Apgar v. State of Wyoming ( 2000 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
AUG 2 2000
TENTH CIRCUIT
__________________________ PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
E. STORMY APGAR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 99-8029
(D. Wyo.)
STATE OF WYOMING; WYOMING (D.Ct. No. 98-CV-068-D)
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
HIGHWAY PATROL; EVERETTE L.
AYERS; GARY L. MARSDEN; DAVID E.
FERGUSON; DAVID D. COLEMAN;
JAMES A. PUDGE; RICHARD
BURRIDGE; CARL E. CLEMENTS;
CASEY C. GOODMAN, as individuals,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY, McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and ELLISON, ** District
Judge.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
The Honorable James O. Ellison, Senior District Judge for the Northern District
of Oklahoma, sitting by designation.
Former highway patrol officer E. Stormy Apgar sued the Wyoming
Highway Patrol and several officers in their individual capacities, claiming
gender discrimination, hostile work environment, retaliation for reporting
discriminatory conduct, breach of an implied employment contract, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted defendants’
summary judgment motion and dismissed all claims. This timely appeal followed.
We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. After a thorough review
of the briefs and record on appeal, we affirm in part, reverse in part and remand
for further consideration.
I. BACKGROUND 1
Ms. Apgar first worked for the Wyoming Highway Patrol (Patrol) in the
1980s, resigning May 13, 1990 to pursue employment opportunities in Montana.
At the conclusion of this first employment period, Ms. Apgar’s supervisor gave
her a mostly positive performance review and recommended she receive a
favorable rating should she ever wish to return to the Patrol. Ms. Apgar did
express an interest in returning to the Patrol, which led to her second period of
1
Given the procedural posture of this case, we will view the facts in the light most
favorable to Ms. Apgar, the nonmoving party at the summary judgment stage. See Wolf v.
Prudential Ins. Co., 50 F.3d 793, 796 (10th Cir. 1995).
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employment beginning in January 1994. The Patrol assigned Ms. Apgar to
Division C (id. at 288), where her supervisors included three of the named
defendants in this suit: Sergeant James A. Pudge, Lieutenant David D. Coleman,
and Captain David E. Ferguson Ms. Apgar was the first female patrolman to serve
in Division C.
Ms. Apgar described herself as “thrilled” and happy to be back with the
Patrol and stationed with Division C. Unfortunately, some of her co-workers did
not share her enthusiasm for her new posting. Almost immediately Ms. Apgar
began experiencing hostile behavior that would later form the basis of her
complaint in this lawsuit. We now examine this allegedly discriminatory conduct.
Lieutenant Coleman told Ms. Apgar on her first day some people were not
happy with her assignment to the division. Ms. Apgar quickly learned one of the
patrolmen who was unhappy with her arrival was Carl Clements. Patrolman
Clements was assigned to oversee Ms. Apgar’s field training in Division C. Ms.
Apgar felt Patrolman Clements was unsupportive from the beginning and hoped
she would fail. After filing the current lawsuit, Ms. Apgar learned Patrolman
Clements once told other officers at a training meeting women did not belong in
law enforcement. Prior to Ms. Apgar’s arrival at Division C, Patrolman Clements
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also wondered aloud what she had done to receive the assignment.
During field training, Patrolman Clements apparently made two rude
comments. When a citizen asked Patrolman Clements who was in his patrol car,
he described Ms. Apgar as a drunk female he arrested. He also told a resident of
Sheridan, Wyoming, who asked about Ms. Apgar, not to worry about having to
deal with her because she would be based in the neighboring city of Buffalo.
Patrolman Clements was originally assigned as Ms. Apgar’s shift partner;
however, Lieutenant Coleman and Sergeant Pudge eventually gave that
assignment to Patrolman Joe Arzy instead, explaining to Patrolman Arzy some of
the other patrolmen in the division did not want to work with Ms. Apgar.
