United States v. Burzynski ( 2000 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FEB 17 2000
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
No. 99-1359
(D.C. No. 95-CR-361-Z)
LAWRENCE BURZYNSKI, also
(D. Colo.)
known as Larry Burns, also known as
Barry J. Wilson,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY, EBEL and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
Defendant-Appellant Lawrence Burzynski (“Burzynski”) appeals from a
district court order denying his petition for a writ of mandamus filed pursuant to
*
After examining appellant’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R.
34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This
Order and Judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be
cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
28 U.S.C. § 1361. 1 Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we
AFFIRM.
BACKGROUND
Burzynski entered into a plea agreement with the United States in
September 1998 in which he agreed to plead guilty to Counts 9 and 19 of the
indictment, wire fraud and mail fraud respectively, in exchange for the dismissal
of the remaining nineteen counts. The Plea Agreement contains no reference to
the facility at which Burzynski would serve his sentence. However, during the
district court hearing on September 2, 1998, at which Burzynski tendered his
guilty pleas, Burzynski’s counsel discussed with the trial judge his understanding,
based on a telephone conversation with a Bureau of Prisons official, that
Burzynski might be eligible for placement by the Bureau of Prisons in a federal
prison camp. Burzynski’s counsel requested that the district court recommend to
the Bureau of Prisons that Burzynski be placed in such a camp. The government
indicated that it would not object to such a recommendation, and the court stated
that it would make such a recommendation. At Burzynski’s sentencing hearing,
his counsel again requested that the district court recommend to the Bureau of
Prisons that Burzynski be placed in a federal prison camp. The government
1
Section 1361 provides: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the
United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.”
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reiterated that it would not object to the recommendation. At both the hearing at
which Burzynski entered his guilty pleas and at the sentencing hearing, the
district court emphasized that it could only recommend and could not guarantee
placement in a federal prison camp. The court ultimately made the
recommendation, however the Bureau of Prisons did not place Burzynski in a
federal prison camp as requested. On July 20, 1999, Burzynski filed a petition in
the United States District Court for the District of Colorado for a writ of
mandamus to enforce his plea agreement with the government, which he argued
was breached, by requiring the Bureau of Prisons to designate the Federal Prison
Camp at Nellis Air Force Base (“Nellis”) as the place Burzynski will serve the
remainder of his sentence. The district court denied this petition the same day,
finding that Burzynski was not promised placement at Nellis but instead was
promised that the court would only make a recommendation. The court found that
this promise was fulfilled and therefore Burzynski’s petition was without merit.
DISCUSSION
Construing Burzynski’s pro se pleadings liberally, see Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972), Burzynski appears to make two arguments on
appeal. Burzynski first argues that the government violated his plea agreement
when it did not ensure that the Bureau of Prisons placed him in the federal prison
camp. Whether government conduct has violated a plea agreement is a question
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of law we review de novo. See United States v. Hawley, 93 F.3d 682, 690 (10th
Cir. 1996). “Our analysis focuses on the nature and extent of the promises made
by the government, but is sensitive to the defendant’s reasonable understanding
thereof.” United States v. Furman, 112 F.3d 435, 439 (10th Cir. 1997). In this
case, the plea agreement itself did not contain a promise that Burzynski would be
placed in a federal prison camp. However, there was discussion during
Burzynski’s plea hearing and at his sentencing hearing that the court would
recommend a federal prison camp and the government would not object. Even
assuming, without deciding, that these statements are part of the plea agreement,
it is clear that there was no promise made by either the government or the court to
ensure that Burzynski was imprisoned at a federal prison camp. Based on our
review of the record, it clear that the district court informed Burzynski that it only
had the power to recommend a federal prison camp and that the Bureau of Prisons
does not always follow these recommendations. Moreover, the government
simply agreed not to object to the recommendation. The court made the
recommendation and there is no allegation that the government ever objected to
the recommendation, therefore, we find no breach of the plea agreement.
Burzynski’s second argument is that the district court abused its discretion
when it denied his petition for a writ of mandamus. “[W]e review a district
court’s denial of a mandamus for an abuse of . . . discretion . . .;however, we
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consider de novo whether the legal prerequisites for such relief are present.”
Marquez-Ramos v. Reno, 69 F.3d 477, 479 (10th Cir. 1995) (internal citations
omitted). Before mandamus can be issued, “there must be a clear right to the
relief sought, a plainly defined and peremptory duty on the part of respondent to
do the action in question, and no other adequate remedy available. . . . Petitioner
must also show that his right to the writ is ‘clear and indisputable.’” Johnson v.
Rogers, 917 F.2d 1283, 1285 (10th Cir. 1990) (internal citations omitted).
In this case, Burzynski has failed to show that he has a clear right to relief.
As noted earlier, the court and the government made no promise that Burzynski
would be placed in a federal prison camp. The only promises made concerned the
court’s promise to recommend a prison camp and the government’s promise not to
object. Burzynski stated during the hearings before the court that he understood
the court could only recommend a prison camp and that the Bureau of Prisons
might disregard the recommendation. The court made the recommendation and
the government did not object, thus the agreement was properly enforced and
Burzynski does not have a right to any relief.
Moreover, mandamus is only appropriate if the respondent owes a clear
nondiscretionary duty. See Marquez-Ramos, 69 F.3d at 479. In this case, the
Bureau of Prisons was the agency that made the final determination of where
Burzynski would be housed. Congress has given the Bureau of Prisons broad
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discretion in the designation of the correctional facility at which a federal
prisoner will serve his term of imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 1321 provides that a
sentenced defendant “shall be committed to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons”
who “may designate any available penal or correctional facility . . . that the
Bureau determines to be appropriate and suitable.” This language clearly gives
the Bureau of Prisons discretion as to where a prisoner will be housed. See
United States v. Williams, 65 F.3d 301, 307 (2d Cir. 1995). Thus, because the
Bureau of Prisons exercised its discretion under the statute, Burzynski is unable
to show a “plainly defined and peremptory duty” to place him in a federal prison
camp.
We therefore find that the prerequisites for the issuance of a writ of mandamus
have not been satisfied.
For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of the
petition for a writ of mandamus and find that the government has not breached the
plea agreement.
The mandate shall issue forthwith.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
David M. Ebel
Circuit Judge
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