Guyton v. Ottawa Truck Division, Kalmar Industries U.S.A., Inc. , 15 F. App'x 571 ( 2001 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
APR 27 2001
TENTH CIRCUIT
__________________________ PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
JOHNNY L. GUYTON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 00-3028
(D. Kan.)
OTTAWA TRUCK DIVISION, (D.Ct. No. 98-CV-2488-GTV)
KALMAR INDUSTRIES U.S.A.,
INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA Chief Circuit Judge, and SEYMOUR and BRORBY, Circuit
Judges.
Mr. Guyton appeals from the district court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of Ottawa Truck Division of Kalmar Industries U.S.A., Inc. (“Ottawa
Truck”). Mr. Guyton alleges Ottawa Truck racially discriminated against him in
violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (“Title VII”) and 42 U.S.C. § 1981*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
(“Section 1981”), and seeks damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981a. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and affirm.
BACKGROUND
In January 1998, Mr. Guyton began working for Ottawa Truck as a
“contract drafter.” He was the only African-American employee in Ottawa
Truck’s engineering department at that time. He obtained a temporary position
“with ... the possibility of being hired later if [his] performance was okay.” As a
“contract drafter,” his responsibilities included “mak[ing] changes and
produc[ing] new drawings, as necessary, to facilitate [Ottawa Truck] building
trucks that pulled trailers.”
Drafters at Ottawa Truck used a computer aided design system loaded with
drafting software entitled “Computer Vision.” Mr. Guyton lacked experience
with Computer Vision, but was familiar with computer aided design systems.
Because of Mr. Guyton’s inexperience with Computer Vision, Mr. Brown, a
design engineer, trained him during his first week of work at Ottawa Truck.
On Mr. Guyton’s fourth day of work, his supervisor, Mr. Lehman, assigned
him a training exercise. He completed the assignment and submitted it to Mr.
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Lehman, who testified in deposition that he viewed Mr. Guyton’s drawing as
technically unsatisfactory and untimely. Mr. Lehman never proffered his
criticism to Mr. Guyton when he submitted his drawing; however, Mr. Guyton
noticed Mr. Lehman appeared displeased with his performance.
Mr. Halverson, the Director of Engineering at Ottawa Truck, fired Mr.
Guyton six days after he began working for the company. Before terminating
him, Mr. Halverson spoke with Mr. Lehman and Mr. Brown about Mr. Guyton’s
drafting performance. Mr. Lehman told Mr. Halverson he was displeased with
Mr. Guyton’s submitted drawing and drafting abilities. Mr. Brown told Mr.
Halverson “there were some basic mechanical things that [Mr. Guyton] didn’t
know how to draw.”
According to Mr. Guyton, Mr. Halverson told him of his termination,
expressed his regrets and explained, “we’re going to have to let you go because
we don’t feel that we could bring you up to speed. We thought that your technical
abilities were more than what they were, and we’re going to let you go at this
point.” Mr. Guyton then retrieved his briefcase, and left the building.
Two or three weeks after his discharge, Mr. Guyton received a telephone
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call from Mr. Vasquez, another temporary employee at Ottawa Truck. Mr.
Vasquez explained he overheard Mr. King, who at the time was Chief Engineer at
Ottawa Truck, remark “[w]e finally got rid of that nigger.” Mr. Guyton was
surprised Mr. Vasquez called him to report the racial slur because Mr. Guyton
found the people he worked with at Ottawa Truck “very nice and very polite.”