The working relationship between Ms. Apgar and Patrolman Clements did
not improve after the training period. Ms. Apgar felt Patrolman Clements was
openly hostile toward her on the firing range, refusing to answer her questions
and berating her for being late in front of other officers – an approach she claims
he did not take with others in the division. In addition, Ms. Apgar and Patrolman
Clements became embroiled in a controversy over how officers of the highway
patrol should be identified in official publications. Patrolman Clements pushed
the Wyoming Highway Patrol Association to adopt a policy of using the official
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ranks of officers, which in the case of the rank and file officers would be
“Patrolman.” Ms. Apgar wrote a letter to the Association opposed to the policy
and successfully lobbied to allow officers to use the unofficial title “Trooper” if
so desired.
Ms. Apgar also had problems with other officers in the division. Shortly
after Ms. Apgar arrived at Division C, Patrolman Casey C. Goodman refused to
take tickets written by Ms. Apgar to court as was the usual practice because Ms.
Apgar put a “smiley face” at the bottom of a note attached to the tickets.
Patrolman Arzy recalls having to take the tickets to court himself and Patrolman
Goodman later directing him to tell Ms. Apgar “real patrolmen don’t put ‘smiley
faces’ on things.” Ms. Apgar responded with a sarcastic letter addressed to
Patrolman Clements, whom she believed had made the comment.
To make matters worse, Ms. Apgar’s interactions with Sergeant Pudge were
terse and unfriendly. Ms. Apgar sensed Sergeant Pudge was uncomfortable
around her, a hunch Sergeant Pudge confirmed in his deposition. Sergeant Pudge
felt uncomfortable because in his opinion Ms. Apgar did not take criticism or
suggestions well, a trait he told Lieutenant Coleman reminded him of his ex-wife.
In addition, Sergeant Pudge did not ride with Ms. Apgar as often as he should
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have and provided her first performance review in a public place with another
patrolman present. Other co-workers gave Ms. Apgar an equally cool reception.
For instance, Ms. Apgar claims other officers would pass her on the street or
highway and refuse to acknowledge her either by gesture or verbally over the
radio. She also claims she was regularly excluded from “coffee meetings” with
other officers.
Ms. Apgar did develop a good relationship with her shift partner, Patrolman
Arzy, but unfortunately the strength of their professional relationship led to
unfounded rumors within the local law enforcement community the two were
involved in an amorous affair, and inappropriate comments from a Department of
Transportation mechanic making the same inference. Eventually Lieutenant
Coleman and Sergeant Pudge became aware of the rumors, and in order to put an
end to the gossip, decided to split up the shift partners by reassigning Patrolman
Arzy to a different shift.
Ms. Apgar viewed Patrolman Arzy’s shift change as the last straw, and as a
result sent a letter, running over nine single-spaced pages, to the head of the
Patrol, Colonel Everette Ayers. In the letter, Ms. Apgar detailed the behavior she
found objectionable, claimed she was being discriminated against based on her
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gender, and asked Colonel Ayers to rectify the situation. Colonel Ayers assigned
Major Gary Marsden to investigate Ms. Apgar’s complaint, a task Major Marsden
completed by delivering a written report to Colonel Ayers in March 1995, less
than two months after Ms. Apgar wrote her letter to Colonel Ayers.
Major Marsden’s investigation confirmed the occurrence of several of the
events listed above, found a general feeling of “uneasiness and apprehension”
between Ms. Apgar and some of her co-workers, and discovered a problem with
Sergeant Pudge’s supervisory techniques. Major Marsden concluded Sergeant
Pudge’s shortcomings were directed at all members of the division, not solely
toward Ms. Apgar, and many of the problems could be traced to a lack of
communication within the division. The written report concluded by stating Ms.
Apgar’s complaints were raised with her supervisors, positive changes were made
in the supervisory approach, and all parties agreed some professional courtesy
could provide a remedy and improve the workplace atmosphere. In addition to
the operational changes made in the division, Patrolman Arzy was restored to his
previous shift and again became Ms. Apgar’s shift partner.
Unfortunately, the return of her shift partner was the only positive
development to come out of Ms. Apgar’s grievance letter. Her supervisors and
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co-workers were not pleased with the accusations in her letter or in the way it was
presented outside the normal chain of command. For instance, Captain Ferguson
traveled to Buffalo to meet with Ms. Apgar and express his disappointment she
had not raised her concerns with him personally prior to notifying the Colonel.
