United States v. Steffan ( 2003 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FEB 4 2003
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 01-3396
v. D.C. No. 00-CR-40095-02-RDR
(D. Kansas)
ERIC LEE STEFFAN,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, McKAY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. **
Defendant-Appellant Eric Lee Steffan appeals from his conviction and
sentence. Mr. Steffan’s counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967), and moves for leave to withdraw as counsel. For the
reasons set out below, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and dismiss the
appeal.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Mr. Steffan pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with the intent to
distribute 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing
methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. He was sentenced to 120
months’ imprisonment, to be followed by a five-year term of supervised release.
In this appeal, Mr. Steffan has responded to the Anders brief by filing a motion
seeking different appellate counsel. In that motion, he argues that (1) his guilty
plea was involuntary, (2) his sentence was improper, and (3) his counsel was
ineffective. We deny his request for different appellate counsel, but consider his
arguments in the context of this appeal.
We have fully examined the proceedings as required by Anders and
conclude that the appeal is without merit. First, the record shows that Mr.
Steffan’s guilty plea was voluntary. We ordinarily review the question of whether
the plea agreement was entered knowingly and voluntarily de novo, see United
States v. Rubio, 231 F.3d 709, 712 (10th Cir. 2000), but review for plain error
where a defendant does not move to withdraw his guilty plea before the district
court. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Vonn, 122 S. Ct. 1043, 1046
(2002); United States v. Schuh, 289 F.3d 968, 974 (7th Cir. 2002). The district
court informed Mr. Steffan in open court of the nature of the charge and the
maximum penalty (including the mandatory minimum which he received) and
instructed him as to the rights he was giving up by pleading guilty. See Aplt.
-2-
App. at 22-46 (transcript of plea hearing); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (necessary
disclosures to insure a voluntary plea).
Second, we have held that a district court can impose any sentence within
the applicable guideline range without entitling the defendant to withdraw the
guilty plea. United States v. Siedlik, 231 F.3d 744, 749 (10th Cir. 2000). In this
case, the district court’s sentence was neither contrary to law nor an incorrect
application of the sentencing guidelines; Mr. Steffan was sentenced at the low end
of the guideline range, consistent with the mandatory minimum. Mr. Steffan
appears to be claiming that the district court improperly relied upon “heresay
[sic]” in its determination that Mr. Steffan had 500 grams or more of
methamphetamine in his possession. Aplt. R. to Anders Br. at 1. To the extent
Mr. Steffan is rasing an evidentiary objection to the court’s finding, we reject his
argument on the ground that the rules of evidence do not apply to sentencing
hearings; the district court is allowed to consider all evidence that bears “a
minimum indicia of reliability.” United States v. Cruz Camacho, 137 F.3d 1220,
1225 (10th Cir. 1998). To the extent Mr. Steffan is arguing that his sentence is
improper because “there was [sic] no drugs in [his] possession,” Aplt. R. to
Anders Br. at 1, we review for plain error as no objection was made at the district
court. We note that a district court “may sentence the defendant based on the
total amount of drugs ‘which he reasonably foresaw or which fell within the scope
-3-
of his particular agreement with the conspirators.’” Cruz Camacho, 137 F.3d at
1225 (quoting United States v. Ivy, 83 F.3d 1266, 1289 (10th Cir. 1996)). The
PSR contains sufficient evidence of the requisite quantity of methamphetamine
among Mr. Steffan and his co-conspirators.
As to Mr. Steffan’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, we have
held that “[i]neffective assistance of counsel claims should be brought in
collateral proceedings, not on direct appeal. Such claims brought on direct appeal
are presumptively dismissible, and virtually all will be dismissed.” United States
v. Galloway, 56 F.3d 1239, 1240 (10th Cir. 1995). We therefore decline to
review the ineffective assistance claims here.
AFFIRMED. Counsel’s request to withdraw is GRANTED.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
-4-