In October 1998, Mr. Guyton filed a complaint in district court alleging
racial discrimination in violation of Title VII and Section 1981, and seeking
damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981a. After the parties filed cross-motions for
summary judgment, the district court granted Ottawa Truck’s motion and denied
Mr. Guyton’s motion. The district court held Mr. Guyton neither suffered
disparate treatment nor experienced a racially hostile work environment, and was
not entitled to punitive damages. Regarding Mr. Guyton’s disparate treatment
allegation, the district court concluded he failed to present sufficient evidence
showing Ottawa Truck’s reasons for terminating him were pretextual. On appeal,
Mr. Guyton argues he proffered sufficient prima facie and pretext evidence to
withstand summary judgment. 1
1
Mr. Guyton does not appeal, and we do not address, his hostile work
environment claim. In addition, because we affirm the district court’s summary judgment
ruling in favor of Ottawa Truck, we need not discuss: (1) Mr. Guyton’s request for
damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a; and (2) Ottawa Truck’s argument that an inference of
nondiscrimination arises when the same person hires and fires the employee alleging
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“We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,
applying the same legal standard used by the district court.” Simms v. Oklahoma,
165 F.3d 1321, 1326 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 815 (1999). “Summary
judgment is appropriate ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). “Summary
judgment may be granted if the evidence is merely colorable or is not
significantly probative.” Vitkus v. Beatrice Co., 11 F.3d 1535, 1539 (10th Cir.
1993). “[W]e view the evidence and draw reasonable inferences therefrom in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Simms, 165 F.3d at 1326.
DISCUSSION
Mr. Guyton relies on indirect evidence to support his claim of
discriminatory discharge under Title VII and Section 1981. 2 The elements of an
discrimination. See Griffin v. Davies, 929 F.2d 550, 554 (10th Cir. 1991) (“We will not
undertake to decide issues that do not affect the outcome of a dispute”).
2
As discussed below, Mr. Guyton claims that Ottawa Truck’s reasons for
terminating him are false, he was disparately treated, and its managers harbor racial
animus. Although he describes this as only a disparate treatment case, it is more
accurately characterized as alleging discriminatory discharge. Accordingly, we will not
limit our review exclusively to his disparate treatment allegation.
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employee’s discriminatory discharge claim are the same whether brought under
Title VII or Section 1981, and we analyze them using the burden-shifting
framework first articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792(1973). See Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1225-26
(10th Cir. 2000). We are mindful that “[a]lthough the general rule that an
employer can discharge an at-will employee for any reason or no reason is still
valid, an employer can no longer terminate an at-will employment relationship for
a racially discriminatory reason.” Perry v. Woodward, 199 F.3d 1126, 1133 (10th
Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1110 (2000).
Pursuant to the McDonnell Douglas framework, the employee “must carry
the initial burden under the statute of establishing a prima facie case of racial
discrimination.” Kendrick, 220 F.3d at 1226 (quotation marks and citation
omitted). Once the employee establishes a prima facie case, “the burden then
must shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for its employment action.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). If the
employer satisfies his burden of production, the employee must then show that the
employer’s justification is pretextual. Id. Accordingly, “[an employee’s] prima
facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted
justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer
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unlawfully discriminated.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S.
133, 135 (2000).
A. Prima Facie Case
The district court assumed Mr. Guyton proved his prima facie case of
discrimination. To establish a prima facie case, Mr. Guyton must show: “(1) he
belongs to a protected class; (2) he was qualified for his job; (3) despite his
qualifications, he was discharged; and (4) the job was not eliminated after his
discharge.” Kendrick, 220 F.3d at 1229. Although both the parties and the
district court identified an inaccurate prima facie standard, we find it appropriate
to assume, for the purposes of this opinion, that Mr. Guyton established a prima
facie case of discrimination and proceed directly to the second and third steps of
the McDonnell Douglas analysis. Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc., 186 F.3d
1301, 1316 n. 11 (10th Cir. 1999) (recognizing it is appropriate for this court to
focus on the pretext element of a discrimination lawsuit when the district court
concentrated its analysis on that element).
B. Legitimate, Non-Discriminatory Reason for Termination
Having assumed Mr. Guyton established his prima facie case, the burden
shifts to Ottawa Truck to provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
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terminating him. Ottawa Truck’s stated reasons for discharge are: (1) he was not
technically proficient at drafting parts for the trucking industry; and (2) it would
take too long to train him on the drafting software. Accordingly, we hold Ottawa
Truck articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for firing Mr. Guyton.