Lieutenant Coleman agreed he felt “betrayed” and “miffed” that Ms. Apgar had
“gone over [his] head,” and described his relationship with Ms. Apgar as
“frostier” after the letter was sent.. Sergeant Pudge described the letter as
disruptive. Captain Ferguson did meet with Patrolmen Clements, Goodman, and
Burridge to extract assurances they would make an effort to develop a better
working relationship with Ms. Apgar, and several meetings were scheduled
between Ms. Apgar and her co-workers to accomplish this goal. However, Ms.
Apgar decided to stop attending the meetings, and her situation with her co-
workers did not improve.
In Ms. Apgar’s view, the tension within Division C culminated in Sergeant
Pudge’s failure to provide her adequate backup while she searched for two
escapees from the Wyoming Boys’ School. Ms. Apgar first learned of the escape
the early morning of July, 24, 1995, and she located and arrested the escapees at
approximately 3:00 p.m. that same afternoon. Ms. Apgar and Patrolman Arzy
apparently asked Sergeant Pudge if Patrolman Arzy could join Ms. Apgar at
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several points during the day-long search. Sergeant Pudge repeatedly refused to
allow the two patrolmen to work together, preferring the broader coverage of
having them patrol separate areas. Finally, as Ms. Apgar located the escapees, a
patrolman from an adjoining division directed the dispatcher to send backup, and
Patrolman Burridge headed toward Ms. Apgar’s position. Ms. Apgar asked
Patrolman Burridge to assist by setting up a roadblock; however, she stopped the
suspects prior to reaching his position. After approaching the vehicle and
confirming the identity of the suspects, Ms. Apgar told the driver she was giving
him a warning, she returned to her vehicle to request backup, and Patrolman
Burridge arrived to help Ms. Apgar with the actual arrest of the suspects. At
some point when the dispatcher informed Sergeant Pudge Ms. Apgar requested
backup, Sergeant Pudge made what the dispatcher termed a “sarcastic and smart
alecky” remark to the effect he would pretend to back her up from Sheridan.
While Sergeant Pudge disputed Ms. Apgar’s account, a tape of the day’s events
normally kept at the dispatch center came up missing. The Wyoming Division of
Criminal Investigation conducted an extensive investigation of this incident and
determined no criminal activity contributed to the disappearance of the tape and
backup was not intentionally withheld from Ms. Apgar.
Ms. Apgar started to feel her life was in danger due to the lack of support
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from her fellow patrolmen. After her shift partner Patrolman Arzy was fired, Ms.
Apgar began to suspect her supervisors were “trying to get rid” of her, and
looking for any excuse to fire her. Ms. Apgar claimed the constant stress of
working under such conditions impacted her ability to perform her job.
Ultimately, Ms. Apgar filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission and the appropriate state agency on March
5, 1996. Four months later Ms. Apgar officially resigned from the Wyoming
Highway Patrol effective July 10, 1996.
Ms. Apgar filed the current lawsuit on March 20, 1998, raising claims of
disparate treatment based on her gender, hostile work environment sexual
harassment, retaliation for engaging in a protected activity, breach of contract, 2
and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Ms. Apgar also sued the
individual defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming their actions violated her
right to equal protection under the law. The district court granted the defendants’
motion for summary judgment, finding the behavior directed at Ms. Apgar may
have been unprofessional, but it was not motivated by her gender and lacked the
pervasiveness or severity to form the basis of a hostile environment claim. The
2
Ms. Apgar waives the breach of contract claim on appeal because she did not
raise the issue in her opening brief. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Mhoon, 31 F.3d
979, 984 n.7 (10th Cir. 1994).
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district court also determined there was no adverse employment action on which
to base the retaliation and disparate treatment claims, and found a dearth of
evidence in support of the § 1983 and state claims.
