United States v. Brannon ( 2000 )


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  •                                                                           F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    MAY 25 2000
    TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,                       No. 99-2319
    v.                                                 D. N.M.
    ALFRED RAY BRANNON,                                (D.C. No. CR-99-865-SC)
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT           *
    Before HENRY , PORFILIO , Circuit Judges, and         WEINSHIENK , District
    Judge. **
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
    this appeal.    See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is,
    therefore, ordered submitted without oral argument.
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
    generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
    and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    **
    The Honorable Zita Weinshienk of the United States District Court for
    the District of Colorado, sitting by designation.
    Alfred Ray Brannon appeals the district court ordering referring him
    for a mental health evaluation pursuant to 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 4241
    (a), 4242, 4247, and
    Fed. R. Crim. P. 12.2(c). His initial commitment period of 45 days has expired.
    Nevertheless, he still challenges the authority of the district court to order the
    mental health examination.
    We note at the outset, that although Mr. Brannon’s case appears moot in
    that he is no longer in the custody of a federal mental health facility, and there is
    no further relief we can afford him, there is precedent to suggest that his situation
    is justiciable. In United States v. Deters , 
    143 F.3d 577
    , 578 n.2 (10th Cir. 1998),
    we held that review of section 4247(b) commitment orders that have been
    terminated may present situations “capable of repetition, yet evading review.”
    United States v. Boigegrain , 
    122 F.3d 1345
    , 1347 n.1 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting
    conclusion of defendant’s commitment order entered under § 4241(d) did not
    moot a justiciable case or controversy) (en banc) (per curiam);   but see United
    States v. Weston , 
    194 F.3d 145
    , 147 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (noting, in the context of a
    § 4241 order where the defendant did not submit to the examination, “‘if []
    event[s] occur while a case is pending on appeal that make[] it impossible for the
    court to grant any effectual relief whatever to a prevailing party, the appeal must
    be dismissed [as moot]’”) (quoting    Church of Scientology of Calif. v. United
    -2-
    States , 
    506 U.S. 9
    , 12 (1992)). Thus, giving Mr. Brannon the benefit of the
    doubt, we will review his appeal following         Deters .
    Our standard of review was set forth in       Deters : we “‘should give
    appropriate deference not only to [the district court’s] findings but also to the
    conclusion reached by the district court’ regarding the appropriateness of
    confinement.” 
    143 F.3d at 584
     (quoting       In re Newchurch , 
    807 F.2d 404
    , 412 (5th
    Cir. 1986)). The district court’s findings of fact are reviewed for clear error.      See
    In re Newchurch , 
    807 F.2d at 412
    .
    After thorough review, we find no error, clear or otherwise, in the district
    court’s careful evaluation and determination of the facts. The district court’s
    conclusion as to its inherent authority to order a mental health examination was
    “reached in [its] sound exercise of judgment founded on the facts.”        1
    Likewise,
    we find no error in its conclusions of law, especially under the deferential
    standard.
    Consequently, with the exception of only the district court’s conclusion that
    it may order a psychiatric examination under Rule 12.2(c), we affirm for
    substantially the same reasons articulated by the district court in its October 22,
    1
    
    Id.
     Because in this case the court has the inherent authority to order a
    mental health evaluation, we have no need to reach the issue whether under Fed.
    R. Crim. P. 12.2(c) authorizes the court to order a mental health exam in the
    absence of the defense of insanity.
    -3-
    1999 order, see Rec. vol. IX, doc. 53, and for that reason we decline to articulate
    the same analysis here.
    Entered for the Court,
    Robert H. Henry
    Circuit Judge
    -4-