C. Pretext
To satisfy his burden of showing pretext, Mr. Guyton offers two arguments.
First, he claims Reeves obviates an employee’s obligation to show pretext. In the
alternative, Mr. Guyton argues he presented sufficient pretext evidence
demonstrating: (1) Ottawa Truck’s justifications are false – he is, in fact,
proficient and requires only minimal additional training on the drafting software;
(2) he was treated less favorably than a “similarly situated” white contract
drafter; 3 and (3) Ottawa Truck’s managers harbor racial animus.
Before examining his alternative argument, we briefly express our
disagreement with Mr. Guyton’s first assertion that Reeves eliminates the
3
In the district court, Mr. Guyton argued he was treated less favorably than Mr.
Vasquez, who, according to Mr. Guyton, was a similarly situated contract drafter. The
district court held Ottawa Truck’s decision not to terminate Mr. Vasquez failed to show
pretext. Mr. Guyton does not challenge the district court’s holding regarding Mr.
Vasquez on appeal; thus, we deem this matter waived. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v.
Mhoon, 31 F.3d 979, 984 n.7 (10th Cir. 1994).
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employee’s burden of showing pretext. In Reeves, the Supreme Court reiterates:
[T]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the
[employer] intentionally discriminated against the [employee]
remains at all times with the [employee]. And in attempting to
satisfy this burden, the [employee] – once the employer produces
sufficient evidence to support a nondiscriminatory explanation for its
decision – must be afforded the opportunity to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by
the [employer] were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for
discrimination.
530 U.S. at 143 (quotation marks and citations omitted). It is evident Reeves
rejects certain circuit courts’ attempt to require an employee to introduce
sufficient evidence to find both that the employer’s reasons are false and that the
real reason is discrimination. Id. at 2104-05, 2108-09 (rejecting pretext-plus
standard). However, the case does not eliminate Mr. Guyton’s obligation to
establish his prima facie case and provide sufficient evidence to disbelieve
Ottawa Truck’s legitimate, non-discriminatory explanations for firing him. Id. at
2109 (holding “[an employee’s] prima facie case, combined with sufficient
evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the
trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated”). Based on
our reading of Reeves, we hold Mr. Guyton’s first argument necessarily fails.
Therefore, we focus our attention on his alternative argument and examine his
evidence of pretext.
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1. False Justification for Termination
In his alternative argument, Mr. Guyton claims he provided sufficient
evidence showing Ottawa Truck’s reasons are false. Mr. Guyton primarily argues
his deposition testimony and affidavit, in which he claims he is proficient and
able to draft without significant additional training, creates a genuine issue of
material fact that Ottawa Truck’s reasons are false. Additionally, he cites Mr.
Vasquez’s affidavit and deposition testimony as support for his contention he is in
fact proficient and requires “very little training.” We conclude Mr. Guyton’s
subjective evaluation of his own drafting aptitude and ability to work without
substantial additional training, and Mr. Vasquez’s similar perspective, do not
create a material fact dispute, because the relevant inquiry is the decisionmaker’s
perception of the employee’s performance. See Shorter v. ICG Holdings, Inc.,
188 F.3d 1204, 1209 (10th Cir. 1999); see also Bullington, 186 F.3d at 1318.
As this court consistently recognizes, we must “look at the facts as they
appear to the person making the decision to terminate [the employee].” Kendrick,
220 F.3d at 1231; see also Shorter, 188 F.3d at 1209 (recognizing “it is the
manager’s perception of the employee’s performance that is relevant,” and “not
[the employee’s] subjective evaluation of [his] own relative performance” in
determining pretext) (quotation marks omitted). Thus, “[t]he relevant inquiry is
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not whether [the employer’s] proffered reasons were wise, fair or correct, but
whether [the employer] honestly believed those reasons and acted in good faith
upon those beliefs.” Bullington, 186 F.3d at 1318.
Mr. Halverson, the Director of Engineering, made the decision to fire Mr.