II. DISCUSSION
We review the grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo, applying
the same legal standard as the district court. See Wolf, 50 F.3d at 796. We have
often pointed out summary judgment is proper when “the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
The movant for summary judgment must meet the initial burden of showing the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact, then the nonmovant bears the burden
of pointing to specific facts in the record “showing a genuine issue for trial as to
those dispositive matters for which it carries the burden of proof.” Wolf, 50 F.3d
at 796. As stated earlier, when reviewing the grant of summary judgment we
must examine the facts and any reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Id.-11-
A. Hostile Work Environment
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any
individual with respect to her terms or privileges of employment because of her
sex. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Ms. Apgar relies on two theories to show a
Title VII violation: disparate treatment and hostile work environment. To
survive summary judgment on the hostile environment claim, Ms. Apgar “‘must
show that a rational jury could find that the workplace is permeated with
discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive
working environment.’” Penry v. Federal Home Loan Bank, 155 F.3d 1257, 1261
(10th Cir. 1998) (quoting Davis v. United States Postal Serv., 142 F.3d 1334,
1341 (10th Cir. 1998)), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1039 (1999). Ms. Apgar must not
only show she subjectively perceived the environment as hostile or abusive, but
that her perception was objectively reasonable. 3 Davis, 142 F.3d at 1341. In
order to determine whether an environment is hostile or abusive we look at a
myriad of factors, including “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its
severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive
utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work
3
The Patrol does not dispute Ms. Apgar’s subjective perception of her
environment as hostile, therefore we focus solely on the objective part of the test.
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performance.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993). When
reviewing a hostile environment claim on summary judgment, courts must look to
the totality of the circumstances, and avoid the temptation to view allegedly
discriminatory conduct in isolation. Penry, 155 F.3d at 1262.
The district court identified the aforementioned standards, examined the
totality of the circumstances, and determined Ms. Apgar failed to point to
sufficiently severe or pervasive hostility based on Ms. Apgar’s gender to alter the
conditions of her employment. Because we conclude Ms. Apgar has presented
genuine issues of material fact on this issue, we disagree.
We begin by noting none of the allegedly discriminatory incidents involved
the boorish conduct of inappropriate touching, leering, or sexual language
commonly found in hostile environment claims. This fortunate fact is not fatal to
Ms. Apgar’s claims because actionable conduct in the Title VII realm “is not
limited to behavior motivated by sexual desire.” Id. at 1261 (citing Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998)). However, Ms. Apgar
must still “produce evidence that she was the object of harassment because of her
gender.” Id.-13-
The district court correctly noted the vast majority of the day-to-day events
Ms. Apgar points to as discriminatory were gender neutral on their face, such as
the failure to invite her to coffee breaks, not waving to her on the street, or the
lack of normal conversation on the radio. The same can be said of Patrolman
Goodman’s “smiley face” comment and Sergeant Pudge’s refusal to allow
Patrolman Arzy to search for the escapees with Ms. Apgar. Having said that, it is
important to point out “[f]acially neutral abusive conduct can support a finding
of gender animus sufficient to sustain a hostile work environment claim when
that conduct is viewed in the context of other, overtly gender-discriminatory
conduct.” O’Shea v. Yellow Tech. Servs., Inc. , 185 F.3d 1093, 1097 (10th Cir.
1999).
The district court found four incidents could be reasonably viewed as based
on gender: (1) the rumor of an affair between Ms. Apgar and Patrolman Arzy; (2)
Sergeant Pudge’s admission he was uncomfortable around Ms. Apgar because she
reminded him of his ex-wife; (3) Patrolman Clements’ comments to the effect
women did not belong in law enforcement; and (4) the “trooper” or “patrolman”
debate waged between Ms. Apgar and Patrolman Clements. We add to this list
Patrolman Clements’ ponderings on what Ms. Apgar had to do to get assigned to
Division C in Buffalo.
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We concede at the outset this is a close case. The gender-based conduct
laid out above does not appear particularly severe or pervasive when viewed in
isolation and compared to the blatantly inappropriate behavior found in many
hostile environment cases. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 60, 68
(1986) (unwelcome sexual advances); Davis, 142 F.3d at 1341 (unwelcome
hugging and kissing); Smith v. Northwest Fin. Acceptance, Inc., 129 F.3d 1408,
1413-14 (10th Cir. 1997) (disparaging sexual remarks). However, as stated
earlier, we must not view these events in isolation. Penry, 155 F.3d at 1262. As
part of our review of the totality of the circumstances, we pay particular attention
to “the setting and context in which the discriminatory behavior occurred.”
