Nickleberry v. Booher ( 2000 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
NOV 30 2000
TENTH CIRCUIT
__________________________ PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
WILLIE LEE NICKLEBERRY, JR.,
Petitioner-Appellant,
No. 00-6226
v. (W.D. Okla.)
(D.Ct. No. 99-CV-468-M)
GLYNN BOOHER,
Respondent-Appellee.
____________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY, KELLY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Appellant, Willie Lee Nickleberry, Jr., a state inmate appearing pro se,
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
appeals the district court’s decision denying his habeas petition filed pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2254. We deny Mr. Nickleberry’s request for a certificate of
appealability and to proceed in forma pauperis, and dismiss his appeal.
In his federal habeas petition, Mr. Nickleberry challenged his Oklahoma
convictions of one count of larceny of merchandise from a retailer after two or
more felonies, and one count of assault and battery. As grounds supporting his
petition, Mr. Nickleberry contended the state trial court violated his constitutional
rights by: 1) restricting cross-examination of a witness, for impeachment
purposes, concerning the value of the stolen item, and 2) failing to properly
respond to a jury question without notifying defense counsel. The district court
referred the matter to a magistrate judge who issued a carefully written and
thorough Report and Recommendation, discussing the surrounding circumstances
and merits of Mr. Nickleberry’s claims and recommending his petition be denied.
In so doing, the magistrate judge determined Mr. Nickleberry failed to
demonstrate the Oklahoma court’s resolution of these claims was contrary to, or
an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, or involved an
unreasonable factual determination.
Mr. Nickleberry filed an objection to the Report and Recommendation, and
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for the first time claimed the trial court erred in enhancing his sentence based on
his prior convictions. After considering Mr. Nickleberry’s objections, the district
court adopted the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation, but directed
the magistrate judge to consider Mr. Nickleberry’s newly raised sentence
enhancement claim. At the district court’s direction, the magistrate judge issued a
cogent Supplemental Report and Recommendation, explaining Mr. Nickleberry
failed to exhaust his sentence enhancement claim in the state courts. The
magistrate judge nevertheless decided to address Mr. Nickleberry’s sentence
enhancement claim on the merits. In rejecting his claim, the magistrate judge
concluded: (1) application of Oklahoma’s habitual criminal enhancement statute
to Mr. Nickleberry’s sentence raised a matter of state law, and (2) Mr.
Nickleberry failed to show the sentence imposed was outside the possible range of
punishment provided by statute. The magistrate judge then recommended Mr.
Nickleberry’s habeas petition be denied in its entirety. Accordingly, the district
court adopted the Supplemental Report and Recommendation and denied Mr.
Nickleberry’s habeas petition.
On appeal, Mr. Nickleberry raises the same claims addressed by the
magistrate judge and district court. He also claims his petition raises issues
debatable among jurists because two state appellate court judges dissented with
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the majority in ruling on his direct appeal.
When reviewing the denial of a § 2254 petition, we review the district court
factual findings for clear error and its legal rulings de novo. See Rogers v.
Gibson, 173 F.3d 1278, 1282 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 944(2000). Applying this standard and after a careful review of the record, we agree
with the thorough and well-reasoned assessment of Mr. Nickleberry’s claims in
the magistrate judge’s February 29, 2000 Report and Recommendation, and May
31, 2000 Supplemental Report and Recommendation. For that reason, we decline
to duplicate the same analysis.
In addition, we reject Mr. Nickleberry’s claim his petition raises issues
debatable among jurists because two state appellate court judges dissented from
the majority, which affirmed Mr. Nickleberry’s convictions on direct appeal. In
this case, the issue is not whether the state’s appellate justices actually disagreed
on the underlying merits of Mr. Nickleberry’s direct appeal, but whether
reasonable jurists would debate whether the state court’s adjudication
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted
in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
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See Herrera v. Lemaster, 225 F.3d 1176, 1178 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d) (Supp. III 1997)). Applying this criteria, we conclude Mr.
Nickleberry fails to “demonstrate that jurists of reason would find the district
court’s assessment of the constitutional issues debatable or wrong.” Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, ___, 120 S. Ct. 1595, 1604 (2000). In other words, Mr.
Nickleberry fails “to demonstrate that reasonable jurists could debate whether ...
the petition should have been resolved in a different matter or that the issues
presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Tillman
v. Cook, 215 F.3d 1116, 1133 (10th Cir.) (quotation marks and alterations
omitted) (rejecting similar contention by petitioner in which individual state court
justices dissented in different proceedings on different issues, but the majority
nevertheless affirmed petitioner’s conviction and sentence), petition for cert.
filed, (U.S. Sept. 13, 2000) (No. 00-6580). Thus, we conclude Mr. Nickleberry
fails to make the substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right
required for a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
Based on this reasoning, and for substantially the same reasons set forth in
the district court’s April 20, 2000 and June 19, 2000 Orders, and the magistrate
judge’s February 29, 2000 Report and Recommendation, and May 31, 2000
Supplemental Report and Recommendation, we deny Mr. Nickleberry’s motion
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for a certificate of appealability, deny his motion to proceed in forma pauperis,
and DISMISS his appeal.
Entered by the Court:
WADE BRORBY
United States Circuit Judge
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