Guyton because he believed Mr. Guyton lacked proficiency in drafting parts for
the trucking industry and required substantial training on the drafting software.
Mr. Halverson solicited comments and feedback from Mr. Brown and Mr.
Lehman. According to Mr. Halverson, Mr. Brown told him that Mr. Guyton
lacked the ability to draft “basic mechanical things.” In addition, both parties
agree Mr. Lehman, who was personally familiar with Mr. Guyton’s drawings,
complained to Mr. Halverson about the quality of Mr. Guyton’s work and his lack
of drafting proficiency. Accordingly, the fact that Mr. Halverson consulted with
people familiar with Mr. Guyton’s work and received negative commentary,
suggests Mr. Halverson honestly believed his proffered reasons.
Mr. Guyton’s alleged aptitude simply does not show that when Mr.
Halverson decided to terminate him, Mr. Halverson did not honestly believe his
proffered reasons. Similarly, even if we assume Mr. Vasquez’s affidavit and
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deposition testimony are admissible, 4 the evidence attesting to Mr. Guyton’s
proficiency is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of
pretext. Mr. Vasquez neither reviewed Mr. Guyton’s drafting samples nor
possessed decisionmaking or supervisory authority over Mr. Guyton; thus, Mr.
Halverson did not ask for his opinion about Mr. Guyton’s technical ability to draft
parts for the trucking industry. This evidence suggests, at most, Ottawa Truck
may have unwisely discharged Mr. Guyton, but it fails to show Mr. Halverson
dishonestly fired him. See Bullington, 186 F.3d at 1318.
With this inquiry in mind, we examine Mr. Guyton’s three ancillary
arguments. He claims pretext is shown by: (1) his trainer, Mr. Brown, provided
him with positive feedback on his drafting; (2) he drafted “actual production
work,” rather than training exercises, during his first week at Ottawa Truck; and
(3) his mechanical drawings drafted while working for other employers. After
reviewing the record, we conclude this evidence does not preclude summary
judgment for Ottawa Truck because it, too, fails to establish Mr. Halverson did
4
Mr. Vasquez’s affidavit speaks to Mr. Guyton’s drafting proficiency in general,
conclusory terms. “While an affidavit is certainly an appropriate vehicle to establish a fact
for summary judgment purposes, the affidavit must set forth facts, not conclusory
statements.” Bancoklahoma Mortgage Corp. v. Capital Title Co., 194 F.3d 1089, 1101
(10th Cir. 1999) (addressing the summary judgment requirement that “facts” be
established by evidence that would be admissible at trial).
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not honestly believe his stated reasons for terminating Mr. Guyton. We address
each argument in turn.
First, Mr. Guyton’s claim the trainer provided him with positive feedback
fails to create a genuine issue of material fact that Mr. Halverson’s reasons for
firing him are pretextual. The record is replete with evidence the trainer was not
“the person making the decision to terminate” Mr. Guyton. See Kendrick, 220
F.3d at 1231. According to the trainer, he did not recommend Mr. Guyton’s
termination, and was unaware of Mr. Halverson’s decision to do so. In fact, he
was attending another meeting when Mr. Halverson announced his decision.
Thus, we must look at the facts as they appear to Mr. Halverson only, not the
trainer. Id.As noted above, Mr. Halverson did solicit the trainer’s assessment of Mr.
Guyton’s drafting abilities. Unlike the alleged positive feedback he gave to Mr.
Guyton, the trainer told Mr. Halverson “there were some basic mechanical things
that [Mr. Guyton] didn’t know how to draw.” In other words, drawing all
inferences in Mr. Guyton’s favor, the trainer provided positive feedback to Mr.
Guyton, but negative commentary to Mr. Halverson. However, the trainer’s
inconsistent feedback fails to cast doubt on Mr. Halverson’s honest belief in his
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reasons for firing Mr. Guyton because Mr. Halverson is “entitled to the
assumption that those people he did consult were telling the truth.” Rand v. CF
Indus., Inc., 42 F.3d 1139, 1145 (7th Cir. 1994) (acknowledging “[a]ny pretext
determination is concerned with whether the employer honestly believes in the
reasons it offers, not whether it made a bad decision.”) (quotation marks and
citation omitted).