Smith, 129 F.3d at 1414. “Speech that might be offensive or unacceptable in a
prep school faculty meeting, or on the floor of Congress, is tolerated in other
work environments.” Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1538 (10th
Cir. 1995). The same can be said for conduct. Therefore, we must evaluate the
evidence presented in the context of Ms. Apgar’s unique work environment –
patrolling the nation’s highways as a law enforcement officer. See id. at 1537-38.
When viewed from this perspective, we hold a reasonable jury could infer Ms.
Apgar’s co-workers and superiors made her work environment a hostile one
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because she was a woman. 4
Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Ms. Apgar, we know
Ms. Apgar walked into a less-than-favorable situation at Division C. Her direct
supervisors told Ms. Apgar some of her co-workers were unhappy with her arrival
her very first day on the job. The same supervisors changed her shift partner
because other officers did not want to work with her. The supervisors told
Patrolman Arzy the situation was “a delicate one,” and asked him to keep them
posted and keep an open mind. Considering Ms. Apgar’s previous positive stint
with the Patrol, it is reasonable to infer the concern within the division was based
on gender animus. Patrolman Clements’ belief women do not belong in law
enforcement, his comments that he wondered what Ms. Apgar had done to get the
assignment in Buffalo, and his insistence members of the Patrol should be
identified by the title “Patrolman,” and not “Trooper,” only buttress the inference.
Once Ms. Apgar began her assignment she was ostracized on a daily basis.
4
We note the Patrol did not ignore Ms. Apgar’s complaints. Efforts were made to
bring some civility to the division. Whether the Patrol can be held liable for the actions
of its employees depends on whether these efforts stopped the harassment, or were
reasonably calculated to do so. See Baty v. Willamette Indus., Inc., 172 F.3d 1232, 1241-
43 (10th Cir. 1999). We make no determination of the reasonableness of the Patrol’s
response because the district court did not address this issue in its decision.
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Patrolman Clements was not supportive during Ms. Apgar’s field training, and he
later treated her poorly at the rifle range. Sergeant Pudge refused to ride with Ms.
Apgar, was obviously uncomfortable around her, and was unresponsive to her
questions. Ms. Apgar’s co-workers did not invite her to coffee, ignored her
comments on the radio, and passed her on the highway without waiving or
otherwise acknowledging her. While we would have a difficult time
characterizing this kind of “silent treatment” as severe and pervasive harassment
in an office setting, but see O’Shea, 185 F.3d at 1101-02, the behavior takes on an
entirely different meaning in the law enforcement context. Law enforcement
officers must rely on their fellow officers while on duty – their lives literally
depend on it. Given the constant threat of danger which accompanies this job,
and the reliance on one’s co-workers that necessarily goes with it, we think a
reasonable person in Ms. Apgar’s position could perceive the environment as
hostile. This is especially true when considered in light of what Ms. Apgar
describes as the failure to back her up during her search for the escapees.
On appeal, the Patrol tries to downplay this event by pointing out Patrolman
Burridge did provide backup prior to the actual arrest of the suspects. However,
Patrolman Gordon Herring, the patrolman assigned to Division B who eventually
ordered dispatch to send Patrolman Burridge to Ms. Apgar’s position, stated he
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was “flabbergasted that patrolmen from Division C were doing their normal duties
and routine traffic stops instead of going to Apgar’s location to provide back up
[sic].” Patrolman Herring thought Ms. Apgar’s co-workers had “left her out to
dry.” Tina Grimes, the dispatcher on duty that day, was so concerned by Sergeant
Pudge’s actions she told her supervisor to pull the tape of the events because she
felt something would be “coming out of what occurred.” Clearly Ms. Apgar was
not the only person troubled by her treatment prior to the actual apprehension of
the suspects.
Finally, when Ms. Apgar did develop a positive working relationship with
her shift partner, she faced rumors of an adulterous affair, and her supervisors
moved her partner to a different shift. While the district court correctly pointed
out the rumors impacted both Patrolman Arzy and Ms. Apgar, which limits the
inference the rumors were gender-motivated, the rumors were relevant to show
the overall environment in which Ms. Apgar worked. Given the totality of the
circumstances, we hold summary judgment was inappropriate on this claim.
