United States v. Hrbowskie ( 2000 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUL 31 2000
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
GWENDOLYN R. HRABOWSKIE;
ANGELA SNOW; FAITH R. JONES;
ARTHUR I. RADCLIFF; MABELENE
RADCLIFF,
Plaintiffs-Appellants, No. 99-7100
(D.C. No. 98-CV-379-S)
and (E.D. Okla.)
ARTHURENE R. CRAIG;
JOSHUA L. RADCLIFF,
Plaintiffs,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA , PORFILIO , and EBEL , Circuit Judges.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiffs brought suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (FTCA), alleging that the United States was liable to them
for damages resulting from the negligence and outrageous conduct of the
Veteran’s Administration Medical Center (VA) in Muskogee, Oklahoma, in
connection with the death of their father, Arthur Radcliff. The district court
conducted a bench trial and found that the evidence did not establish that the VA
was negligent or that its conduct was extreme and outrageous.
“We review de novo the district court’s legal conclusions under the FTCA.
The district court’s factual findings will be set aside, however, only if they are
clearly erroneous.” Engle v. Mecke , 24 F.3d 133, 135 (10th Cir. 1994) (citation
omitted). “[A] finding is clearly erroneous when although there is evidence to
support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Anderson v. City of
Bessemer City , 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (quotations omitted). “If the district
court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its
entirety, [we] may not reverse . . . even though . . . [we] would have weighed the
-2-
evidence differently. Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the
factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” Id. at 573-74.
Guided by these standards, we affirm.
Facts
Plaintiffs are children of Arthur Radcliff, a Black man who died at the VA
in Muskogee, Oklahoma on July 9, 1995. The funeral was to be held in Alabama,
and arrangements were made to have Sloan’s Funeral Home (Sloan’s) in Tulsa
pick up the body, embalm it, and ship it to the Alabama funeral home.
Two days after Mr. Radcliff died, Donald Nelson, who was Caucasian,
also died at the VA in Muskogee. Mr. Nelson’s family arranged to have Sloan’s
pick up Mr. Nelson’s body from the VA for cremation. Sloan’s was to pick up
Mr. Nelson on July 11th, and Mr. Radcliff on July 12th. As a result, both men
were in the cooler room in the new morgue at the VA at the same time.
A Sloan’s employee picked up what he believed was Mr. Nelson’s
body on July 11th, and a different employee picked up what he believed was
Mr. Radcliff’s body on the 12th. Consequently, both bodies were at Sloan’s for
a period of time. Sloan’s embalmed what they believed was Mr. Radcliff’s body
on the 12th. They could not cremate Mr. Nelson’s body until they received
a Death Certificate from the State Medical Examiner, and they cremated what
they believed was Mr. Nelson’s body on the 13th, after they received the Death
-3-
Certificate. The Death Certificate stated Mr. Nelson’s race as Caucasian. Sloan’s
delivered what they believed was Mr. Radcliff’s body to the airport on July 14th,
for shipment to Alabama.
Quite unfortunately, the body that was sent to Alabama was, in fact,
Mr. Nelson’s. When the body arrived at the Alabama funeral home, it was viewed
by plaintiffs, who were expecting to see their father. The body that was cremated
was Mr. Radcliff’s. Plaintiffs contend that this unfortunate error was the result of
the VA’s negligence in identifying and releasing their father’s body, failing to
adequately train their employees, and failing to institute proper procedures for the
placement of bodies in its new morgue. In addition, plaintiffs claim that the VA’s
actions resulted in negligent infliction of emotional distress and that the VA’s
conduct was extreme and outrageous and, thus, they are entitled to recover for
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Discussion
Because the FTCA “makes the United States liable on tort claims under
those circumstances in which a private individual would be liable under state
law,” we apply “the law of the place where the alleged negligence occurred.”
Flynn v. United States , 902 F.2d 1524, 1527 (10th Cir. 1990). Oklahoma law
provides that “to establish a claim based on negligence, the plaintiff must
establish (a) the existence of a duty owed by defendant to plaintiff; (b) that the
-4-
defendant failed to perform that duty; and (c) that the defendant’s failure caused
the plaintiff injury.” Woolard v. JLG Indus., Inc. , 210 F.3d 1158, 1168 (10th Cir.
2000). “[A] proximate cause is defined as one that, in the natural and continuous
sequence, produces [the plaintiff’s] injury and without which the injury would not
have happened.” Id. at 1172 (quotations omitted). If, however, “an unforeseeable
event intervenes between the breach of duty, and that event directly causes the
injury completely independent of the original breach, then the intervening cause
becomes the supervening cause and breaks the causal nexus between the initial
breach and the subsequent injury.” Id. at 1181 (quotation omitted). When there
is a supervening cause, any original negligence becomes only a remote cause
or mere condition. See Lefthand v. City of Okmulgee , 968 P.2d 1224, 1226
(Okla. 1998). “A true supervening cause acting to insulate [a] defendant from
liability must satisfy a three-prong test: (1) it must be independent of the original
act, (2) it must be adequate of itself to bring about the result, and (3) it must not
have been a reasonably foreseeable event.” Id. Generally, whether a defendant’s
failure to perform a duty owed is the proximate cause of a plaintiff’s injury is
a question of fact. See id. 1
1
“[T]he question of proximate cause becomes a question of law when the
facts are undisputed and there is no evidence from which a [factfinder] could
reasonably find a causal connection between the allegedly negligent act and the
injury.” Lefthand , 968 P.2d at 1226. This exception to the general rule that
(continued...)
-5-
After considering all the evidence, the district court found that the two
bodies were properly identified by toe tags and identification bracelets at the VA
and that the identifying tags remained on the bodies while they were at Sloan’s.
In fact, the toe tag identifying Mr. Nelson was still attached to his toe when he
was returned from Alabama. The court found that the VA employee who released
Mr. Nelson’s body, and the Sloan’s employee who took the body, both confirmed
Mr. Nelson’s identity according to the toe tag and/or the bracelet. It further found
that Sloan’s visually inspected the chest area of every body it cremated for the
presence of a pacemaker, and an inspection of Mr. Radcliff’s chest area would
have revealed that he was Black. The court concluded that Sloan’s erroneously
cremated Mr. Radcliff’s body contrary to the Death Certificate, which authorized
cremation of Mr. Nelson, a Caucasian. In sum, the district court found that the
VA was not negligent because it released the proper bodies to the respective
Sloan’s employees. All of these findings are perfectly plausible when the record
is viewed in its entirety, and, therefore there was no clear error.
To the extent that the VA breached a duty to institute appropriate
procedures for the placement of bodies in the new morgue and properly train its
employees in the procedures to be used in the new morgue, the district court
1
(...continued)
proximate cause is a factual question does not apply on this record.
-6-
found that these failures by the VA were not the proximate cause of plaintiffs’
injuries. Instead, it found that the VA’s omissions were merely a condition that
made the cremation of Mr. Radcliff possible. Sloan’s cremation of Mr. Radcliff
without authorization and its delivery of Mr. Nelson to Alabama without verifying
his identity were independent, efficient, and unforeseeable acts and, as such,
amounted to a supervening cause that insulates the VA from any liability. See id.
These findings are also permissible views of the evidence, and, as such, are not
clearly erroneous.
Finally, the district court was correct in finding that defendant’s conduct
was neither extreme nor outrageous. Consequently, plaintiffs are not entitled to
recover on a theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
David Ebel
Circuit Judge
-7-