We next examine Mr. Guyton’s argument that he allegedly handled
“production work,” rather than mere training exercises, during his first week of
work at Ottawa Truck. In essence, he suggests the trainer’s decision to assign
him production work demonstrates Ottawa Truck deemed him sufficiently
proficient and capable of drafting parts for the trucking industry on its software
without substantial additional training.
We disagree with Mr. Guyton’s contention Mr. Halverson’s reasons for
terminating him are pretext simply because his trainer assigned him production
work. As previously mentioned, the trainer was not the person who decided to
terminate Mr. Guyton. Accordingly, the trainer’s decision to assign Mr. Guyton
production work does not cast doubt on Mr. Halverson’s belief he lacked
proficiency and required substantial training. Moreover, Mr. Guyton admits in his
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deposition testimony the actual production drawings were drafted by someone
other than himself, and his job was simply to make “minor changes” to these
drawings. He never completed these minor changes because the computer
network malfunctioned; therefore, his changes were never reviewed by a
supervisor for “accuracy, content, completeness, clarity and [to] make sure that
[the drawing] was what it was supposed to be.” Thus, the trainer’s decision to
assign Mr. Guyton the task of drafting minor changes to pre-existing production
drawings, which were never reviewed by a supervisor, fails to show Mr.
Halverson did not honestly believe Mr. Guyton lacked drafting proficiency and
required substantial training.
Finally, Mr. Guyton submits three mechanical drawings to prove Mr.
Halverson’s reasons are pretext, and that he is, in fact, a proficient drafter. 5
These drawings, too, fail to create a genuine issue of material fact that Mr.
Halverson’s reasons for terminating him are pretextual.
5
At oral argument, Mr. Guyton’s counsel suggested a mechanical drawing that his
client allegedly produced while at Ottawa Truck recently surfaced and shows his
technical proficiency. However, this is nothing more than a passing comment; the
evidence was not before the district court, and is not before us now. See Thomas v.
Denny’s, Inc., 111 F.3d 1506, 1510 n. 5 (10th Cir.) (recognizing that raising an issue for
the first time at oral argument “comes too late.”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1028 (1977).
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The drawings lack probative value because Mr. Guyton’s affidavit and
attached resume reveal these drawings were created with the “Autocad” drafting
software, not the Computer Vision drafting software required by Ottawa Truck.
See Vitkus, 11 F.3d at 1539 (“Summary judgment may be granted if the evidence
is merely colorable or is not significantly probative.”). More importantly, it is
apparent Mr. Guyton produced these documents for employers not engaged in the
trucking industry, who presumably have different standards for drafting
proficiency than Ottawa Truck. A company must be allowed to judge for itself
whether an employee is proficient on its own software and in its industry; this
court is ill-suited to second guess such judgment based on three unrelated
mechanical drawings. See Kendrick, 220 F.3d at 1233 (recognizing a court must
not “act as a super personnel department that second guesses employers’ business
judgments”) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Different decisionmakers
are entitled to be concerned about different things. Just as we will not dictate
employment criteria to any company, we will not require separate decisionmakers
for different, albeit related, companies to use the same criteria.” Chapman v. AI
Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1031 n.21 (11th Cir. 2000). Even viewing this
evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Guyton, it fails to undermine Mr.
Halverson’s beliefs about Mr. Guyton’s drafting proficiency.
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2. Disparate Treatment
Having concluded the deposition, affidavit, and drafting sample evidence
fail to show Ottawa Truck’s proffered explanations for terminating Mr. Guyton
are false, we turn our attention to his claim he established pretext by presenting
evidence that he was treated less favorably than a white contract drafter.