Although like the district court we have reservations concerning Ms. Apgar’s
chances in prevailing on the merits in this case, that is not for us to decide. Ms.
Apgar raises disputed questions of material fact. It is for the jury to resolve these
issues. We therefore reverse and remand for that purpose.
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B. Disparate Treatment
The analysis for a disparate treatment claim, which requires proof of
discriminatory intent or motive, differs from the hostile environment claim and is
governed by the well-known McDonnell Douglas framework. See Bullington v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 186 F.3d 1301, 1315 (10th Cir. 1999) (referring to the test
set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)). Under this
framework, Ms. Apgar
has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of
discrimination .... If she establishes a prima facie case, the burden
shifts to [the defendants] to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the adverse employment decision. If [the defendants]
offer[] a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for [their] actions, the
burden reverts to Ms. [Apgar] to show [the] proffered reason was a
pretext for discrimination.
Bullington, 186 F.3d at 1315-16 (citations omitted). In order to establish a prima
facie case under Title VII, Ms. Apgar must show: “(1) she is a member of the
class protected by the statute; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; (3)
she was qualified for the position at issue; and (4) she was treated less favorably
than others not in the protected class.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
The second and fourth inquiries are at issue in this case. The district court found
Ms. Apgar did not establish a prima facie case of discrimination because she
failed to show she suffered an adverse employment action. We disagree, but
affirm because Ms. Apgar’s response to the summary judgment motion did not
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contain a cite to evidence in the record tending to show unequal treatment. 5
The only adverse employment action Ms. Apgar claims to have suffered for
purposes of her disparate treatment claim is her constructive discharge from the
Patrol. We have recognized constructive discharge can be a cognizable claim
under Title VII. See Thomas v. Denny’s, Inc., 111 F.3d 1506, 1514 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1028 (1997). “In order to make out a constructive
discharge claim, Ms. [Apgar] must allege facts sufficient to demonstrate under an
objective test that a reasonable person would have viewed her working conditions
as intolerable.” Jeffries v. Kansas, 147 F.3d 1220, 1233 (10th Cir. 1998). “That
is to say the working conditions, when viewed objectively, must be so difficult
that a reasonable person would feel compelled to resign.... Essentially, a plaintiff
must show that she had no other choice but to quit.” Yearous v. Niobrara County
Mem’l Hosp., 128 F.3d 1351, 1356 (10th Cir. 1997) (quotation marks and
citations omitted), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1074 (1998).
Prior to Ms. Apgar’s resignation an officer from Division J in Laramie
5
We can affirm the district court on any ground for which there is a sufficient
record. See Medina v. City & County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1495 n.1 (10th Cir.
1992).
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contacted her and asked her to transfer to his division. Ms. Apgar decided not to
take advantage of this lateral transfer because her husband would have had to quit
two jobs he enjoyed, and she felt her mistreatment had already reached the highest
ranks of the Patrol. The district court determined Ms. Apgar’s refusal to request
this transfer foreclosed her claim of constructive discharge. We can find no
support for this conclusion in the case law, nor did the district court cite any in its
decision. This is not a case of corporate restructuring where several employees
were offered a transfer in lieu of termination. See Gartman v. Gencorp Inc., 120
F.3d 127 (8th Cir. 1997). We hardly think it a tolerable work condition, under the
facts of this case, to expect Ms. Apgar to pick up her family and move hundreds
of miles in order to avoid discriminatory conduct. Such a result would effectively
punish the victim for experiencing discrimination.
As we indicated earlier, this case is not a particularly strong one. “We have
considerable doubt whether the [ostracism that Ms. Apgar faced was] ... so severe
and intolerable that a reasonable person would have no alternative except to
resign.... [T]hese are not matters to be decided on summary judgment.”
Woodward v. City of Worland, 977 F.2d 1392, 1402 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
509 U.S. 923 (1993). Whether the conduct in question constituted constructive
discharge is a question of material fact which should be decided by a jury.
