteh’s] fingerprints were found on the packaging
material containing the drugs and that there is nothing in the record to support of
finding that anyone else was involved.” Rec. vol. I, doc. 97, at 3. The district
court properly exercised its discretion in concluding that Mr. Shayesteh did not
carry his burden of demonstrating an entitlement to a§ 3B1.2 sentence reduction.
See also United States v. Burnett , No. 98-6224, 1999 WL 569055, at **9 (Aug. 4,
1999) (affirming district court reasoning in denying a minor-role reduction where
defendant’s “fingerprint was found on the tape which packaged one of the bundles
of the cocaine”).
II. USSG § 3C1.1 Enhancement
At the time of Mr. Shayesteh’s sentencing, § 3C1.1 required a two-point
upward adjustment to a defendant’s offense level “[i]f the defendant willfully
obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of
justice during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense.”
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“Obstruction of justice includes the offering of perjured testimony at trial.”
United States v. Copus , 110 F.3d 1529, 1536 (10th Cir. 1997). For the purposes
of § 3C1.1, “[a] defendant commits perjury . . . if he ‘gives false testimony
concerning a material matter with the willful intent to provide false testimony.’”
United States v. Pretty , 98 F.3d 1213, 1221 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting United
States v. Dunnigan , 507 U.S. 87, 94 (1993)) .
“In order to apply the § 3C1.1 enhancement, it is well-settled that a
sentencing court must make a specific finding--that is, one which is independent
of the jury verdict--that the defendant has perjured h[im]self.” United States v.
Massey , 48 F.3d 1560, 1573 (10th Cir. 1995). The required finding must
encompass “‘all of the factual predicates of perjury,’” id. (quoting Dunnigan , 507
U.S. at 95), so that we are able “‘to satisfy our appellate responsibility of review
in determining whether the record would support findings of falsity, materiality
and willful intent.’” United States v. Owens , 70 F.3d 1118, 1132 (10th Cir.
1995) (quoting Massey , 48 F.3d at 1574). However, “[t]he mere fact that a
defendant testifies to his or her innocence and is later found guilty by the jury
does not automatically warrant a finding of perjury.” United States v. Markum , 4
F.3d 891, 897 (10th Cir. 1993). In turn, the district court must “indicate what
specific testimony it finds to be untrue and how that testimony concerns a
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material matter designed to substantially affect the outcome of the case.” United
States v. Arias-Santos , 39 F.3d 1070, 1077 (10th Cir. 1994).
In applying the enhancement here, the district court outlined the specific
instance in which it believed Mr. Shayesteh lied under oath. The court found that
the defendant:
testified that he was given the duffle bags that held the drugs found in
the trunk of his car for delivery to Utah, but that he was unaware of
what was in the bags. The evidence at trial established that the
fingerprints of the defendant were on the packaging of the drugs inside
a sock found in one of the duffle bags taken from the trunk of
defendant’s car. The defendant’s testimony is found to be false and
that it pertained to the only real issue in the case, that is, defendant’s
knowledge of the drugs which is established by the presence of his
fingerprints. . . . Considering all the testimony regarding this issue, the
court finds that defendant’s testimony regarding how his fingerprints
got on the ziplock bag is not credible and is rejected as being
unbelievable.
Rec. vol. I, doc. 97, at 2.
Mr. Shayesteh argues on appeal that the court’s findings are inadequate,
and that much of the testimony concerning his contact with the plastic bag that
contained the drugs was conflicting. Mr. Shayesteh testified that while being
interviewed in the jail cell, an officer held up a plastic bag containing Mr.
Shayesteh’s personal effects, and that Mr. Shayesteh grabbed the bag to examine
the contents. He contends that the prints left on this bag were those prints
identified on the bag containing the contraband. The testimony of the relevant
officers suggests that there was no second plastic bag containing personal effects.
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We determine that the district court’s factual findings adequately set out
the reasons why it believed Mr. Shayesteh’s testimony was false, and why the
falsehood was intentional. The district court’s specific finding that Mr.
Shayesteh testified falsely is not clearly erroneous. Moreover, it is clear that the
falsehood was material, as Mr. Shayesteh’s knowledge of the contents of the
plastic bag, evidenced by his fingerprints on the plastic bag, was probative of Mr.
Shayesteh’s involvement and role in the illegal drug trade. Such a finding of
perjury is sufficient to support a § 3C1.1 enhancement. See United States v.
Anderson , 189 F.3d 1201, 1213 (10th Cir. 1999).
Therefore, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court,
Robert H. Henry
Circuit Judge
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