The district court did not discuss whether the white employee is similarly
situated to Mr. Guyton. Pursuant to our de novo review, we conclude Mr. Guyton
raised the issue of the white employee’s differential treatment to the district court.
In Mr. Guyton’s response to Ottawa Truck’s motion for summary judgment, he
cites Mr. Vasquez’s affidavit as evidence a white drafter was “similarly situated”
to himself but treated differently. Mr. Vasquez’s affidavit states, “[s]hortly after
Mr. Guyton, was terminated, Ottawa Truck hired a Caucasian contract drafter
with no prior experience on the Computer Vision software program. This
Caucasian contract drafter was given much more training on this program than
was Mr. Guyton. The people training him included the chief engineer, Harold
King.” According to Mr. Guyton, the white drafter received preferential
treatment despite the fact that he “demonstrated no aptitude on the software
program” and “required significant hands-on training.” However, Mr. Guyton’s
assertion of disparate treatment does not create a genuine issue of material fact
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because he fails to present evidence that the white drafter is similarly situated to
himself.
An employee may “show pretext on a theory of disparate treatment by
providing evidence that he was treated differently from other similarly situated,
non-protected employees.” Kendrick, 220 F.3d at 1232; Gossett v. Oklahoma, No.
98-5084, 2001 WL 355846, at *2 (10th Cir. Apr. 10, 2001) (acknowledging
“[e]vidence sufficient to raise a fact issue on whether an [employer’s] proffered
explanation is pretextual may take a variety of forms, including evidence that the
[employer] treated the plaintiff differently from others who were similarly
situated, which we have held is especially relevant to a showing of pretext”). We
recognize “[a]n employee is similarly situated to the plaintiff if the employee
deals with the same supervisor and is subject to the same standards governing
performance evaluation and discipline.” Id. (quotation marks and citation
omitted). When determining whether Mr. Guyton is similarly situated to a
comparable employee, we “should also compare the relevant employment
circumstances, such as work history and company policy.” Id. We are also
mindful that “the failure of the plaintiff and affiant to share the same supervisor
does not preclude the consideration” of evidence when “the plaintiff contends he
is the victim of the discriminatory applicationn of a facility-wide [or company-
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wide] policy and has other evidence of that policy.” Id., at *3.
Mr. Guyton presented absolutely no evidence to indicate he and the white
drafter shared the same supervisor and trainers, and possessed comparable
drafting skills and proficiency in the trucking industry. Nor has he alleged
Ottawa Truck discriminated on the basis of race in applying a company-wide
“policy,” such as allowing a probationary period for contract drafters. See id., at
*3 (holding plaintiff alleged the school “routinely discriminated on the basis of
gender in applying its school-wide policy of allowing failing students to receive
incomplete grades and extra time to improve their performance”). Therefore, we
hold Mr. Guyton failed to show the white contract drafter was “similarly
situated”; the mere assertion of different treatment is insufficient to create a
genuine issue of material fact on the issue of pretext.
3. Circumstantial Evidence of Racial Animus
Finally, we examine whether Mr. Guyton’s additional circumstantial
evidence of racial animosity establishes pretext. Mr. Guyton contends racial
animus is demonstrable because “on the same day [Mr. Guyton] was terminated,
[Mr. King,] the chief engineer said that ‘We got rid of the nigger.’ This sort of
attitude and comment was consistent with management philosophy: [Mr.
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Guyton’s] supervisor and the Director of Engineering did nothing to stop,
discourage or report racial discrimination in the Engineering Department.” We
disagree with Mr. Guyton’s contention that this evidence is sufficient to suggest
Ottawa Truck’s reasons are pretextual.
“Language not amounting to direct evidence, but showing some racial
animus, may be significant evidence of pretext once [an employee] has set out the
prima facie case.” Jones v. Bessemer Carraway Med. Ctr., 151 F.3d 1321, 1323
(11th Cir. 1998); see also Shorter, 188 F.3d at 1209-10 (acknowledging
derogatory comments may serve as circumstantial evidence of discrimination).