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Ms. Apgar’s disparate treatment claim fails despite our view of her claim of
constructive discharge because her response to the summary judgment motion was
entirely inadequate. As the nonmovant, Ms. Apgar was required to identify
specific facts, through affidavits, depositions, or exhibits, from which a rational
trier of fact could find in her favor. See Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d
664, 671 (10th Cir. 1998). In her response, Ms. Apgar stated the Patrol argued
her disparate treatment claim was flawed because she failed to show she was
treated differently than men in her division. Yet her response on this issue was
limited to one conclusory statement claiming “[t]here are factual disputes over
whether ... she was treated less favorably than her male counterparts.” The
response was completely void of cites to the record tending to show disparate
treatment. Neither the district court, or this Court on appeal, is obligated to comb
the record in order to make Ms. Apgar’s arguments for her. “The district court
has discretion to go beyond the referenced portions of these materials, but is not
required to do so. If the rule were otherwise, the workload of the district courts
would be insurmountable and summary judgment would rarely be granted.”
Adler, 144 F.3d at 672 (citation omitted). Ms. Apgar failed to meet her burden of
presenting specific facts, by reference to affidavits, depositions, or exhibits in the
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record, to overcome the motion for summary judgment. 6 Therefore we affirm the
district court’s grant of summary judgment on the disparate treatment claim.
C. Section 1983
Ms. Apgar also brought a § 1983 claim against the individual defendants
named in her suit. The district court mischaracterized Ms. Apgar’s § 1983 claim
as one for constructive discharge, and failed to address the qualified immunity
defense raised by the defendants. Given the quality of the summary judgment
motions on both sides of this lawsuit, we are not surprised the district court was
led astray. We remand the § 1983 claims because the district court did not
address the claims in its decision. As a short guideline, we note § 1983 provides
a cause of action against individuals who, acting under color of state law, violate
a person’s constitutional rights:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District
of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983. We have held sexual harassment and discrimination can result
6
We make this determination having fully considered the evidence of gender-
specific conduct discussed earlier in this opinion.
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in a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the law.
See Starrett v. Wadley, 876 F.2d 808, 814 (10th Cir. 1989). “[H]owever, ... in
order to establish the state action necessary to support a § 1983 claim, [each
individual defendant] had to be [Ms. Apgar’s] supervisor or in some other way
exercise state authority over her.” Noland v. McAdoo, 39 F.3d 269, 271 (10th Cir.
1994); see also David v. City & County of Denver, 101 F.3d 1344, 1354 (10th Cir.
1996) (co-employees may act under color of law if they exercise de facto
authority over victim), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 858 (1997). State action can occur
when a supervisor “participates in or consciously acquiesces in sexual harassment
... by co-workers.” Murrell v. School Dist. No. 1, 186 F.3d 1238, 1250 (10th Cir.
1999) (quotation marks and citation omitted). If the defendants who meet this
initial criteria raise the defense of qualified immunity, plaintiffs are obligated to
“show that the law was clearly established when the alleged violation occurred
and come forward with facts or allegations sufficient to show that the official
violated the clearly established law.” Woodward, 977 F.2d at 1396. Should the
district court determine Ms. Apgar made this showing, summary judgment would
be inappropriate.
D. Retaliation
The McDonnell Douglas framework applies to the Title VII retaliation
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claims just as it does to the disparate treatment claim disposed of earlier. See
Jeffries, 147 F.3d at 1231. Therefore, Ms. Apgar was first required to make out a
prima facie case, which in the instance of retaliation consists of showing: “(1)
protected opposition to discrimination or participation in a proceeding arising out
of discrimination; (2) adverse action by the employer; and (3) a causal connection
between the protected activity and the adverse action.” Id. (quotation marks and
citation omitted). “A plaintiff may maintain an action for retaliation based on
participation in a protected proceeding regardless of whether the conduct forming
the basis of her underlying complaint is adjudged to violate Title VII.” Id. The
district court concluded Ms. Apgar failed to establish an adverse employment
action and granted summary judgment to the defendants. We must disagree and
reverse.