After Reeves, we are mindful that these comments need not be made “in the direct
context” of the employee’s termination. 530 U.S. at 139. Moreover, Reeves
recognizes the person harboring racial animus need not be the actual
decisionmaker provided that the racially hostile individual is “principally
responsible” for the employee’s firing. 530 U.S. at 151; see also Kendrick, 220
F.3d at 1231 (recognizing other circuits’ caselaw that an employer “may be held
liable if the manager who discharged the [employee] merely acted as a rubber
stamp, or the ‘cat’s paw,’ for a subordinate employee’s prejudice, even if the
manager lacked discriminatory intent”). With these principles in mind, we
examine Mr. Guyton’s evidence of racial animus.
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Although the district court did not have the benefit of Reeves, its opinion is
not undermined by the Supreme Court’s decision. See 530 U.S. at 151. The
district court concluded “[t]here is no evidence ... that King had any input in [Mr.
Guyton’s] termination decision or that racial motivation for the decision existed
... [Mr. Guyton] has produced no evidence that King was involved at all in the
decision to terminate [him].” We agree with the district court and address the
issue in light of Reeves.
In this instance, Mr. Guyton’s circumstantial evidence of racial animosity is
insufficient to demonstrate pretext. Mr. Guyton merely attributes the racial slur
to Mr. King, notes the timing of the remark, and points out Mr. King’s job title as
chief engineer at Ottawa Truck. Presumably, Mr. Guyton recognizes Mr. King
did not actually fire Mr. Guyton, and instead is suggesting a person’s job title
alone is sufficient to establish the individual’s influence in the workplace.
Assuming this is Mr. Guyton’s argument, he misses the point.
A non-decisionmaking employee’s job title, without more, is insufficient to
establish the individual is “principally responsible” for the employee’s firing. Cf.
Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 221, 227-28 (5th Cir. 2000)
(recognizing the Director of Operations, who did not have the authority to fire
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plaintiff, acted as the “de facto decisionmaker” because he exerted great informal
influence over the actual decisionmaker when (1) he provided her with an
ultimatum that he would quit if she did not fire the plaintiff, and (2) his father
was CEO of the parent corporation). In this case, there is no evidence to
substantiate Mr. King was “principally responsible” for, or even involved with,
the decision to fire Mr. Guyton, or that he exerted any influence over the official
decisionmaker. Cf. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151; Russell, 235 F.3d at 227-28. After
thoroughly reviewing the record and construing the evidence and inferences in the
light most favorable to Mr. Guyton, we hold Mr. King’s racial slur, though clearly
reprehensible, does not evidence pretext.
Having concluded Mr. King’s racial epithet fails to show Ottawa Truck’s
reasons are pretextual, we now consider Mr. Guyton’s contention that Mr.
Halverson and Mr. Lehman’s tolerance of other employee’s racial slurs
establishes pretext. Mr. Guyton cites to both men’s deposition testimony, where
they acknowledged that the word “nigger” had been used in the engineering
department, but did not know how often or by whom the slur was spoken.
As we have already mentioned, the comments need not be made “in the
direct context” of the employee’s discharge. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151 (quotation
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marks omitted). However, Mr. Guyton fails to establish any context for these
remarks, and instead simply asserts these comments are typical of “management
philosophy.” It is obvious from the record that these alleged remarks are
unquantified, uttered by unknown employees, and occurred at some point in the
unspecified past. See Wixson v. Dowagiac Nursing Home, 87 F.3d 164, 171 (6th
Cir. 1996) (holding that the discharged employees failed to show pretext when
alleging numerous instances of disparate treatment and a hostile work
environment in conclusory terms with no reference to names, times and
occasions). Therefore, we conclude this evidence suffers fatal shortcomings, and
is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of pretext.
See id.Accordingly, we hold Mr. Guyton failed to present sufficient evidence
showing Ottawa Truck’s reasons for terminating him are pretext. We AFFIRM
the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Ottawa Truck.
Entered by the Court:
WADE BRORBY
United States Circuit Judge
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