The district court correctly stated we liberally interpret what constitutes an
“adverse employment action.” See Gunnell v. Utah Valley State College, 152
F.3d 1253, 1264 (10th Cir. 1998). In Gunnell, we went so far as to state “co-
worker hostility or retaliatory harassment, if sufficiently severe, may constitute
‘adverse employment action’ for purposes of a retaliation claim.” Id. We do not
find fault with the district court’s conclusion Ms. Apgar failed to show her
perceived mistreatment at the hands of her co-workers was sufficiently severe to
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constitute an adverse employment action for retaliation purposes. However, we
do disagree with the district court’s finding Ms. Apgar’s employment status was
not altered in retaliation for her protected activity.
As stated earlier, we disagree with the district court’s determination the
necessary adverse employment action could not come from a constructive
discharge of Ms. Apgar. Such a decision is for the jury. We also hold an
additional avenue exists to possibly show Ms. Apgar’s employment status was
altered. Following Ms. Apgar’s resignation, Captain Ferguson, with input from
Lieutenant Coleman and Sergeant Pudge, prepared a final report concluding Ms.
Apgar should not be considered for rehire with the Patrol because of her
“negative attitude.” In the report, Captain Ferguson described Ms. Apgar as
“disruptive to the Division. Tended to be a complainer. She was negative in her
views of the Highway Patrol and was constantly attempting to undermine her
supervisors.” Later in the report he states Ms. Apgar “had problems getting along
with some of her co-workers. She did not get along with her chain of command.
[She] was not happy with the way she was supervised, specifically, she did not
accept criticism well.” Given our liberal interpretation of “adverse employment
action,” and our past willingness to hold “an adverse employment action can arise
from events having an adverse impact on future employment opportunities,” see
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Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 1996), we hold the
negative final report constitutes an adverse employment action.
Having determined Ms. Apgar suffered an adverse employment action, we
must now turn to the third part of the prima facie case: whether she showed a
causal connection between her protected activity and the adverse employment
action. This prong is usually met by showing a temporal proximity between the
two events. Cf. Bullington, 186 F.3d at 1320. However, in the case of the final
report, we have direct evidence in the record, when read with every reasonable
inference in the light most favorable to Ms. Apgar, which supports a direct causal
connection. Specifically, Sergeant Pudge stated in his deposition, when asked if
he agreed with the assessment of Ms. Apgar as disruptive to the division, “[w]ell,
yes, sir.... The first letter that she wrote to Colonel Ayers kind of disrupted any
harmony that was here.” Captain Ferguson’s deposition confirms in preparing the
final report he adopted Sergeant Pudge’s assessment of Ms. Apgar as disruptive
because she wrote the letter to Colonel Ayers. Based on the limited record before
us, we conclude Ms. Apgar did establish a prima facie case of retaliation.
Because the Patrol has not so much as attempted to articulate a legitimate,
nonretaliatory reason for the adverse employment action as required under the
McDonnell Douglas framework, a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial as
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to whether the negative final report, or Ms. Apgar’s possible constructive
discharge, came in retaliation for Ms. Apgar’s complaints to Colonel Ayers and
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
E. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Wyoming has adopted the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
as articulated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46. See Kanzler v. Renner,
937 P.2d 1337, 1341 (Wyo. 1997).
To recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff
must prove that the defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous
and that the defendant intentionally or recklessly caused the plaintiff
to suffer severe emotional harm. When presented with a motion for
summary judgment, the court, as a matter of law, makes preliminary
determinations regarding the outrageousness of the conduct and the
severity of the emotional distress.
Id. (citation omitted). Under this scheme, “[o]utrageous conduct is defined as
conduct which goes ‘beyond all possible bounds of decency,’ and which is
‘regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.’” Id.(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d). The record before us is
void of any conduct which could be deemed “outrageous” under this stringent
standard. “[L]iability clearly does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats,
annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.” Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 46 cmt. d. We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on
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this issue.
III. Conclusion
Having thoroughly reviewed the briefs of the parties and the record on
appeal, we hold material facts are in dispute as to certain claims, which precludes
the award of summary judgment in toto. We AFFIRM the grant of summary
judgment on the state law claims and the disparate treatment claim. However, as
to the hostile environment claim, the § 1983 claims, and the retaliation claim, we
must REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
Entered by the Court:
WADE BRORBY
United States Circuit Judge
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